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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The question mark of the project's title alludes to a critical reexamination of Soviet-
Iranian relations during the period and aims to offer an original contribution to 
scholarship in the field by exploring an aspect of Pahlavi foreign relations that lacks any 
detailed treatment in the literature presently available. In pursuit of this goal, research 
has been concentrated on recently-released western archival documentation, the Iranian 
Studies collection held at the University of St Andrews, and similarly materials from the 
Russian Federal Archive for Foreign Relations, to which the author was granted access, 
including ambassadorial papers relating to the premiership of Mohammad Mosaddeq. 
As far as can be ascertained, the majority of the Russian archival evidence presented in 
the dissertation has not been previously been utilised by any Western-based scholar. 
 
At core, the thesis argues that the trajectory of Pahlavi foreign relations specifically (and 
to a certain degree Mohammad Reza's regency more broadly) owed principally to a 
deeply-rooted belief in, and perceived necessity to guard against, the Soviet Union's 
(and Russia's) historical 'objectives' vis-à-vis Iran. While the Shah proved himself to be 
a very effective advocate of this approach, it is suggested that the importance attached 
to the spectre of Soviet interference cannot solely be explained as a means of leverage 
in relation to Iran's western allies, although at times it was undoubtedly used in this 
manner. Rather, the anxieties of Iranian politicians were the genuine consequence of a 
painfully proximate history, significantly reinforced by the unfortunate disconnect 
between public Soviet diplomacy towards Iran and the activities of various 'deniable' 
Communist elements operating both within and outwith Iran‟s borders.  
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OVERVIEW AND DOCUMENTARY SOURCES 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to offer a chronologically-presented, historical analysis of 
relations between Iran under the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. Accordingly, the period of research extends from 1941 – the 
Allied invasion of Iran and the abdication of Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza's 
father – to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The choice of timeframe, coinciding with a 
defined period of Iranian history as opposed to the lifespan of the Soviet Union, reflects 
both the supervisory framework for the project (under the auspices of the Institute for 
Iranian Studies in the University of St Andrews) and therefore the project‟s central 
concern: to complement existing scholarship on Pahlavi-era foreign policy, to which, it 
will be argued, elite perceptions of and interactions with Moscow were central. The 
principal objectives may be stated as follows: 
 
1. To draw together and analyse relevant bodies of documentary and archival 
evidence, complemented by other primary source materials, with a view to 
describing and assessing key Soviet-Iranian episodes and encounters during the 
period, both in their own right and for their relevance to the trajectory of Iran's 
relations with the other powers; 
2. Conversely, using the same methodology, to consider the impact of Western 
regional interests and broader political considerations on the Iranian leadership's 
attitudes toward the USSR, and the extent to which those considerations either 
reinforced, or caused the alteration of, the Iranian leadership‟s policy choices 
with respect to the USSR and more widely; 
3. To highlight, as broader observation, the potency of history, myth and historical 
consciousness in guiding and informing Iran‟s foreign policy during the period, 
and to emphasise more specifically that the perceived need to counter or 
accommodate the Soviet Union had a significant bearing on both the rise and 
indeed fall of the Pahlavi regime. 
 
It is necessary first to concede that a full discussion of the many possible episodes 
categorisable under the heading „Soviet-Iranian relations‟ over a period of thirty-eight 
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years would pose a significant challenge within the context of a doctoral dissertation. 
Accordingly, a case study-orientated approach is adopted. Each chapter presents four 
extended case studies offering an analysis of a particular event (or connected series of 
events), the selection criteria for which were governed in the first instance by the aims 
stated above, and in the second by a preference for episodes where the highest-quality 
documentary or primary source materials could be obtained. The latter criterium 
proceeds from the observation that existing scholarly literature on Soviet-Iranian 
relations exhibit a relative paucity of primary sources in addressing the topic; a 
deficiency by no means due to a lack of diligence on the part of the scholars involved, 
but rather from the handicap of certain documentary sources not having been available 
at their time of research.
1
 By fortunate contrast, this dissertation has benefitted 
extensively from archival research in a number of areas. First, all of the U.K. Foreign 
Office records relating to Soviet-Iranian relations during the period under review, with 
few exceptions, have now been released to the National Archive at Kew.
2
 Second, there 
exists a comparable availability of U.S. archival materials covering the majority of the 
period under study (to 1976), the most recent tranche of which was released in 
December 2012.
3
 Third, the author's successful application to the Russian Foreign 
Ministry for access to its closed Archive, including the opportunity to view papers not 
previously open to researchers outwith the former Soviet Union, furnished a number of 
crucial discoveries.
4
 The thesis makes further use of several political memoirs, in 
Persian and Russian, that do not previously appear to have attracted scholarly attention. 
 
In terms of source content, the core methodological challenges may be stated as, 
primarily, the need to draw a clear distinction between materials that were broadly 
private at their point of composition (namely the „closed‟ diplomatic documentary 
record) and those that were public (press articles, radio broadcasts political memoirs, 
official governmental communiqués or interviews); and more obviously, to identify and 
acknowledge the merits and demerits of each source. While separating rhetoric from 
                                                 
1  See for instance Shahram Chubin‟s monograph Soviet policy toward Iran and the Gulf (International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), which is principally based on contemporary media materials. 
2  The British government operates a thirty-year release policy in the majority of cases. 
3  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXVII: Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976.  
4  The folios relating to Mohammad Mosaddeq, for instance, appeared to have only been accessed by 
Foreign Ministry personnel and a single Azerbaijani scholar, Jamil Hasanli, who made only tangental 
use of them (referenced where appropriate.) 
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reality in the study of relations between states is a standard task for the historian, it 
holds particular importance for the present dissertation in approaching a relationship 
characterised by a significant degree of strain and emotional charge on the part of those 
involved. A basic distinction is therefore made that, whereas statements in the public 
arena (being directed towards a wider audience) display a tendency to highlight how 
actors on both sides desired relations to be perceived by a variety of audiences, the 
diplomatic record (being intended for an closed audience) may provide a more accurate 
insight into the actual status of relations. Such a distinction does not seek to imply, 
however, that „open‟ primary-source materials are inferior. Public rhetoric provides a 
rich repository of political narrative, and its importance during the period under review 
was considerable. It is furthermore clear that the vagaries and vicissitudes of private 
politics bore a strong relation to the character and intent of their public expression, of 
which broadcast or print media were the most prominent manifestation. It is worth 
emphasising in this connection that both governments exercised a high degree of control 
over their respective medias, whose services were frequently employed to send a 
message to the other side that may otherwise have been inadmissible within the 
framework of normal diplomatic exchange.
5
 Indeed, the British Foreign Office dossiers 
(and no less their Soviet equivalent) contain extensive collections of press clippings and 
news monitoring materials, which constitute an integral part of their reports on specific 
incidents.
6
 In short, while awareness of the distinction between the public and private is 
crucial, both are of benefit in providing a rounded appreciation of events. 
 
Press and Media Materials 
The greater part of the media evidence employed in this dissertation derives from the 
corpus of materials offered within the diplomatic records themselves. In terms of 
physical presence, this applies only to the British and Russian archives; published U.S. 
diplomatic materials frequently reference media items but do not reproduce them. A 
further and important difference between the British and Russian archives is that, 
whereas the British files intersperse press monitoring materials chronologically between 
diplomatic papers, the Soviet Foreign Ministry made use of a separate organisation 
                                                 
5 For the use of the media as an unofficial diplomatic channel, see: B. Rotheray, A History of BBC 
Monitoring. http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk/about_us/ (accessed 27.02.2013.) 
6 See e.g. files on the Niavaran Palace plot of 1965. National Archives, FO248/1608 and FO248/1609. 
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(Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union or TASS) to collate and translate relevant 
materials, which are presented as a separate file series. The Russian system is notably 
more comprehensive than the British, with a typical year yielding between five to six 
hundred pages of translations from Iranian newspapers. It was often the case that the 
Tehran TASS correspondent would sit in the Iranian parliament (Majles) press gallery 
and translate politicians' speeches verbatim for reference by the Embassy or Soviet 
Foreign Ministry, a practice that has afforded a number of illuminating insights. In 
instances where Western or Soviet press articles were identified to be of interest, the 
British Library's Newspaper Collection and its Russian equivalent (the National 
Library's Newspaper Division located in the Moscow suburb of Khimki) both proved 
useful resources.
7
 Finally, research undertaken in the open-source intelligence archives 
– namely the BBC's Summary of World Broadcast Service (SWB) and the U.S. 
Government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) – furnished additional 
translations of radio and television broadcasts, newspapers and periodicals, government 
statements and speeches by leading figures.
8
 
 
Despite constituting a useful primary source in their own right however, news materials 
cannot in themselves provide a comprehensive means for assessing government policy. 
Even in firmly state-controlled media environment, inferring a particular government's 
viewpoint through the prism of journalistic selection or interpretation poses two risks. 
First, it assumes that the viewpoint of the government in question was uniform and 
coherent. It frequently was not. And secondly, depending on a specific news source's 
proximity to ruling elites, its content may convey a stronger (or indeed weaker) 
impression than was in fact the reality. Soviet radio stations are a salient example of the 
latter challenge. In assessing their output, it is necessary to establish a distinction 
between „official‟ media outlets operating with official state sanction, whose 
programming tended toward more restrained rhetoric in reflecting the government line, 
and „public‟ radio stations (that is, those not ostensibly state-controlled and often 
operating from the communist periphery), which could afford to be a great deal harsher 
                                                 
7 For instance, the full text of the Soviet government's Note of protest to Iran following the departure of 
its delegation from Tehran in 1959 was reproduced in the Pravda newspaper (see Appendix.) 
8 Both organisations were formed during World War II with the aim of monitoring Japanese radio 
transmissions and subsequently expanded to serve a broader function.  
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in tone due to their deniable nature.
9
 Neither variety may be relied upon to furnish a full 
or accurate picture of underlying official attitudes. And as Soviet archival records 
demonstrate, the internal discussion of certain press articles that were ultimately 
withheld can be just as revealing as the content of those that were published.  
 
Archival Materials of the UK Foreign Office 
The archives of the Foreign Office (Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1968) are 
held at the United Kingdom's National Archives at Kew, and contain diplomatic 
correspondence both to and from the British Embassy in Tehran falling under the period 
of research. The central advantage of the material held by the Archives is their ability – 
in contrast to the published series
10
 - to add much greater depth on specific incidents, 
both quantitatively in terms of their volume and qualitatively through the inclusion of 
the differing perspectives, for instance memoranda of conversations with Iranian 
politicians or diplomats in other embassies and organisations. In addition, each set of 
Embassy correspondence contains the comments and minutes of the receiving Foreign 
Office department, providing further insight into official attitudes and setting the Soviet-
Iranian relationship in its wider regional and global context. Documentation from the 
British Embassy in Tehran and from the relevant government departments in London 
are available in full, except for a limited number of cases where documents retained 
under the Public Records Act (where disclosure is deemed prejudicial to the effective 
conduct of public affairs or detrimental to UK's national security interests.) In such 
cases, a researcher may submit a request for classification review under the Freedom of 
Information Act. Two such requests were made in the course of preparatory research, 
the first of which was successful (resulting in the release of Cabinet Office minutes 
from 1978) and the second of which was denied on the somewhat confusing basis that 
„disclosure could impact on the UK's international standing with the Soviet Union.‟11 
                                                 
9 The editor of Radio Peace and Progress (one such outlet broadcasting to Iran) claimed, for 
example, that the point of view of the station was that 'of our public.' See Open Society Archive: 
Radio Free Liberty Background Reports, HU OSA 300-8-3: Radio Peace and Progress, 8 July 
1970, p2. 
10   For part of the period covered by this thesis (1941-1965) there exist six volumes of Foreign Office 
correspondence from Iran, published as Iran Political Diaries (XI -XIV). A further thirteen volumes, 
entitled Iran Under Allied Occupation, cover developments in Iran during World War II specifically. 
11 E-mail to author from National Archives' Freedom of Information Assessor, 12 January 2012, 
regarding extract FCO 28/3872, Folio 16A: Relations between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. 
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With regard to Soviet-Iranian relations specifically, of particular value was the 
discovery that, for the majority of years covered by this dissertation, a series of folios 
were dedicated exclusively to political or commercial relations between Iran and the 
Soviet Union. Each volume comprised chronological reports on incidents of note, 
accompanied by the relevant documentary materials (for instance translations of Iranian 
or Soviet diplomatic notes) and press clippings where appropriate. Although these 
collections yielded a lesser volume of information between 1968 and 1972, most likely 
due to departmental reorganisation in the Foreign Office, a quantity of American 
archival material was fortuitously available to cover the period in comparable depth.
12
 
This exception notwithstanding, the archives provide an extraordinary wealth of 
material, shedding considerable light on the Iranian political climate in general and the 
relevance to it of Iran's relations with the USSR. In 1959, for example, the year of the 
Shah's secret and ultimately abortive attempt to conclude a Treaty of Non-Aggression 
with Soviet Union, there are over two hundred individual reports and documents.
13
 This 
embarrassment of riches called for a strict methodology in order to focus acquisition 
appropriately. It entailed, first, directing research toward specific Soviet-Iranian 
encounters on the case study basis outlined above. And second, the focussing of archival 
work predominantly toward the period from after 1958, that is, the latter half of the 
thesis. The rationale behind this approach was that, prior to 1958, the availability of 
published British document volumes (taken together with Iranian and Russian sources) 
were of sufficient quality to render additional quantities of archival material broadly 
unnecessary; whereas in later years the British materials serve as a useful, albeit far 
from neutral, counterweight to Soviet or U.S. viewpoints. 
 
U.S. Government Archival Materials 
The Foreign Relations of the United States series represents the U.S. government's 
official documentary record of foreign policy decision making. The original documents 
presented within individual volumes are drawn primarily from the State Department‟s 
archives but are widely supplemented by a range of other primary source materials, 
most prominently records from the Department of Defence, the presidential libraries, 
                                                 
12 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1968-1976, E-4, 1968-1972: Iran. 
13 The files are contained in FO 371/140797, FO 371/140798 and FO 371/140799. 
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the U.S. National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and so forth. The 
principles guiding the compilation and editing of the volumes were established under 
the Secretaryship of Frank Kellogg in 1925, which call for a comprehensive, unedited 
and objective record, in which „nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of glossing over 
what might be regarded by some as a defect in policy.‟ While these stated aims are 
ostensibly subject to a number of clear caveats, most notably „to avoid publication of 
matters that might impede current diplomatic relations‟; „to preserve the confidence 
reposed in the Department by individuals or foreign governments‟; and finally „to 
eliminate personal opinions presented in dispatches and not acted upon by the 
Department‟, in practice the documents exhibit a broad swathe of views, both 
consequential or otherwise, particularly on the part of those Iranian politicians with 
whom U.S. officials interacted; an important point of interest.
14
 The need to safeguard 
the conduct of present-day diplomatic relations, as in the case of the U.K. archives, is 
achieved by a release limitation of between eighteen and thirty-nine years, the average 
being thirty-two years.
15
 
 
The specific value of the FRUS series to this dissertation lay primarily in its 
chronological-organised presentation of selected correspondence between the U.S. 
Embassy in Tehran and the Department of State; diplomatic reports detailing the 
internal situation in Iran and recounting conversations with prominent government 
officials. In particular, and reflecting Iran's Cold War alignment, U.S. ambassadors 
enjoyed regular and preferential access to the Shah himself throughout the period. A 
second benefit is that, whereas the published series are intended to provide a record of 
U.S. relations with Iran as a whole, a considerable portion of the materials pertain either 
directly or indirectly to Soviet-Iranian relations. For the twelve year period 1964-1976, 
for instance, approximately one half of all published documentation on Iran (over two 
thousand pages in total) contains a reference to the Soviet Union or the threat of 
communism. A third advantage is that later volumes (from 1961 onwards) have visibly 
benefitted from wider access afforded to State Department historians by the CIA 
following a procedural review undertaken in 1991.
16
 The Foreign Relations series does, 
                                                 
14 See Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1942, Vol. IV, Preface, III 
15 Survey by author based on comparison between publication dates and document dates. 
16 See Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Near East; Iran; Iraq. Preface, V. 
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however, have one particular flaw from the standpoint of this thesis. Being a record of 
United States foreign policy, as opposed to of Soviet or Iranian foreign policy, a number 
of volumes naturally focus on broader U.S. strategy rather the specifics of local 
diplomacy. An example is the volume covering Iran from 1955 to 1957, which 
emphasises the development and execution of the Eisenhower Doctrine in the region 
and adopts this as its primary basis for document selection. Although the theme is of 
clear importance with respect to Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact, the focus reduces 
the space available for U.S. diplomatic reportage from Iran itself, including (by the 
editors' own admission) internal Department of State assessments, or details relating to 
policy execution.
17
 Fortunately, the level of detail available in other sources proved 
more than adequate to address this deficiency; the series overall offered invaluable 
insights into perceptions of the Soviet Union on the part of Iranian politicians, the 
consequences of those perceptions, and their impact on U.S. decision making. 
 
Soviet Foreign Ministry Archival Materials 
Prior to its recent refurbishment, a sign prominently positioned above the enquiries desk 
at the Russian Federal Archive for Foreign Affairs bore the following advice: „Enter 
quietly, speak carefully, ask for little, leave quickly.‟18  Although meant in jest, the 
instruction offers in fact a fair and accurate reflection on the experience that awaits 
visiting researchers, on whom the restrictions are both varied and inventive. In order to 
gain access, applicants must first submit their bone fides three months in advance to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with cover letter setting out, in precise detail, the 
topics and date ranges proposed for research. This task is impeded by the fact that 
information regarding the Archive's extent, organisation and holdings is not available 
publicly. Rather, only after having secured permission and gained access to the 
Archive‟s premises in Moscow may scholars consult the Archive's authoritative 
Spravochnik (Guide), which lays out, in a format that may be generously characterised 
as basic, the composition of the Ministry's sixteen miles of shelving, comprising over 
forty five thousand separate folios. Of the six divisions (razdel) from which the Archive 
is composed, three were relevant to the period under research: 
                                                 
17 See Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Near East; Iran; Iraq. Preface, IV 
18 Входи тихо, говори чѐтко, спроси мало, уходи быстро. 
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 Division I - the largest collection in the Archive, comprising records of the 
Ministry's country-specific referenturi („Desks‟ in Western diplomatic parlance); 
 Division II - records of individual Ministry departments (otdel), containing 
materials that fall within a particular Department's geographic remit and internal 
exchanges of correspondence between its staff; 
 Division III - records from the Secretariats of individual Foreign Ministers. 
 
Division I contained a single accumulative reserve on Iran, with records organised 
chronologically beginning in 1909. Individual years are divided into two folios, one half 
of which records official Soviet correspondence directed to the Iranian government via 
the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, and the second of which holds diplomatic notes and 
memoranda received from the Iranian Embassy in Moscow. Both halves proved 
immensely valuable both in bringing to light exchanges that Western diplomatic 
personnel were evidently unaware of and in recording the official Iranian standpoint on 
the certain episodes. Division I also offered an insight into internal debates within the 
Foreign Ministry itself, including in one fascinating instance the text of a proposed 
newspaper article, publication of which was evidently dropped amid concerns its release 
would create an „unfavourable atmosphere‟ for the Shah's visit to Moscow in June 1956. 
The polemic, excoriating Iran's decision to join the Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact, 
was entitled „Pie with an American Filling.‟19 Finally, in a breakthrough that required а 
separate excursion to Moscow and sustained diplomatic pressure, access was granted to 
the papers of Ivan Sadchikov, Soviet ambassador to Iran in the final year of Mohammad 
Mosaddeq's premiership, including memoranda of conversations with the Prime 
Minister himself. Findings from this documentation are presented in Chapter One. 
 
Of the source materials on offer from Division II, documentation was provided from the 
Near East Department's Press Division. These folios, as noted above, offer substantial 
quantities of news media reportage compiled by the Soviet press agency TASS, via its 
office based in Tehran during the period, the majority of which are Russian translations 
                                                 
19 АВПРФ, ф.94, оп.45, п.132, д.201-ИР: О размещении в печати статьи <<Пирог с американской 
начинкой.>> 15 May 1956 
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of articles and broadcasts from the Persian original. The compilations document official 
Iranian views on incidents of significance, and more specifically, collate evidence of the 
Iranian government's reaction to Soviet policy. This includes, in a number of important 
cases, the full text of Iranian diplomatic notes otherwise lost in alternative sources, in 
addition to speeches by Iranian politicians on Soviet-Iranian relations in the Majles and 
Senate and anecdotes from press conferences held by prominent Iranian officials. 
Finally, Division III held out the possibility of accessing the personal files of prominent 
personalities who had close dealings with Iran, including papers from the Secretariats of 
Vyacheslav Molotov and Sergei Kavtaradze, respectively Soviet Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (1939-1949; 1953-1956), and Assistant People‟s Commissar for Near East 
Affairs (1941-1944.) Of these, access was granted to Molotov's personal files only: 
permission to review Kavtaradze's files was refused on the grounds that the latter's 
famously unsuccessful mission to Iran in 1944 (to secure an oil concession for the 
Soviet Union) constituted an „economic‟ question, whereas the Ministry had only 
granted the author access to „diplomatic‟ materials. This setback notwithstanding, 
Molotov's files shed considerable light on the formulation of Soviet policy toward Iran 
in the 1950s (discussed in Chapter Two.) 
 
The disadvantages of working with the Foreign Ministry materials are several. Most 
obviously, aside from the difficulties of gaining access in the first instance, is the fact 
that visiting scholars are not permitted to peruse the Archive‟s holdings independently. 
Instead, having first ascertained from the Guide in which fund documents of interest 
might be located, an official request must be submitted, itemising the specific matters or 
events regarding which materials are sought. The number of requests that may feature 
on an order is ten, based on which a custodian of the Archive will themselves identify 
and locate „appropriate‟ documentation on the researcher's behalf. The time required for 
this process is four working days. Photocopying is permitted up to a maximum of 
twenty pages, a restriction which applies to the permission holder's field as a whole not 
to individual orders. Any copies of text required above this limit must be written out by 
hand. No photographic equipment is permitted in the reading room. These challenges 
called for a highly selective approach, and accordingly a number of specific episodes 
were chosen for research with the aim of addressing gaps in the Western diplomatic 
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record: 
 
1. Interactions between Soviet diplomatic representatives and the Iranian 
government officials during the final year of Mosaddeq's premiership; 
2. Internal Soviet reaction to Iran's decision to join the Baghdad Pact and the 
subsequent invitation of Mohammad Reza Shah to visit the Soviet Union; 
3. Exchanges between the Soviet Embassy in Tehran and the Iranian government in 
the final months before the Islamic Revolution. 
 
Although the difficulties described above precluded the possibility of gathering a larger 
body of evidence in the context of doctoral research, the documentation obtained, to the 
extent that acquisition was possible, has permitted a fresh evaluation of critical 
episodes, providing both a complement and counterweight to other archival materials 
available in the Western world. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial 
support of the Research Committee at the British Institute of Persian Studies for 
enabling these preparatory research trips to Moscow. 
 
Persian Language Sources 
The pursuit of archival research in Iran itself was impractical due to political 
considerations. Fortutuitously, Iranian diplomatic materials – often in the Persian 
original – are extensively reproduced in the British and Soviet sources and a substantial 
quantity of (internal) Pahlavi-era documents have been made available by the regime 
that overthrew it. Specifically, several volumes of documentation from the SAVAK 
archive (Pahlavi-era counterpart to the KGB formed in 1957) are devoted exclusively to 
Soviet-Iranian relations. Although the documents are neither systematically presented 
nor disinterestedly selected – their purpose partly being to show the ancien régime in a 
unfavourable light – the editorial bias does offer the positive benefit of highlighting 
facts that Western sources may have been inclined to suppress. This unique advantage is 
shared by another valuable collection, the Asnad-e Laneh-ye Jasusi („Documents from 
the Nest of Spies‟, being papers requisitioned by hardline students during the U.S. 
Embassy hostage crisis of 1979-1980), which preserve a number of fascinating 
documents that would otherwise be unavailable. A third Persian language primary 
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source has been the collected speeches of the Shah, in particular, speeches to Soviet 
politicians on state occasions. These offer a useful illustration of issues that were seen 
by the Iranian side as important, however, it is necessary to bear in mind that their 
warmth of tone belies the Shah‟s private views, which less official Iranian accounts 
suggest were somewhat more cynical. As the monarch stressed to his entourage on a trip 
to Moscow in 1965: 
 
“If you want something, like bananas for example, just mention it aloud in your 
room. Generally there are microphones hidden in the walls and the next day, if 
not sooner, your wishes are granted. I experienced it myself, on my first visit to 
Russia [in June 1956], I felt like having a banana and wished for it aloud. There 
was no one in my room, but the next morning a banana was on the table.”20 
 
The survey of documentary resources has been complemented by the opportunity, on 
two separate occasions in Switzerland, to conduct interviews with Mr. Ardeshir Zahedi 
(Foreign Minister of Iran, 1968-1972 and latterly Iranian Ambassador to the United 
States.) Mr. Zahedi kindly provided a copy of his Persian memoirs, which afforded 
some unique perspectives albeit these cannot be accepted uncritically due to their 
author‟s close personal association with the Shah. A second and invaluable resource has 
been the wide variety of Persian-language materials available at the University of St 
Andrews as part of the Iranian Studies Collection. Of particular benefit were the 
memoirs and biographies of some prominent and lesser-known Tudeh (Communist) 
party members. One such source, a recent interview by an Iranian historian with former 
Tudeh party activist Abdollah Argani, has shed critical light on a particular case study 
(the assassination attempt on the Shah in February 1949.) Finally, a number of Iranian 
political histories have offered greater detail on specific areas where the Western 
diplomatic record is insufficiently comprehensive. Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam‟s 
delegation to Moscow in 1946 and Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq‟s speeches in the Majles 
are two such examples used in this thesis. 
 
 
                                                 
20
 F. Sepahbody: Accompanying the Shah on a trip to Communist Russia in The Iranian, 25 April 2003 
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INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
„Let us not forget that the roots of human action are, as a rule, countlessly more  
intricate and varied than we may later seek to explain them,  
and rarely clearly delineable.‟ 
 
- DOSTOEVSKY, THE IDIOT 
 
It is a readily observable feature of history that there exists a pronounced tendency, 
among a variety of actors, to ascribe or infer certain immutable characteristics to 
political entities: to reify the state.
1
 The potential pitfalls of such a proclivity, however, 
do not lie solely in the reductionism it implies. Indeed, proponents of the unitary state-
as-actor in international relations theory have advanced persuasive models to explain 
why states do often behave in a coherent and unified fashion.
2
 At issue rather, is that the 
formation and perpetuation of political narratives, by acting as a collective constraint on 
those who subscribe to them, may create a reality capable of enduring independently of 
changes in circumstance. When this perceived „reality‟ acts to structure 
(mis)understanding both of the state and of the individuals from whom it is composed, 
the conduct of that state‟s affairs or the specifics of its diplomacy are prone to be viewed 
in an equally prescriptive manner; inaccurately and, more often than not, unfavourably. 
As Muriel Atkin has pointed out in her interrogation of the myths in Soviet-Iranian 
relations, the imputation to Tsarist, Soviet and indeed modern Federal Russia of „quasi-
instinctual obsessions‟ – originating in Peter the Great's alleged ambition to secure a 
warm water port on the Persian Gulf – to a significant degree shaped both Pahlavi 
policy making toward the USSR and Western assessments of the same.
3
 In common 
with the several political myths upon which Pahlavi state-building was predicated, the 
Soviet threat provided a very real reference point against which the Iranian elite could 
situate its genesis, justify its continuance and frame its policies.
4
 Ardeshir Zahedi, 
                                                 
1 As Graham Allison has pointed out apropos the Cuban missile crisis „treating national governments as 
if they were centrally coordinated, purposeful individuals provides a useful shorthand for 
understanding policy choices and actions.‟ G. Allison, Essence of Decision (1999 second edition), p3 
2 See 'State as a Person' in the Review of International Studies, Volume 30, Issue 2 (2004), pp255-316. 
3 Muriel Atkin (1990) Myths of Soviet-Iranian Relations in N. Keddie and M. Gasiorowski (eds.): 
Neither East nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union and the United States, p111. 
4  The term „myth‟ is used throughout in this thesis to denote the political utility of historical 
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Foreign Minister of Iran from 1968 to 1972 and whose membership of the Pahlavi elite 
spanned some four decades, perhaps captures this procedure most clearly in his 
rationalisation of the 1953 coup against Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq: 
 
„The most important thing of all was the danger of communism. The Tudeh 
[Iranian communist party] was becoming stronger by the day and had also 
infiltrated the army and security forces. Later we saw just how close they had 
come to a coup d‟etat and seizing power; even several officers close to my father 
[General Fazollah Zahedi, Prime Minister of Iran following the 1953 coup] had 
become members of Tudeh. If the 27
th
 of Mordad [19
th
 of August 1953] had not 
happened, the Tudeh would easily have got rid of Mosaddeq, just as the 
communists had got rid of Edvard Beneš in Czechoslovakia a few years earlier.‟5 
 
As will be evidenced throughout this dissertation, the myth of Soviet territorial 
pretension was a thesis to which senior Iranian politicians not only subscribed, but of 
which they were immensely successful proponents. The Shah's brand of nationalism, as 
Ramazani has argued, was broadly inseparable from the threat of Soviet imperialism.
6
  
 
Iranian conviction in the immutability of Russian „objectives‟ was paralleled by the 
similarly fixated nature of Russian attitudes toward Iran, which exhibited considerable 
continuity between the Tsarist government and its revolutionary successor. In particular, 
while the prevalence of „orientalist‟-type perceptions among Tsarist officials has already 
been established, the degree and virulence with which such views persisted in private 
under Soviet rule was equally notable.
7
 In the writings of Ivan Sadchikov (Soviet 
Ambassador to Iran 1947-1953), for instance, Mohammad Mosaddeq is presented to 
Moscow as the architypal „wiley‟ Iranian, whose untrustworthiness and not infrequently 
                                                                                                                                               
consciousness. For Iranian leaders, enduring „truths‟ in respect of Russia may be said to have held an 
immediacy and relevancy that could be brought to bear on the present, whose perceived realities 
tended to strengthen the underlying narrative. For the relationship of myth-making to existential 
threats, see Ricoeur, Myth as the Bearer of Possible Words in A Ricoeur Reader, 1991, p484. 
5  Khåteråt-e Ardeshir Zåhedi (Memoirs of Ardeshir Zahedi), Vol. 2, p196. For an account of Edvard 
Beneš‟ fate, see E. Táborský, Beneš and The Soviets in Foreign Affairs, 27 (1948-1949), p302. 
6 R. Ramazani (1975): Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973, p440. 
7  Said‟s critique of orientalism identifies a mode of thought that suggests an „enduring reality‟ and that 
gave rise to a discourse justifying Western control of the orient. E. Said (1995), Orientalism, p333. 
See F. Kazemzadeh: Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism (passim.) 
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bewidering „histrionics‟ merited a dismissive, unconstructive and ultimately obstructive 
policy response; a tendency by no means confined to Soviet officialdom.
8
 A particularly 
striking example can be found the memoirs of Soviet Foreign Minister Alexei Gromyko, 
whose brief verdict on the twenty-two years of Pahlavi-Soviet relations over which he 
presided opens with the following: 
 
„A number of times a swarthy individual, of not great height, came to visit 
Moscow. Having become acquainted with him a little more closely, it was 
possible to discern that he was educated. Over the course of several decades he 
determined not only the internal, but also the external policy of Iran, our 
neighbour. This was the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi [who] ascended 
the thrown in 1941 after his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi, abdicated: the Majlis had 
selected him for the Iranian throne following the internal upheaval of 1925 [sic], 
as a result of which the country became a petty-burgeois dictatorship.‟9 
 
An unhelpful adjunct to prevailing official attitudes were the constraints to which senior 
Soviet personnel on the ground in Iran (themselves often not specialists in the region) 
found themselves subject, and which arguably diminished their access to, and thus 
ability to adequately understand, Iran's elite and broader society.
10
 On one revealing 
occasion, in 1973, the First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy openly lamented his lack of 
access to the Iranian government beyond formal contacts with the Foreign Ministry and 
asked his U.S. counterpart whether he might consider including him on cocktail party 
invitations.
11
 Although the KGB undoubtedly enjoyed its occasional successes in 
developing highly placed contacts, the range of official or even extra-official Iranian 
contacts emerge from Russian sources as surprisingly limited: a sympathetic bureaucrat 
                                                 
8  In 1974 for instance, the American ambassador to Iran, reporting on Iranian reaction to delays in the 
delivery of U.S.-manufactured weaponry, reassured his superiors that „Iranians are quick to perceive a 
conspiracy […] we are dealing here with Oriental thought-processes [sic].‟ Foreign Relations of the 
United States (hereafter „FRUS‟), 1969-1976, Vol. 27: Backchannel Message, 4 September 1974 (1).  
9 A. Gromyko, Pamyatnoe, Vol. II, p176. The analysis is at best disingenuous. See Ervand Abrahamian, 
(1982), Iran between Two Revolutions, pp116-7. 
10 See O. A. Westad (2005), The Global Cold War, p70-1. Westad argues that, following the Sino-Soviet 
debacle of the 1950s, more experienced diplomats became a 'lost generation', sidelined in favour of a 
younger cadres with little experience abroad. For restrictions on Soviet personnel in Iran, see S. 
Khrakhmalov (2000), Memoirs of a Military Attaché, p170-1. See also Asnad-e Laneh-ye Jasusi 
(Documents from the Nest of Spies), Vol. 48, Memorandum of Conversation, 3 April 1978, pp72-3. 
11 Asnad-e Laneh-ye Jasusi, Vol. 47, Memorandum of Conversation, 9 April 1973, §3, pp52-3. 
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visiting the Soviet cinema; a low-ranking Majlis deputy; popular wisdom from 
tradesmen in the bazaar.
12
 Moreover, Moscow would often peremptorily require 
termination of contact with „interesting‟ people on the grounds that they were suspected 
as SAVAK agents.
13
 Nor was the dearth of information implied by these challenges a 
phenomenon limited to Soviet officials. Until modest numbers of Iranians began to 
receive technical training in the Soviet Union from the mid-1960s, experience of the 
USSR was in effect confined to carefully stage-managed official visits, invariably 
complemented by relaxing diversions to the USSR's top beauty spots.
14
 Meanwhile, the 
coverage enjoyed by officialdom and the Iranian public alike with respect to their 
northern neighbour was distinctly bipolar in nature. On one side of the divide stood 
Soviet Embassy-sponsored pamphlets and newspapers, which, complemented by the 
strenuous exertions of clandestine radio, extolled the achievements of the Soviet people 
and the disinterested character of socialist assistance to developing nations.
15
 In turn, 
the Iranian government press sought to counter the effects of Soviet propaganda by 
presenting its readership with a singularly unsympathetic portrayal of life across the 
border – a „scorching hell.‟16 
 
As such accounts suggest, a central feature of Soviet-Iranian relations during the period 
under review was the persistency of its narratives, exacerbated by their resistance to re-
interpretation, mutually reinforcing character and political efficaciousness. In the 
context of the period under review, these observations were first and foremost true of 
the Shah's personal fixation with Soviet „objectives‟, rooted in the Azerbaijan crisis of 
1946 that appeared to evidence them so unambiguously and which had – in common 
with the premiership of Mohammad Mosaddeq – posed the gravest challenge to royal 
                                                 
12 For the successes and failures of Soviet espionage in Iran, see G. Khazhakyan (2010): Breaking Cover 
– Undercover Agents Gevork and Gohar Vardanyan (in Russian); Foreign Intelligence in Post-War 
Iran in Essays on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence (in Russian), Vol. 5, 1945-1965, p378-9; 
V. Vinogradov (1998), Diplomacy: People and Events (in Russian), p391. 
13 See S. Khrakhmalov (2000), Memoirs of a Military Attaché (Russian source), pp25-6. 
14 For evidence of the latter point, see Soviet Foreign Ministry‟s complaint to officials in Yalta that the 
royal entourage's „no doubt relaxing‟ cruise on the Black Sea had overrun by three days. АВПРФ 
(Foreign Affairs Archive of the Russian Federation), ф.94, оп.45., п.131, д.6. 
15 Khrushchev argued that the economies of countries such as Iran were 'subordinated to the mercenary 
interests of foreign monopolies' and that their industrialisation was being 'deliberately impeded.' See 
his speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 1960 (Official Record, 15
th
 Session, pp68-84.) 
16 See Soviet TASS translation of article series in Tehran-e Mosavvar newspaper: Chapter One, n91. 
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prerogatives.
17
 Indeed, Soviet support for separatist movements in Tabriz and Mahabad 
during World War II may be said to have painfully tested not only the internal coherence 
of Iran as a polity, but Iran as a concept in its own right. The Shah felt a personal weight 
of responsibility to restore the glories of Iran's ancient civilisation against this fragile 
and humiliating background.
18
 From the Soviet side, a comparable conviction persisted 
that the Shah‟s „royal camarilla‟ was straightforwardly complicit in the historic mission 
of  the USSR‟s enemies to threaten its periphery and proscribe its economic presence in 
the Middle East.
19
 It also emerges strongly from the Soviet archival evidence that a 
popular narrative – though not necessarily always the dominant one – remained firmly 
convinced in the USSR‟s internationalist mission to extricate countries such as Iran 
from the predations of neo-imperialism, and that Soviet aid thereby stood in positive 
contrast to Western „assistance‟ whose sole purpose was „to strengthen the shameful 
colonialist condition of countries in the region.‟20  
 
On the basis of the foregoing observations, the theoretical framework for this thesis 
fundamentally argues for a conception of statehood that recognises the centrality of 
historical experience in diplomacy. Its methodology differs in this respect from that 
offered by Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih in their analysis of Soviet-Iranian 
relations, which places its primary emphasis on „the content and outcome of foreign 
policy rather than on the perceptions, motivations and decision-making process giving 
rise to it.‟21 The approach offered here, by contrast, aims to describe the Soviet-Iranian 
relationship as a product of its causes rather than its effects. It concurs substantially with 
Ramazani's plea for historical context in the study of foreign policy; that detailed, 
chronologically-framed, empirical source work constitutes a complement to the work of 
theorists, not its antithesis.
22
 With respect to the theories themselves, such an approach 
purposefully resists the temptation to analyse the Soviet-Iranian relationship through 
                                                 
17 See A. Ansari (2012), The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran, p132-3. For archival evidence of 
the tussle for constitutional supremacy between the Shah and his Prime Minister in 1953, and the 
Majlis' unsuccessful attempts to reconcile the two sides, see conversation between Soviet Ambassador 
and Deputy Rafi'i in АВПРФ, ф.094, о.65, п.403, д. № 033, л.83: Record of Conversation, 6 April 
1953. See also Iran Political Diaries, Vol. 14: Iranian Political Trends from the Departure of the 
British Legation to the End of the Iranian Year, March 20, 1953, p11. 
18 R. Ramazani, op. cit., p439. 
19  See A. Gromyko, op. cit., p198  
20  Soviet government‟s draft note to the government of Iran, 6 January 1956 (see Chapter Two.)  
21 S. Chubin and S. Zabih (1974): The Foreign Relations of Iran, p10. 
22 R. Ramazani (1975): op. cit., p20. 
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any particular conceptual prism; rather, an attempt is made to demonstrate that, whilst 
individual theories hold considerable explanatory power, no single framework is 
sufficient or satisfactory in isolation.  Thus, realism (most visibly the Shah‟s build-up of 
military power in order to „deter‟ the Soviet Union in what he viewed as an anarchic 
international context exacerbated by the complacency of the West), institutionalism 
(discernable in the rational, mutually self-interested improvement of economic and 
political relations between both parties in spite of broader disagreements and the 
sharpness of public rhetoric), liberalism (demonstrably neither regime was an 
inpenetrable „black box‟ but rather a shifting configuration individuals and private 
groups representing the interests of a particular subset of society), and constructivism 
(fundamentally witnessed in the less tangible cocktail of historical sensitivities, myth 
and belief systems that characterised and to varying degrees structured the actions of 
both regimes); all these are salient and applicable to the period under review.
23
 To the 
extent, however, that this thesis questions – although it does not reject – rational actor 
theories and chooses to emphasise the ontological anxieties of leaders and human 
motivations as the primary determinant of their actions, its approach and conclusions 
hold more in common with the latter two theories than the former, notwithstanding the 
apparently „realist‟ presentation of several episodes surveyed. 
 
Three issues will be explored by this introduction with a view to building on the above. 
First, in surveying a key debate in international political theory regarding the 
relationship between structure and agency (whether greater explanatory power is 
afforded by envisaging „the state‟ as the sum of its parts or as „a whole‟ that governs its 
constituent elements) an argument is made for the ascendancy of personal agency within 
Soviet-Iranian relations but exercised within the structural restraints of circumstance 
and domestic prerogatives: leaders make history, to paraphrase Marx, but rarely on their 
own terms.
24
 Secondly, an attempt is made to assess the notion of rationality in 
international politics, namely, the widespread claims of individual actors (or indeed 
states) to „rational‟ conduct, and their similarly notable disposition to identify 
„irrational‟ behaviour in others. The outcome in turn is to emphasise the role of 
                                                 
23 A. Slaughter (2011): International Relations, Principal Theories in R. Wolfrum (Ed.), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of International Public Law. 
24 K. Marx (1851): The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Boneparte, p3. 
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perception (and misperception) in decision making, and to argue for an understanding of 
„state‟ behaviour as the complex product of individual competition and often conflicting 
priorities: the fine line between rationality and incomprehensibility may be profitably 
interpreted as a function of viewpoint.  Finally, and connectedly, an attempt is made to 
describe and evidence the impact of emotion in diplomacy and its role in shaping and 
developing the political myths that arise from historical experience.  
 
Structure and Agency  
  At the core of the tendency to reify the state, outlined above, lies a temptation to adopt 
structure as a starting point for judgements about their constituent parts. Attribution of 
intentionality to the whole – „the Soviets did x‟ – thus effaces to some degree the 
complexity and internal controversy that may have lain behind any individual decision. 
A striking illustration of this point is provided in a remarkable letter from Joseph Stalin 
to Ja'far Pishevari, the leader of the successionist Azerbaijan Democratic Party during 
World War II. Writing shortly after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, Stalin 
appraised a clearly disillusioned Pishevari of his reasoning, namely that „the presence of 
Soviet troops in Iran undermine the basis of our liberationist policy in Europe and Asia 
[…] if Soviet forces can remain in Iran, then why should not British forces remain in 
Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, Greece – and the Americans in China, Iceland and Denmark?‟25 
The passage suggests that the Soviet occupation of northern Iran was not the 
unequivocal examplar of Russian expansionism apparently witnessed. Indeed, the 
evidence assessed in Chapter One of this thesis suggests that Stalin‟s (undeniable) 
instigation of Pishevari‟s movement was primarily attributable to its utility as economic 
leverage. Nikita Khrushchev subsequently upbraided Stalin and Molotov for their 
handling of the crisis and its consequences. Addressing the Communist Party Central 
Committee in June 1957, Khrushchev noted: „“We poisoned the Persians' mood. Their 
Shah […] says he cannot forget what we wanted to do. And who was in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs? I can't remember, but Molotov was one of Stalin's chief foreign policy 
advisers.”‟ Molotov retorted, perhaps accurately, that: „“It wasn't my suggestion.”‟26 
 
                                                 
25 The letter, held in Russia's State Archive for Foreign Relations (ф.6, с.7, оп.34, д.544, л.8-9) was first 
identified by Natalya Yegorova. See The Iranian Crisis, 1945-1946: Newly Declassified Archival 
Materials in the Russian journal Новая и новейшая история, 1994, № 3. 
26 See Yakovlev, A. N. (Ed.): Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957 (in Russian), p532. 
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The theme of shifting and indeed competing bureaucratic priorities within the Soviet 
government has been explored by Galia Golan.
27
 The central insight, which can be 
witnessed at several junctures in the history of Soviet relations with Iran, is that the 
nominally pyramidal nature of Soviet power – with the Party as a „superstructure‟ 
reflecting and channeling the will of the proletariat – in practice gave rise to a parallel 
system of governance.
28
 In theory, each government structure involved in foreign policy, 
mostly obviously the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Trade and the KGB, was 
controlled by the relevant political branch of the Central Committee, to which it 
submitted proposals for action and to whose recommendations it deferred. In practice, 
the relationship between these bureaucracies and their political masters was far from 
harmonious, and policy often resulted from negotiation and compromise between 
them.
29
 The picture is further complicated by the influence of parastatal actors in Soviet 
foreign policy such as the various academic institutes established by the Central 
Committee under the USSR Academy of Sciences umbrella, and whose members often 
assumed crucial roles that cut across the responsibilities of other, more „official‟ 
channels. In the Soviet-Iranian context this situation is exemplified by Yevgeny 
Primakov‟s frequent involvement in intelligence missions in the 1970s and as a key 
negotiator in the Middle East, for example with the K.D.P. in Iraqi, despite his official 
title of Deputy Chairman of the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations.
30
 Finally, it is clear that some Soviet actors, notably KGB agents within Iran, 
were often a law unto themselves. While the ideological pronouncements of their 
political superiors may have served as the cue and framework for their activities, no 
hard evidence exists that the more dramatic attempts at interpreting them – including 
indirect KGB involvement in at least one assassination attempt on the Shah (discussed 
in Chapter One below) – resulted from any direct order, and indeed, were a source of 
considerable embarrassment to their diplomatic colleagues.  
 
A further, important consideration with respect to Soviet foreign policy, and also 
                                                 
27 G. Golan (1990), Soviet Policy Making in the Middle East: from World War Two to Gorbachev 
28 Ibid., p5-6  
29 See, for example, the internal debate regarding Iran‟s adherence to the Baghdad pact, below p84-85   
30 Prior to taking up the position, Primakov (a fluent Arabic speaker) was special Middle East 
correspondent for Pravda, in which capacity, according to one Russian scholar of the period, he 
became „virtually the representative of […] the Central Committee‟ in the region. See: R. A. 
Medvedev (2013): Post Soviet Russia: A Journey Through the Yeltsin Era.  
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highlighted by Golan, is posed by internal divisions regarding the Soviet Union‟s role 
vis-à-vis the Third World. Indeed, competing narratives within the Soviet elite were of 
particular relevance to the early 1970s and the Shah‟s response to perceived Soviet 
expansionism in the Middle East prompted by the departure of the British. In that 
context, Brezhnev‟s notion of the „divisibility‟ of détente with the West – the claim that 
peaceful coexistence with the West was not incompatible with support for revolutionary 
movements in areas of Soviet interest or more widely – can be viewed as reflecting 
three factors: first, a desire not to „lose the initiative‟ in the Third World to other, more 
radical actors (in particular the Chinese
31
) and deflect the criticism of others (notably 
Cuba) for lack of leadership; secondly, and more obviously, the intensely competitive 
approach of the U.S. toward the region; and thirdly, a desire not to alienate those  of the 
regime (namely the military) with a vested interest in maintaining Soviet power 
projection or who opposed détente on ideological grounds.
32
 The practical result of 
détente‟s „divisibility‟, at least prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was arguably 
a significant dualism in Soviet policy. On the one hand, rhetoric toward and in several 
instances active assistance for „national liberation‟ movements in what may be termed 
the „arms-length‟ Third World – areas of strategic interest as bargaining chips versus the 
U.S. or for their naval facilities but not of crucial military significance – the Horn of 
Africa and Yemen being good examples.
33
 And on the other hand, a notably more 
restrained and cautious policy toward the „near‟ Middle East, where a desire not to 
provoke an increased Western presence (or invasion) and maintain Soviet influence, 
preferably at minimal cost, took precendence over ideological aspirations. The latter 
tendency is clearly visible in the rhetoric of détente „doves‟ Kosygin and Andropov, 
whose efforts to promote a less confrontational approach toward Iran and restrain the 
more narrow revolutionary tendencies of their colleagues are discussed in chapter four 
and the conclusion of this dissertation, respectively. 
 
Whilst the existence of competing power structures and priorities within the Soviet state 
                                                 
31 See for instance Chinese involvement in Oman with the PFLO in 1971. S. Page (1985), The Soviet 
Union and the Yemens: Influence in Asymmetrical Relationships, p113; and J. E. Peterson, Guerilla 
Warfare and Ideological Confrontation in the Arabian Peninsula, World Affairs, Vol. 139, No. 4 
(Spring 1977), p289, n43. 
32 G. Golan, op. cit., p24-25 
33 W. Andersen (1984): Soviets in the Indian Ocean: Much Ado about Something – But What? in Asian 
Survey, Vol. 24, No. 9 (Sept. 1984), p926 
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are now widely appreciated and explored in the literature, however, it is important to 
note that such analyses are post hoc, drawing on archival materials and personal 
accounts that were not available to the actors involved. Similarly, whereas the archival 
evidence surveyed in this dissertation reveals the often florid internal debate and 
individual idiosychrasies that underlay Soviet foreign policy, such nuances would not 
have been obvious to Iranian politicians at the time. In fact, arguably the reverse was 
true; the Shah's personal disposition toward identifying conspiracies was actively 
supported through weekly briefings provided to him by the CIA and MI6.
34
 The 
inevitable focus therefore on the manifestations of Soviet decision making – that is, on 
the assortment of verbeage and action that apparently constituted Soviet policy toward 
Iran – suggested continuities and tended to diminish the ways in which power might 
have been manipulated or exercised within those structural contraints of the communist 
state.
35
 For the Shah and those around him, invectives against the U.S. presence in Iran 
and Soviet actions in the wider region were neither conditioned by circumstance nor the 
result of conflicting bureaucratic and political priorities but rather symptomatic of a 
broader structure. The mix of policies resulting from the détente‟s „divisibility‟ acted to 
reinforce a perception of the Soviet Union as a fundamentally expansionist state, which 
in teurn served as a prism through which to interpret the behaviour of its constituents.
36
 
In sum, the „collective illusion‟ of the Soviet state acting, to borrow Robert Gilpin's 
phrase, was real and immediate for the Pahlavi elite.
37
  
 
If however, the Iranian and Soviet elites saw the relationship between the state and its 
leaders as „mutually constitutive‟ they had good reason to do so.38 To the extent that the 
leaders of both states exhibited an ability to channel the behaviour of members towards 
a certain goals, the equation of personality with policy was an understandible conceit. In 
this regard Stalin's letter to Pishevari recalls Ernst Gellner‟s description, writing on the 
emergence of nationalism, of the state as being created „suitable for the conditions 
                                                 
34 A. Milani (2011), The Shah, p363 and p475, n36-37. 
35 D. Dessler, What's At Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate? in International Organization and Global 
Governance ed. Kratochwil & Mansfield, 1994, p391. 
36 A. Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory in International 
Organisation, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1987, p337. 
37 R. Gilpin, The Richness of the Tradition of Politcal Realism in R. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and Its 
Critics, p318 
38 A. Wendt: op. cit., p305 
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prevailing.‟39 To the extent that political actors may trim their sails to circumstance, the 
role of agency, even when faced with what Engels has identified as „uncontrolled forces 
[...] more powerful than those that are planned‟, often survives undiminished.40 The 
history of Iranian-Soviet relations is replete with circumstances that have disposed their 
respective politics, often in the most unpromising of circumstances, to the critical 
agency of individuals.
41
 And indeed, leaving aside what Brezhnev generously styled the 
two states' „differing assessments of international life‟, through their common drive to 
impose political conformity – both among their elites and in society more broadly – 
both Soviet and Iranian leaders may be rightly said to have, following Foucault, to have 
governed by structuring the possible field of action for others; the state was an 
instrument at the disposal of the ruling elite.
42
 Membership of the Pahlavi or Soviet elite 
entailed acceptance of an obligation to act jointly on behalf of collective beliefs, 
irrespective of whether one privately subscribed to them or not intellectually.
43
 And as 
the Shah once instructed his ambassador in Washington to maintain, „there are no 
intellectuals in Iran; these are all Marxists.‟44 
 
Yet neither Soviet nor Iranian leaders were themselves entirely free agents. As Gramsci 
recognised, if the state is defined in terms of the administrative coercion at the disposal 
of the ruling class, then the basis of that coercion must be accounted for, as manifested 
in the constituent institutions through which the hegemonic order is perpetuated. 
Leaders and elites cannot survive in isolation from their social underpinnings and the 
social structure of their state.
45
 Domestic prerogatives undoubtedly governed the Shah's 
decision to assume ownership of the White Revolution‟s land redistribution programme 
                                                 
39 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, p48. See also Machiavelli‟s advice of „matching actions to the 
conditions of the times.‟ J. Atkinson and D. Sices: op. cit., pp134-36. 
40 Quoted in David Cooper (2002): World Philosophies, p342. 
41 D. Byman & K. Pollack, Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In, 
International Security 25:4 (2001), p160. 
42 A. Callinicos, Making History, p24. For Brezhnev's 1963 state visit to Iran, see Chapter Three. See 
also analysis in Laneh-ye Jasusi, Vol. 7, Decision Making in Iran, (Tehran A-132, 22 July 1976), p9, 
which argues that the Rastakhiz party, created by the Shah in March 1975, was „primarily a 
mechanism for communicating policy guidance from central government to the public.‟ 
43 A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p219. A cogent example is provided in the fall from 
grace of Mir Abbas Hoveyda. See V. Vinogradov (1998), Diplomacy: People and Events, p404. 
44 Note to Ardeshir Zahedi. Quoted in A. Milani, op cit., p475. 
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of 1963.
46
 They also underlay a broader tension existing between economic 
development and the government‟s quest to meet the weaponry requirements of a 
military from which it derived its chief support – an observation also substantially true 
of the Soviet Union.
47
 Defining the state in terms of its leadership likewise fails to 
account for the apparent paradox, identified by Alexander Wendt, that groups are 
capable of possessing a structural reality distinct from that of their members. Once a 
joint commitment exists to a particular policy, group members become subject to strong 
constraints on their action and the group structure is therefore said to „supervene‟ on 
individual intentions.
 48
 The concept is applicable to the Shah's momentous decision to 
pursue Iranian participation in the Baghdad Pact. On the one hand, the Eisenhower 
doctrine's logical corollary in mutual security guarantees and the implicit expectation 
for Western-led improvement of Iran's defensive capability became an important point 
of leverage over the Shah‟s Cold War allies. Having adhered to the Pact, on the other 
hand, the strength of Western reaction to subsequent attempts by Iran to consider 
accommodation with the USSR imposed a clear constraint on the Iranian government's 
diplomatic room for manoeuvre. As one U.S. ambassador bluntly informed the Shah, 
responding to a proposed purchase of Soviet military equipment, it was „difficult to be a 
little bit pregnant‟; acceptance of Russian aid would be inevitably followed by an 
inability to „put the lid back on Pandora's box.‟49 Thus, Western reinforcement of the 
Shah's apprehensions vis-à-vis Moscow's intentions, and in equal measure, the Shah's 
vested interest in strengthening Washington's emergent regional security thesis produced 
a framework for Soviet-Iranian relations that did indeed „supervene‟, and demonstrably 
so, on a variety of foreign policy decisions. 
 
Rationality and ‘Rational’ Actors 
As alluded to above, a central preoccupation of International Relations theory consists 
in the search for an adequate means of describing state behaviour or action at the 
                                                 
46  J. Bill, Modernization and Reform from Above: The Case of Iran in The Journal of Politics 32 (1) 
47 See the paper on Soviet Foreign Policy in FCO 28/1094, where the British Ambassador in Moscow 
argues (p2) for greater awareness of the interaction between domestic and external policy in the USSR 
and points out (§8) that „there is more or less continuous debate […] between economists and scientists 
within the leadership who want more money immediately to support certain machinery or instruments, 
and the military who want more and better arms.‟ 
48 A. Wendt, op. cit., p301. 
49 FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22: Telegram from the Embassy in Iran, 7 July 1966, §11. 
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collective level without the need to „reduce‟ it to its constituent elements. One major 
theory seeking to address this question is that of the Rational Actor Model.
50
 The 
approach posits that states are unitary in the sense of possessing beliefs about their 
environment that engender certain desires, on the basis of which leaderships are enabled 
to make intentional choices in a rational manner with intent to maximise the expected 
utility of their actions. Given a particular set of circumstances and all other factors being 
equal, states will pursue the most favourable outcome or „equilibrium‟; a strategy from 
which there is no logical incentive to deviate.
51
 The permissible boundaries of „rational‟ 
choice are thus limited to situations that reward effective choices and punish inefficient 
ones. Accordingly, rational choice theorists emphasise the potency of external factors – 
of structural considerations that transcend political boundaries and individual 
proclivities – and their limiting effect on state action. Kenneth Waltz, for instance, in his 
three-fold theory of international politics, identifies systemic disparities in capability 
and power as the most cogent explanation for state behaviour.
52
 Such a schema would 
indeed appear, superficially, to explain the Shah‟s rapid militarisation drive of the 
1970s: it was felt that Iran should achieve military „credibility‟ in order to deter the 
threat of Soviet invasion.
53
 Similarly, fears of an American „monopoly‟ in the Middle 
East substantially motivated the provision of Soviet military assistance to otherwise 
„bourgeois‟ nationalist regimes such as that of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, despite the 
adverse political consequences involved for local Communist parties. 
 
The primary challenge to the rationalist model consists in the question of whether, how 
and for whom state action, even if accepted as unitary in nature, may be characterised as 
„rational.‟ With respect to Iran‟s militarisation, for instance, the apparently rational and 
beneficial equilibrium achieved in political relations between Iran and the Soviet Union 
at the end of the 1960s (Chapter Three), crowned by a significant series of economic 
collaborations, was significantly undermined by Iran‟s weaponisation programme and 
the tension to which it gave rise.  Indeed, the Shah's emergent security hypothesis may 
be said to have produced a set of behaviours that ran substantially counter to the 
                                                 
50 For an assessment of the field and its possible limitations, see Stephen M. Walt, Rigor or Rigor 
Mortis? Rational Choice in Security Studies, International Security, Vol 23, No. 4 (1999), p5 
51 Rational Choice Theory and Politics, Critical Review, Vol. 9, Nos. 1-2 (Winter- Spring 1995), p10. 
52 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War, particularly p16; 80-1; 159-165. 
53  FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E4: Shah‟s Views on Procurement of Military Equipment, 19 March 1970, §6 
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„rational course‟ as perceived by third parties. At a 1969 meeting in the White House, 
for instance, the Shah and Henry Kissinger exchanged the following views: 
 
„Referring to Arab countries in the area, the Shah said that many of them were 
now in the hands of unprincipled bandits who either for their own purposes or in 
the misbegotten belief that Communism was a wave of the future were disposed 
to cooperate with the USSR. He saw the Soviets gaining domination of the area 
through a pincer movement [...] He must, therefore, have the capability to defend 
himself without outside assistance [...] he must have an "over-kill" capability so 
that should anyone be tempted to attack Iran they would think twice or even 
three times. The Secretary asked whether Iran was not already much stronger 
than Iraq and would it not be madness for Iraq to contemplate attacking Iran. 
The Shah answered that "those fellows in Iraq are mad.”‟54 
 
And indeed, the scepticism and in some cases surprise with which Western officials 
viewed this shift in the Shah's strategic thinking was matched by the incredulity of 
Soviet leaders, who believed the Shah‟s apprehensions to have been instigated by the 
Western media, with the objective of causing Iran „to play the role of an American 
Trojan Horse with its belly loaded not only with soldiers but with weapons for 
distribution to other states.‟55 In short, while the rational choice proposition that „within 
a feasible set of actions compatible with the constraints, individuals choose those they 
believe will bring the best results‟ is substantially correct from the perspective of the 
individual concerned, such beliefs may diverge significantly from the rational 
expectations of others.
56
 And as Sherman Kent, director of the U.S. Office of National 
Estimates at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, has pointed out, the Rational Actor 
Model is a reliable one provided that a given situation is viewed through the unique 
perspective of the agent one is analysing.
57
 For the Shah, pursuit of a strong and 
credible military capability was entirely rational, but nevertheless differed significantly 
from the U.S. government's more cautious approach (later abandoned by the Nixon 
                                                 
54 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E4: Memorandum of Conversation, 22 October 1969. Emphasis in original. 
55 Asnåd-e Låneh-ye Jåsusi, Vol. 47, Memorandum of Conversation with Soviet First Secretary, 9 April 
1973. Soviet suspicions in this respect were indeed correct. See Chapter Four, n43. 
56 J. Elster, quoted in A. Callincos, Making History, p78. 
57 G. Allison, Essence of Decision, p81. 
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administration), which initially envisaged a „rational increase in military potential 
without limiting unduly the resources available for economic development and social 
welfare.‟58 The Shah's rationalisation may be said to have ultimately won the debate. 
 
A third, albeit sympathetic critique of the Rational Actor Model is supplied by Robert 
Jarvis in his work on the role of perception in international politics. Jarvis' central 
objection in many respects supports Kent‟s observation; that the attribution of 
rationality assumes all the facts relevant to a given situation are available to 
participating parties and, furthermore, that such information is perceived correctly by 
both sides. Thus, if all involved actors were accurately cognissant of the each other's 
position, their respective behaviours would indeed be perceived as „rational.‟ Decision 
makers will thus benefit, Jarvis argues, by making explicit the process and framework 
from which their decisions arise.
59
 In the case of Soviet-Iranian relations, however, 
almost the precise opposite may be said to have occurred. To select one of many 
possible examples, the acrimonious breakdown of the 1959 Soviet-Iranian negotiations 
(Chapter Two) demonstrated that the participants, far from seeking to engage with their 
interlocutor‟s rationale, viewed each other's negotiating position as almost total 
anathema. Khrushchev was incensed at the Shah's „surprising and provocate‟ decision to 
sign a Bilateral Pact with the United States just as the Shah was confused and irritated 
by the Soviet side's apparently unyielding insistence on „paper articles‟; the Soviet-
Iranian Friendship Treaty of 1921. From a careful analysis of such episodes it emerges 
that the inability or unwillingness to perceive accurately is influenced by a variety of 
factors: personal predisposition, ideology, external considerations, domestic 
imperatives. These less quantifiable constraints, Jarvis concedes, may diminish the role 
of rationality in decision-making: „Rational or not, people interpret incoming 
information in terms of what is of concern to them at the time the information arrives.‟60 
Furthermore, any attempt to divorce decision-making analysis from its situation-specific 
pressures or historical context and thus isolate an „actor's perceptions as the immediate 
causes of [their] behaviour‟, is undermined by the observation that such constraints 
(„sub-goals‟) are substantially responsible for the differing ways in which constituent 
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60 Jarvis, op. cit., p204. See also G. Allison, Essence of Decision, p5. 
 33 
parts of the state may work toward a common objective.
61
 Most significantly, as Jarvis 
recognises, the tendency toward single-minded pursuit of (or subservience to) sub-goals 
can often be detrimental to the overall strategy: an observation applicable passim to 
Soviet and Iranian foreign policy during the period covered by this dissertation. 
 
Emotion and Narrative 
For proponents of the Rational Actor Model, the ephemeral nature of human emotion 
may prove a unwelcome variable. Insofar as a lack of obvious measures may render 
emotions difficult to meaningfully quantify or isolate, their potential influence demands 
to be counterracted or diminished rather than accounted for.
62 Hans Morgenthau, for 
example, in his highly influential text Politics Among Nations viewed emotion as a 
negative force and argued that collective emotionality, as exhibited by states, stands in 
inverse proportion to societal and political maturity: „the greater the stability of society 
and the sense of security of its members, the smaller are the chances for collective 
emotions to seek an outlet.‟63 Morgenthau's concerns would have been familiar to Plato, 
who famously has Socrates expel poetry from the Republic on the grounds that it 
„feeding and watering the passions instead of drying them up: she lets them rule, 
although they ought to be controlled, if mankind is ever to increase in happiness and 
virtue.‟ The „honeyed muse‟ thus merits exclusion from the hypothetical state as the 
antithesis to the „law and reason of mankind.‟64 Emotions are, nevertheless, a pervasive 
force in history. In what might be considered a classic of international relations analysis, 
Thucydides' account of the Pelopennesian War (431-401BC) reminds us that „what 
made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused 
in Sparta.‟65 Indeed, and as demonstrated above with respect to Soviet-Iranian relations, 
the perception of existential pressure promoted the search for greater security and 
control, thereby affecting policy choices.
66
 The concept of deterrence assumes a 
fundamental role in realist interpretations of the international arena: the inculcation of 
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fear is designed to prevent certain behaviours. As Kenneth Waltz argues, „fear of 
unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the 
creation of balances of power.‟67 
 
Such analyses held particularly crucial relevance for the psychological conduct of the 
Cold War. U.S. diplomat George Kennan's „long telegram‟ of 1946, where he famously 
described the Soviet leadership as „impervious to the logic of reason and highly 
sensitive to the logic of force‟, interpreted Russian behaviour as, at core, evidencing 
fearfulness and concluded that America's policy toward the Soviet Union be formulated 
appropriately.
68
 Emotional perception – identified by David Hume as „impressions‟69 – 
hold a particular significance for the conduct of Soviet-Iranian relations in this respect. 
The projection and attribution of emotion (or conversely, de-emphasis and denial) 
featured centrally in the assessments of both sides. And indeed, the archival evidence is 
replete with British and American complaints of the ‘blue moods’ to which the Shah 
was apparently prone and his disposition toward identifying hidden conspiracies.70 In 
equal measure, the emotive character of responses by Western officials to any Iranian 
suggestion of rapprochement with Moscow consistently clouded judgement as to why 
Tehran may have contemplated such a move; the Shah's military requirements were 
perceived to be „emotional rather than logical.‟71 While the favoured explanation for 
Iranian ‘emotionalism’ was often simple blackmail, a close reading of the diplomatic 
record reveals the Shah's understandable anxiety at the apparent expendability of 
other U.S. ‘strong men’ abroad (such as President Diem in South Vietnam) and the 
inadequacy of Western commitments in countering the Soviet military presence by 
which he believed Iran to be progressively encircled.
72
 A central challenge with emotion 
then, lies in its propensity to be discounted or improperly perceived. And as already 
stated above, both Soviet and Western diplomats shared an unfortunate tendency to 
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construe Iranian „emotionality‟ as a product of innate character rather than of specific 
circumstances. 
 
An emotion that arguably plays a more significant role than fear, throughout this 
dissertation, is that of pride. The Iranian experience of occupation during World War II 
had left, as the successive Soviet leaders found to their cost, a „residue of sensitivities‟ 
whose latent presence proved both difficult to avoid and a perennial curb on available 
policy outcomes.
73
 Nor was the mistrust engendered by history focussed exclusively on 
the Soviet Union. At times of strain in the U.S.-Iranian relationship, the Shah often 
referred to the alleged lack of assistance provided by the United States during the 
Azerbaijan crisis.
74
 Indeed, Iranian officials in private often showed themselves deeply 
mistrustful of the U.S.
75
 In this context, as British Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham noted 
in his dispatch on the 1971 celebrations at Persepolis to mark the two thousand five 
hundreth anniversary of monarchy in Iran, the Shah sought thereby to efface „past 
humiliations‟, motivated by a determination „that the modern Persian Empire shall 
command respect from even the super powers.‟76 From the Soviet perspective also, as 
seen in Khrushchev's remarks quoted above, a keen sense of wounded pride at the 
manner of the USSR's departure and progressive exclusion from Iranian politics also 
underlay much of Soviet policy. This is clearly evidenced in Soviet archival evidence as 
through the infrequent but often ill-advised outbursts of Soviet leaders and officials 
during the period, who often evinced a private sense of disillusionment with the 
Centre‟s policy choices. Comments in this respect by the KGB's most celebrated 
undercover agent in Iran, Gevork Vardanyan, in an 2006 interview with the Russian 
newspaper Vremya, are instructive: 
 
„At that time [the Soviet occupation of northern Iran from 1941 to 1946], with 
our help, Iranian Azerbaijan became democratic. Kurdistan rose up. My father 
[Ivan Agayants, also a prominent KGB intelligence officer in Iran] said that “we 
                                                 
73 FRUS 1968-1972, Vol. E-4: Memorandum of Conversation with Asadollah 'Alam, 17 June 1971, §7. 
74 See record of grievances 'uncorked' by Shah in FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22: Telegram from the 
Embassy in Tehran, 31 August 1965, §9b. See also the revealing list of grievances intimated to the 
American Ambassador by Asadollah in FRUS 1968-1972, Vol. E-4: Memorandum of Conversation 
with Asadollah 'Alam, 17 June 1971, §4. 
75 See conversation between Hoveyda and Soviet Ambassador in V. Vinogradov, op. cit., p.396. 
76 FCO 17/1517: A Dynasty Blessed by the Gods, 15 October 1971, §8. 
 36 
must consolidate this.” The Prime Minister of Iran at that time however, was 
Qavam es-Saltaneh, a very cunning individual. At first glance he pursued a pro-
Soviet policy. For show, he concluded [an oil] agreement with us but said that 
parliament ought to ratify it. “While Soviet forces remain in Iran, I can't submit 
this to parliament, because the deputies might refuse to agree. When you pull out 
your forces, I promise you, it will be ratified”, he said. My father warned 
Moscow that it was necessary for us to pay off some of the deputies, but they 
paid no attention to this and withdrew our forces. Within a matter of days the 
Iranians had viscerated the democratic governments of Kurdistan and Iranian 
Azerbaijan. Parliament refused to ratify the [oil] agreement, because at that time 
the British and Americans had already succeeded in bribing the deputies. And 
they threw us out of everywhere. We lost everything in Iran.‟77 
 
As the above passage suggests, a key arena for the impact of emotion is that of 
narrative. Emotive language is an inseparable adjunct to the formation of state 
narratives and, as the Shah's speech at the tomb of Cyrus the Great in 1971 strikingly 
illustrated, also indispensible to their maintenance. The impact of emotion, however, 
does not necessarily deminish or undermine the validity of the narratives thereby 
promoted, even if the passage of time may cause them to appear incongruous.
78
 
Underlying narratives in Soviet-Iranian relations were similarly capable of emotively 
colouring perceptions of the opposite party's actions or intentions. As described in 
Chapter Four, a simple diplomatic faux pas by a low-ranking Soviet official, even with 
respect to minor issues, was capable of triggering latent suspicions and reinforcing elite 
narratives.
79
 The potency of such reactions, in these cases and more widely, was 
undiminished by the temporal distance from the specific historical circumstances that 
gave rise to the relevant narrative. Thus, the long history of Russian-Iranian antipathy 
(explored in the following section) rendered it more likely that otherwise positive 
encounters could be negatively perceived; historical precedent and analogy acted to 
unfavourably dispose perception and provide an restrictive framework for diplomatic 
interaction. The Shah could never bring himself to believe in Soviet professions of 
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disinterested economic assistance, just as Soviet officials privately derided the Shah's 
assurances that Iranian involvement with America was a „temporary matter.‟ Given the 
highly personalised nature of politics in both the Soviet Union and Iran during the 
period, and in a context where power was highly centralised and civil society weak, it is 
therefore critical to remain receptive to the emotional power of narrative.
80
  
 
Conclusion 
A central concern of this thesis, then, is to argue for an understanding of Soviet-Iranian 
relations based on an awareness of its historical antecedents. Over and above the 
relative applicability of any particular concept in international relations theory, this 
thesis seeks to argue for the potency of narrative and historical experience as they 
underlie the political consciousnesses of political groups and individuals. Irrespective of 
the extent to which such narratives may be factually accurate, or indeed embellished and 
imagined, their genesis and development allow us to form a subjective appreciation and 
understanding of the stances, policies and actions that result from them.
81
 To this 
contention, however, must be added an important caveat: that the power of narrative 
was neither constant nor applied unitarily across the Soviet or Iranian leaderships of the 
period. Even at the highest levels of government, narratives were frequently contested, 
and this fact complicates any straightforward reading of Soviet or Iranian actions.
82
 To 
reify the state, then, is misleading insofar as the state is not reducible to any single 
element but rather represents the collective expression of its constituent components and 
prevailing conditions; a „complex institutional ensemble.‟ 83  Notwithstanding the 
structural constraints of society or the forces of circumstance however, it follows that 
state power and policy is actualised through the action, reaction and interaction of the 
specific agents located within that ensemble. Thus, to speak of „the state‟ in isolation 
from the human agency through which its actions are realised, is problematic; it should 
indeed be no surprise that the individual, as some theorists have noted, „stubbornly 
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refuses to be written out.‟ 84  A significant underlying theme of this dissertation, 
accordingly, will be to observe that what in fact constituted „the state‟ for both Iranian 
and Soviet leaders was the behaviour and discourse of the individual personalities from 
which their respective governments were composed and by whom they were 
represented.
85
 And as Wittgenstein, in common with Dostoevsky, realised, the 
inscrutibility of human nature frequently eludes definition: 
 
„We say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important 
as regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to 
another […] "I cannot know what is going on in him" is above all a picture. It is 
the convincing expression of a conviction. It does not give the reasons for the 
conviction. These are not at hand. 
 
If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.‟86 
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THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
 
 
A chicken is not a bird, Persia is not a foreign country. 
 
- TSARIST-ERA APHORISM 
 
From North to South Persia is ours: we are neither minors needing a guardian  
nor lunatics needing a keeper. 
 
- HABLU‟L MATIN NEWSPAPER, TEHRAN, SEPTEMBER 1907 
 
 
In order to appropriately frame the period covered by this thesis, it will be of benefit to 
offer an overview of Soviet-Iranian relations as they unfolded prior to the accession of 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the throne. These tumultuous years for Iran, encompassing 
the decline of the Qajar dynasty and the rise of Reza Shah, were the scene of intense 
power competition and consequently a formative period for the many successes and 
tensions that came to characterise bilateral ties in subsequent years. Given the Iranian 
preoccupation with the „spectre‟ of Russian interference however, as outlined in the 
introductory section above, a useful starting point – albeit not the formal beginning of 
relations – is presented by the Russo-Persian war of 1722-1723: Peter the Great‟s 
invasion of northern Persia that culminated in the enfeebled Shah Tahmasp II ceding 
sovereignty of Persian-controlled towns in the Caucasus, together with the provinces 
Gilan, Mazanderan and Golestan in return for Russian assistance in restoring him to the 
throne. While it has been tempting for some scholars to portray this episode as a 
manifestation of Peter the Great‟s alleged drive toward „free waters‟ and commerce with 
India, the evidence suggests the underlying motives were more practical than 
expansionary in substance. St Petersburg sought to ensure that, as the Safavid empire 
declined, their Ottoman rivals would not benefit from the political fragmentation of 
their southern neighbour by gaining access to areas of significant commercial interest to 
Russia, and more specifically, the Caspian littoral.
1
 The Peace Treaty signed in 
September 1723 provided a formal exposition of St Petersburg‟s motives: 
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„Let it be known that, insofar as for the past several years great disorders have 
arisen in Persia, and certain subjects of that country have risen in rebellion 
against His Highness the Shah, visiting significant destruction not only upon 
Persia but even daring to inflict murder and pillagery upon subjects of His 
Imperial Majesty, being engaged in trade with Persia by virtue of the ancient 
friendship and treaty existing between our nations; and insofar as His Highness 
the Shah, on account of the disorders that have arisen within his country, was not 
in a position to exert due authority over the rebels; wherefore, His Imperial 
Majesty […] unwilling to permit the further spread of those rebels toward 
Russia‟s borders оr allow his Highness the Shah to fall as their ultimate victim, 
employed his own arms against them, freeing certain towns and localities on the 
shores of the Caspian that had been the subject of extreme oppression and 
occupying them with his own forces for the defence and protection of His 
Majesty the Shah‟s true subjects.‟2 
 
An early precedent is thus demonstrated for Russian imperial intervention in Iran based 
on two clear objectives that will recur throughout this dissertation: protecting Russia‟s 
borders from threats based on Iranian territory, and inhibiting third parties from gaining 
influence inside Iran at Russia‟s expense. The intense rivalry that subsequently unfolded 
during the „Great Game‟ between Russia and Britain, whose intrigues and predations in 
pursuit of forestalling the other‟s imperialist expansion found a natural geographic locus 
in Iran, can in many respects be understood as the successor to, and logical extension of, 
Russo-Ottoman rivalry.  
 
The resolution of Britain and Russia‟s competing pretensions to predominance in Persia 
attained their most humiliating manifestation, from the Iranian point of view, in the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The central purpose of the document was in effect 
to codify the boundaries of respective influence between the two powers in Persia, with 
each side formally abrogating any right to pursue its commercial interests (or support 
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that of others) in the geographic preserve of other; it would, in the words of the British 
Minister in Tehran „prevent future difficulties and dissensions.‟3 There was, indeed, no 
doubting the political utility of the Convention for the Powers involved. Britain‟s need 
to economise on military expenditure in India required, in the words of Edward Brown 
(a British orientalist and ardent supporter of Iran‟s Constitutional movement) that „the 
ancient bogey of Russian invasion should be exorcised.‟ 4  And similarly, for both 
governments, the increasingly assertive disposition of Germany in Europe, exemplified 
by the Moroccan crisis of 1905, acted as an inducement to strengthen Anglo-Russian 
entente. But while Britain feared German expansionism in political terms, the threat 
from the Russian perspective was perceived as commercial. Any development that held 
out an opportunity for German penetration in Iran (specifically a railway connection 
from Baghdad) posed a potential risk to the preferential position enjoyed by Russian 
traders.
5
 In a now familiar pattern, the prospect of any undesirable foreign influence met 
with stern resistance from St Petersburg. Indeed, Russia‟s somewhat flexible 
interpretation of the 1907 Convention – guaranteeing non-intervention in Iran‟s internal 
affairs „so long as‟ no injury should accrue to its interests – was supported by Tsar 
Nicholas II, who firmly denounced an Iranian government proposal to hire Belgian 
officers to train its army in the following terms: „Since it is harmful to Russia, it is 
therefore impermissible: we are the masters in the North of Persia.‟6  
 
The full implications of this line of thinking found their clearest expression in the 
obstacles encountered by Morgan Shuster, a U.S. customs officer with a reputation for 
diligence, engaged by the Iranian Majles in May 1911 and granted broad powers to 
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конвенциях и соглашениях (Soviet-Iranian Relations in Treaties, Conventions and Agreements), Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1946, p54. 
6  
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bolster the country‟s flagging revenues. 7  Shuster‟s determination not to recognise 
Anglo-Russian „spheres of influence‟ and to doggedly pursue vested interests (in one 
fateful instance taking possession of a house that the Imperial Bank of Russia claimed 
as collateral against the debts of its occupant) placed his administration on a collision 
course with the St Petersburg, which, acting on the belief that „Persians only bow to 
force‟ exacted a heavy price for Shuster‟s obstinacy by occupying Tabriz in order to 
apply pressure for his removal. The excesses of Tsarist officials during this occupation – 
culminating in the execution of a leading religious figure (the chief Mojtahed of Tabriz) 
on the holy Shi‟a day of Ashura – made an indelible impression on the minds of leading 
Iranians of the day.
8
 Prime Minister Qavam es-Sultaneh, for example, under pressure 
from the Soviet government in negotiations at the end of World War II, responded to 
Stalin‟s accusation that Iran was „hostile‟ towards the USSR by pointing to the „brutal 
actions‟ of Russian troops in Tabriz in 1911, raising „in particular‟ the hanging of Mirza 
Ali Tabrizi, the Mojtahed in question.
9
 
 
Late Tsarist-era policy toward Iran also saw the emergence of two important trends that 
were to become a pronounced feature in later years. The first was commercial: Russia‟s 
desire to match the successes of British oil exploration in the south of Iran culminated in 
a concessionary zone between Tabriz and Jolfa (now in Armenia), with Tsarist 
authorities having the right to exploit any oil or coal deposit within sixty miles either 
side of a railway built along the same route.
10
 Although the concessionary area of ten 
thousand square miles was relatively paltry by the standards of the time (and 
subsequently renounced by the Bolshevik regime upon gaining power) the agreement 
provided a notable precursor to the Soviet government‟s renewed demands thirty years 
later and described in Chapter One of this thesis. A second feature was the often chaotic 
implementation of policy. Subject to the whims of one man, the Tsar‟s ambassadors not 
infrequently found that their regent or his ministers would support the wayward 
activities of more radical personnel (notably Vice Consuls) over the head of the 
                                                 
7  
Full account in ibid., p584-591 
8 
 Ibid., p651 
9  
See Mirzå Ahmad Khån al-Saltaneh: dar durån-e Qåjårihå va Pahlavi, Vol. 2,  p383. For a 
contemporary account of Russian actions in Tabriz, see the New York Times, 28 December 1911. 
10  
Kazemzadeh, p675; New York Times, 23 February 1911.
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Legation, a challenge well described in Kazemzadeh‟s detailed work on the period.11 As 
will be seen in Chapter 2, a degree of continuity with this particular feature can be 
identified in the similarly dualistic nature of policy towards Iran under the Soviet 
regime. For successive Iranian politicians, the disconcerting contrast between Moscow‟s 
outward professions of friendship and goodwill on the one hand, and its intermittent 
support for more radical levers of policy – hostile radio propaganda, threatening 
diplomatic notes, apparent support for various oppositionary factions both within Iran 
and abroad – on the other, lent itself to the conclusion that the former was mere charade 
while the latter reflected true underlying policy. 
 
Iran’s relations with post-Revolutionary Russia 
Given the unenviable reputation garnered by the „regency of robbery and coercion‟ it 
overthrew, the newly-incumbent Bolshevik regime found itself almost immediately 
confronted by an uncomfortable policy dilemma. As Lenin and Stalin publicly declared 
within a month of the October Revolution: 
 
„We announce that the treaty of the division of Persia is torn up and destroyed. 
As soon as military operations [connected with World War I] cease, our forces 
will be withdrawn and Persians furnished with the right to free determination of 
their fate […] Not from Russia and the Revolutionary government should you 
expect enslavement, but from from the predatory European capitalists, whо are 
waging the current War in order to divide your country and who have turned 
your homeland into their shameful and plundered colony.‟12 
 
In the diplomatic exchanges that followed – most notably in a wide-ranging and 
idealistic sixteen point plan for the opening of a „new era‟ in relations authored by 
Georgy Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs – the Bolshevik leadership sought to 
contrast itself with the British and crucially, by abrogating all previous „unequal‟ 
agreements, provide Iranian leaders with a vested interest in the regime‟s survival 
                                                 
11  
See for instance in ibid., p656-7 
12  
Soviet-Iranian Relations in Treaties, Conventions and Agreements (in Russian), p59: Declaration of 
the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, V. I. Lenin and of the People's Commissar for 
National Affairs, I. V. Stalin, to all working muslims of Russia and the East, 3 December 1917г.  
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through the emerging Russian civil war.
13
 It was in the latter respect however, as 
Chicherin subsequently lamented, that matters „did not turn out‟ as hoped for. Taking 
advantage of the chaos ensuing from the dissolution of Tsarist Russia, Britain sought to 
address the vacuum by introducing the ill-fated Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, a 
policy energetically pursued by Lord Curzon. The Soviet government‟s violent 
denouncement of the Agreement, a „knavish and piratical act‟ designed to „wring the last 
juices from unhappy Persian workers‟, charged that the „hirling Persian government‟ 
had sought to conceal Chicherin‟s sixteen-point plan from its people and ominously 
warned of the Red Army‟s immanent approach.14 The declaration never reached Tehran; 
the Soviet Representative charged with conveying it was „captured on the way by 
British gangs and Russian counterrevolutionaries‟ and promptly executed.15 Indeed, as 
the subsequent Bolshevik landing at Anzali (and coterminous declaration of the short-
lived Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan
16
) made clear, Bolshevik authorities ultimately 
shared two fundamental concerns of their Tsarists predecessors: first, to ensure that the 
influence of other world powers in Iran should not pose a threat to Russian borders; and 
second, to maintain a means of leverage within Iran itself as insurance against the 
unfavourable policies of Tehran.
17
 The Anzali landing was also accompanied by a 
curious piece of diplomatic acrobatics, which was to reemerge in later years: Chicherin 
felt obliged to inform his Iranian counterpart that the mission‟s commander had acted 
„on his own initiative without orders from Moscow.‟18 The assertion may be considered 
disingenuous; the history of Russian-Iranian relations is replete with examples of 
wayward elements enacting their own agendas to the „embarrassment‟ of the Centre.19 
The tension between such geopolitical necessities on the one hand, and the genuinely-
                                                 
13  
Ibid., p65-7: Declaration to the Persian Governments and People, 26 June 1919. 
14  
Ibid., p70-1: Declaration to the Workers and Peasants of Persia by the People‟s Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs, 30 August 1919. 
15  
Ibid., p72: Telegram from the People‟s Comissar for Foreign Affairs to Persia‟s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, 5 June 1920. 
16  
Cosroe Chaqueri (2005), The Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, 1920-1921: Birth of the Trauma 
17 
 This was seen most clearly in Bolshevik support for the Jangali („Forest‟) rebel movement in Gilan, an 
organisation that drew the majority of its support, perhaps ironically, from those sections of society whose 
commercial success had been undermined by (Tsarist) Russian trade. See E. Abrahamian: The Causes of 
the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, IJMES 10, 1979, p391, 394 
18  В. Генис (2000): Красная Персия: большевики в Гиляне 1920-1921 – документальная хроника (V. 
Genis: The Bolsheviks in Gilan 1920-1921 – A Documentary Chronicle, p68. 
19  
Cf. for example the late 16
th
 century exploits of Russian Cossack rebel Stenka Razin. F. Kazemzadeh 
Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 in The Cambridge History of Iran, 7, p314. 
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held belief that Iran could and should benefit from the „disinterested and unfeigned 
sincerity‟ of post-Revolutionary foreign policy on the other, found a somewhat awkward 
compromise in the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921, negotiated by Iran‟s maverick 
Ambassador to Russia, Moshaver-ol-Mamalek (Aligholi Masoud-Ansari.) While the 
document was chiefly concerned with a recapitulation of the Soviet government‟s 
earlier-stated principles and assurances, it incorporated two articles that were to have a 
critical bearing on subsequent relations: the first (Article 5) forbade the formation on the 
signatories‟ respective territory of any group „whose object is armed struggle against 
Persia or Russia‟; the second (Article 6) provided the Soviet government with the 
unilateral right to invade Iran in the event that the Iranian government, having been 
made aware of any such groups, was „not in a position to avert the danger.‟20 The 
agreement, signed five days after the change of regime in Tehran following the 
Cossack-led coup of Reza Khan, was not concluded with the new government‟s 
consent. Rather it would appear that the Iranian ambassador, eager to see that his 
considerable labours bore fruit and taking advantage of the power vacuum, took what 
we might nowadays be called an executive decision. This fact raises a critical question 
in the context of this dissertation: why did the incoming Pahlavi regime not seek to 
nullify the 1921 treaty on the grounds that it was concluded by a diplomatic 
representative of the government they had ousted? There were three factors: first, 
Russian troops were yet to evacuate Iran following World War I; secondly, the newly-
installed regime was in a position of domestic political weakness and could ill afford to 
antagonise Moscow; thirdly, and most importantly, the 1921 agreement was 
substantially more favourable to Iran than the existing treaties it replaced.
21
 
 
On the strength of the Treaty‟s more positive aspects – particularly with respect to free 
trade – relations attained a stable and even prosperous level during the years that 
followed; in the period 1929-1933, commercial exchanges with the Soviet Union 
accounted for some thirty five percent of Iran‟s trade volume. 22 The unhappy issue of 
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articles 5 and 6, however, together with the repressive measures adopted by Reza Shah 
against Iranian communists, were subsequently to give rise to a significant deterioration 
in relations. Iran sought to argue, on its accession to the League of Nations, that the 
organisation‟s founding Charter – enshrining the principle of respect for sovereignty and 
non-interference in the affairs of other countries – rendered Russia‟s right of armed 
entry into Iran under the 1921 Treaty obselete. Furthermore, as the original document 
reveals, the Treaty had only been signed into law by the Majles on the basis of 
assurances by the Soviet Representative in Tehran, Theodore Rothstein, that articles 5 
and 6 (which Iranian lawmakers considered to be „vaguely worded‟) were only intended 
for application to „cases in which preparations have been made for an active and armed 
struggle against Russia or the Soviet Republics allied to her, by the partisans of the 
regime which has been overthrown or by its supporters among those foreign Powers 
which are in a position to assist the enemies of the Workers' and Peasants' Republics.‟23 
The official Soviet record of treaties concluded with Iran (published in 1946), by 
contrast, failed to record the existence of the Annex at all. The only identifiable 
reference to it on the part of the Soviet regime was made in 1959, when an article in 
Pravda dismissed Iranian references to it as „baseless‟ and an attempt by certain circles 
to „free their hands for implementing military cooperation plans with aggressive circles 
in the USA.‟24 It was indeed manifest that, even if the articles 5 & 6 had initially been 
intended in a narrower sense to guard against the use of Iranian territory by White 
Russians or their allies at a point when that specific risk demonstrably existed, the 
potentially wider application of these provisions to any foreign presence on Iranian soil 
perceived as inimical to Soviet security offered a means of diplomatic leverage that 
Moscow was reluctant to forego. The growth of German influence inside Iran, actively 
encouraged by Reza Shah in order to counteract British and Soviet influence, furnished 
the first fateful opportunity for the Treaty‟s invocation. 
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CHAPTER ONE | SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS FROM 1941 TO 1953 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
- INTRODUCTION 
- 1941-1946: THE ALLIED INVASION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
- 1946-1948: THE POST-WAR ENVIRONMENT 
- 1949: THE FAILED ASSISSINATION ATTEMPT ON THE SHAH 
- 1951-1953: DR. MOHAMMAD MOSADDEQ AND THE SOVIET UNION 
- CONCLUSION 
 
 
Introduction 
As the historical survey offered above has suggested, relations between Iran and the 
Soviet Union at the outset of the period under review may be justly characterised as 
strained. Drawing on the archival materials outlined in the historiographical section, this 
chapter will seek to evidence how the „bitter experiences‟ of Iranian statesmen with 
their significant Northern neighbour during the turbulent years under review in this 
chapter both consolidated and complicated the Tsarist-era legacy; an ingrained suspicion 
of, instinctive unease with and latent antipathy toward Russian leaders. Most 
prominently, the disastrous dénouement of the Red Army‟s invasion of northern Iran, 
and the precipitate unravelling of the Azerbaijan People‟s Government in Tabriz – 
whose separatist demands the Soviet occupation had actively facilitated – constituted a 
serious setback for Soviet policy in Iran.
1
 The subsequent extension of Moscow‟s 
influence over the Iranian Tudeh (Communist) Party, responsible for often violent 
political agitation at critical junctures and whose more radical members were (it will be 
shown) directly complicit in a 1949 assassination attempt on the Shah himself, served to 
further entrench perceptions of the Kremlin's underlying policies and pretensions vis-à-
vis Iran. It is argued that these factors, viewed in the context of Soviet policy elsewhere 
in the world at the time, played a decisive role in convincing the young and politically 
insecure Mohammad Reza Shah of the benefits held out by military assistance from the 
United States, whose own interest in what subsequently came to be termed the 'Northern 
                                                 
1  The nature and extent of the Soviet vision for „Southern Azerbaijan‟ – and indeed all northern Iranian 
provinces – is set out in a remarkable Politburo directive in July 1945 to Mir Jafar Baghirov (First 
Secretary of the Azerbaijan SSR Communist Party.) Cold War International History Project, Record 
ID 112021. 
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Tier' – a line of defence against Communist expansion of which Iran was a crucial 
component – was developing rapidly.2  
 
The inevitable corollary of America's evolving strategic view of, and deepening 
involvement in, Iran was a heightened sensitivity – buttressed and reinforced to 
sustained effect by the Shah personally – to any possible move by the Soviet Union to 
establish a greater position of influence in Iranian politics. An attempt is made to trace 
the genesis and interplay of U.S. and Iranian apprehensions in this respect, from the 
immediate post-War environment through to their final apotheosis in the coup d‟etat 
against Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq. The latter‟s storied removal from the post of Prime – 
Minister following a chaotic series of events orchestrated partly by the CIA – was 
predicated principally on the former's alleged solicitation of Soviet support and apparent 
reliance on the Tudeh Party, the excesses and ulterior ambitions of which the West 
concluded Mosaddeq was either unable or unwilling to control.
 3
 Recognising the 
profound and lasting consequences of this episode for subsequent Soviet-Iranian 
relations, and indeed for Iranian history more broadly, this chapter will offer a fresh 
insight on Mosaddeq's final months as premier on the basis of Russian archival 
materials detailing the Prime Minister‟s interaction with Soviet diplomatic 
representatives. Critical examination of these documents will reveal that ingrained 
distrust between Mosaddeq‟s administration and the Kremlin, combined with a 
fundamental incompatibility of their respective motives, ultimately precluded any 
meaningful or mutually-beneficial cooperation between them; an irony sharpened by the 
clear conviction on the part of the British and Americans that precisely the opposite was 
the case. Of broader significance, the documents lend further support to an argument 
(well made elsewhere by Houshang Chehabi) that Mosaddeq, through his increasingly 
bold attempts to elicit assistance from both the Soviet Union and America by effectively 
pitting one side against each other – or as Moscow saw it, „blackmail‟ – must be 
considered a substantial factor in the Prime Minister‟s downfall.4 And finally, it will be 
suggested, the cautious and superficial nature of Moscow's „moral support‟ for the 
                                                 
2 The Turco-Pakistani agreement formed the initial component of what was to become the Baghdad 
Pact. When it was signed, in March 1946, the Shah was twenty-seven years old (b. 26 October 1919.) 
3   A detailed documentary examination of the CIA‟s role has now been made available as George 
Washington University‟s Electronic Briefing Book No. 435, posted 19 August 2013. 
4 Jamil Hasanli (2006): USSR-Iran: The Azerbaijan Crisis and the Beginning of the Cold War, p473 
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Mosaddeq administration (mirrored by its ambivalent attitude toward the Tudeh Party) 
arguably constituted a further failure of policy caused, as in Azerbaijan, by the 
opportunistic pursuit of Soviet interests to the exclusion of Iranian political realities.
5
 
 
1941-1946: The Allied Invasion and its Aftermath 
It was the British Minister in Tehran, Sir Reader Bullard, who broke the news of 
Operation Barbarossa to his Soviet counterparts early in the morning of June the 22
nd
, 
1941. The first reaction was disbelief. Indeed, so mistrustful were the Russian officials 
of their British counterparts that they covertly dispatched their newly-appointed press 
attaché, Daniil Komissarov, to the Tehran telegraph office to seek independent 
confirmation from Moscow.
6
 The full-scale invasion of the Soviet Union by Hitler's 
forces made the presence of Axis nationals in Iran, who had established a significant 
economic presence encouraged by Reza Shah‟s government, an unwelcome security 
threat: Iran not only offered a potential base from which to attack the Baku oil fields, 
but also represented the only safe all-weather supply route to the Soviet Union and was 
to become a key transit route for lend-lease supplies.
7  Komissarov himself, in his 
memoir Iran – A View on a Troubled Past, is categorical both about the nature of the 
challenge faced, and the reluctance of Reza Shah's government to address it. Nazi 
spies and saboteurs, he asserts, were present in all Iranian provinces, particularly in 
Tehran and areas bordering the USSR.8 The Soviet Union’s official representation to 
the Iranian government on the subject ran to an unprecedented ten pages, and 
provided specific details, for instance, German agents allegedly posing as employees 
of Mercedes.9 The British in turn had three concerns. First, the presence of Axis 
                                                 
5 For an enlightening discussion in this respect, see M. Behrooz, Tudeh Factionalism and the 1953 
Coup in Iran in International Journal of Middle East Studies 33, No. 3 (August 2001): 363-82. 
6 D. S. Komissarov (1985): Iran: View on a Troubled past, p103-5 (Russian source.) 
7 Even before the Anglo-Soviet invasion, the British Embassy documents record held a meeting of 
military attachés on the 2
nd
 of July to examine the possibility of transit trade through Iran and, in 
particular, 'to see how the transport system of Persia can be exploited […] to act as a channel of 
supply to Russia.' Iran Political Diaries (IPD), Vol. XI: Intelligence Summary No. 15, 26 July 1941. 
8 Komissarov, ibid., p105. Komissarov further alleges that he discovered 'ten to twelve' Germans at the 
Shah Hotel in Chalus, accompanied by 'high-ranking Iranian faces', who spoke German. Ibid., p108. 
9    See: Советско-Иранские Отношения в догорворах, конвенциах и соглашениях (Soviet-Iranian 
Relations in Treaties, Conventions and Agreements), USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1946, p159. 
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vessels stationed at Bandar Shahpur were an obvious threat to their interests.
10
 Second, 
a trade agreement existing between Iran and Germany – signed before the war for over a 
hundred thousands tons of Iranian exports – now constituted an unwelcome component 
of the Axis war effort. Third and mirroring the Soviet government‟s note, a number of 
the German specialists in Persia were „credibly believed‟ to be military officers, with 
„no real connexion with the firms by whom they were nominally employed.‟11 
 
Repeated representations by the British legation to the Iranian government requesting a 
cessation of non-essential economic cooperation with Germany and information on Axis 
nationals in Iran finally met, on the 19
th
 of August, with „counter proposals on an 
extremely limited scale, coupled with a refusal to supply written details.‟ Soviet 
diplomats had also laid out their own demands on three occasions: on the 26th of 
June, 19th of July and finally the 16th of August, the latter being made jointly with the 
British.12 Reza Shah, however, ‘remained deaf’: 
 
„Wherefore the Soviet Government was obliged to utilise its right, enshrined in 
the Soviet-Iranian agreement of 1921, article six, to bring its forces into Iran for 
the protection of its interests against the real threat posed by German fascists, 
who were preparing a base in Iran for an advance on the USSR.‟13 
 
On the morning of the invasion (25
th
 of August 1941), Reza Shah sent for British and 
Soviet representatives. He seemed to the former in a state of shock, having been „ill-
informed by his ministers and living in a world of unreality.‟14 It is, indeed, a striking 
irony of the period that the reign of Reza Shah, itself enabled by the advance of his 
Russian-trained Cossacks from Qazvin to Tehran, was eventually terminated by the 
threat of the Red Army to do likewise; a fact not lost on his son and successor.  
 
The Allied incursion presented an unique opportunity for Soviet policy, both in terms of 
                                                 
10 These were subsequently found to have explosives on board. IPD, Vol. XI., p429. 
11 IPD, Vol. XI, Annual Report for 1941, 17 June 1942 
12 Ibid., Intelligence Summary No. 17 (10 - 23 August 1941) 
13 Komissarov, ibid., p105. 
14 IPD, Vol. XI: Annual Report for 1941, 17 June 1942. 
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the potential to enhance their prestige and influence and also with a view to 
counteracting the well-established position of the British in southern Iran. In particular, 
as the British records spell out, „the people of Azerbaijan, the peasants of Gilan and 
Mazanderan and the Turkomans of north east Persia [were] fruitful soil for Soviet 
propaganda, having long-standing grievances against the Persian government.‟ 15 
Political commissars under the command of the Red Army, in concert with Soviet 
Embassy and cultural officials, embarked on an extensive „hearts and minds‟ campaign 
(indeed, evidence suggests that preparations were even made in this respect prior to the 
invasion.)
16
 A central role in promoting Soviet influence and coordinating propaganda 
efforts was accorded to the Iranian Society for Cultural Ties with the USSR – a 
„counterblast‟ to the British Council – whose activities included the establishment of 
various commissions: for literature and publications; for medicine and public health; for 
theatre, cinema, sport and even tourism.
17
 Its inaugural meeting, held in the main hall of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran on the 30
th
 of October 1943, benefitted from 
the presence of many prominent personalities, among them the then Prime Minister Ali 
Soheili and Mohammad Sa‟ed, Ambassador to Moscow (1938-1942), later himself to 
become Prime Minister.
18
 The Society's premises in Tehran also housed a library and 
radio broadcasting station.
19
 At the diplomatic level too, Russian consular representation 
was greatly expanded during the initial phase of the occupation. New consulates-general 
were opened both within the Soviet „zone‟ at Tabriz and Mashad, with consulates at 
Rasht, Gurgan and vice-consulates at Rezaieh, Maku and Nowshahr, and also in the 
British zone, with a consulate at Kerman and vice-consulates at Bandar-Shah, Isfahan 
and Ahwaz.
20
  
 
                                                 
15 IPD, Vol. XI: Intelligence Summary No. 18 (24 August to 24 September 1941.) 
16 According to an account provided by Mikhail Pikulin, the Mashhad-based editor of the Soviet war-
time propoganda paper Axbar-e Tazeh-ye Ruz (News of the Day), a series of the courses 'to prepare for 
wartime propoganda work' were held in Moscow in September 1940, and attended by two fluent 
Persian speakers, both of whom subsequently worked under him on the staff of Axbar-e Tazeh-ye Ruz. 
Pikulin, M (1985): At the Post of a Newspaper Editor, p131 
17 IPD, Vol. XII: Intelligence Summary No. 2 (3 to 16
 
January 1944); Komissarov, one of the founding 
members records the date of its inaugural meeting as the 30
th
 October 1943. The Society (Иранское 
Общество Культурных Связей – ИОКС) had branches (known as „Houses of Friendship‟) in 
Esfahan, Rasht, Tabriz and Rezaieh (Urumieh) and Mashhad. See Komissarov, op cit., p118 
18 Komissarov, op. cit., p118 
19 Komissarov, op. cit., p119 
20 IPD, Vol. XI: Report on Political Events of 1942, 26 March 1941, §91. 
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As the occupation entered its third year, however, the disparity in troop numbers 
between the two occupying powers became a notable feature. Whereas the uniformed 
British Army contingent had by 1943 been significantly reduced to less than five 
hundred, the Red Army had some sixty thousand personnel on the ground and were 
observed to be actively encouraging separationist ambitions in Iran‟s Kurdish areas. 
Curiously in light of subsequent developments, initial British reaction toward this latter 
development was in fact sympathetic. „It seems probable [the Russians] are anxious to 
have friendly tribes on the frontier between Azerbaijan and Turkey in the event of the 
military situation in the Caucasus deteriorating‟, averred Sir Reader Bullard, concluding 
that the Iranian government had „exaggerated‟ the extent of the disorders.21 If prior to 
1944, however, the size of the Red Army could be justified by the need to defend and 
supply Russia, the opening of the Black Sea route to Sevastopol by the end of the same 
year effectively negated Iran‟s importance as a crucial supply route. The Red Army, 
irrespective of these changed circumstances, was observed to steadily tighten its grip on 
the Soviet-occupied zone and agitate more openly in support of Azeri autonomy: 
denying entry to government troops to the region; forcing the closure of gendarmerie 
posts; preventing the police from quelling unrest and cutting the telegraph lines with 
Tehran. The request, made 'loudly' and concurrently, was for an oil concession in the 
north of Iran comparable to Britain‟s in the south. Unsurprisingly the British Embassy 
was alarmed by this development, taking a view that „Soviet exploration of North 
Persian oil would unquestionably spell the end of Persian sovereignty in that area.‟22 
And as the U.S. Chargé d'Affairs in Moscow astutely noted: „the oil in northern Iran is 
important, not as something Russia needs, but as something that might be dangerous for 
anyone else to exploit.‟23 
 
The Soviet government's goals in respect of oil were energetically pursued by Mikhail 
Kavtaradze, the Soviet Union‟s Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who was 
dispatched to Tehran in September 1944 with the task of pressing Stalin's personal 
demand for the concessionary zone.
24
 In an audience with the Shah, Kavataradze let it 
                                                 
21 Ibid., §83.   
22 IPD, Vol. XII: Annual Report for 1944, 9 March 1943, §6. 
23 Quoted in E. Abrahamian (1982), Iran Between Two Revolutions, p210. 
24 The British Embassy suggested that Kavtaradze was sent to negotiate a concession covering northern 
Iran 'from Azerbaijan to Quchan', that is, the entirety of Iran's northern frontier with the Soviet Union. 
 53 
be known that Stalin „was not satisfied with the present state of Soviet-Iranian 
relations.‟ When the Shah proposed that the government would consider the Soviet 
application in line with other concession applications, Kavtaradze was unimpressed: 
„“But that is quite different. These applicants are companies; this is the Soviet 
Government.”‟25  The Commissar‟s high-pressure tactics however, culminating in an 
extensive and visibly Soviet-orchestrated campaign of demonstrations against Prime 
Minister Sa‟ed, and ultimately the latter's resignation, failed to advance his mission‟s 
objectives. On the contrary, Kavtaradze‟s intervention „rallied support even among 
former critics of the Prime Minister [...] and hardened public opinion against Russia.‟26 
An influential (and pro-British) member of the Majles, Sayyed Ziya od-Din Tabataba'i, 
issued an impassioned denunciation of Russian methods, comparing the Soviet need for 
a „protective belt‟ in the northern Iran to the Nazi concept of lebensraum.27  Prime 
Minister Sa‟ed‟s letter of resignation, he wrote, „is an historical document that breaks 
the heart: it is a document that should be read to future generations in Iranian schools.‟28 
Мeanwhile in the Majles, galvanised by the crisis, a certain Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq 
tabled and carried a significant bill making it illegal for any Iranian government to grant 
an oil concession to foreign governments or companies.
29
 In an emotional appeal to 
lawmakers, the future Prime Minister set out the rationale for a policy that he styled 
„negative equilibrium‟: 
 
„Prior to Shahrivar 1321 [the Allied invasion of Iran] the Soviet Union's policy 
options in Iran were limited. If a person chose to adhere to that government's 
ideology they were sentenced to prison or the firing squad. […] Subsequently 
however, the USSR's policy toward Iran has changed […] and seeing as 
'political conditions' have changed, our policies too ought to change. Ever since 
[the Allied invasion], whatever the Allies have wanted collectively or demanded 
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singularly, we have said nothing and accepted it. One side's lack of respect and 
our acquiescence in their demands has given the other side the right to feel 
entitled to equal treatment. Sooner or later our statesmen will be telling us that 
the country's policy is such-and-such and we must do whatever they say. Yet this 
will not be accepted by patriotic statesmen. Those who desire for the 
advancement and progress of their homeland will struggle against any policy 
that is not in their country's interest. […] Gentlemen, it behooves us to pursue 
the same policies of our forebears. Even if their level of knowledge cannot be 
compared to our own, their convictions were stronger and thus they succeeded, 
for more than a century, in preserving the integrity of this country between the 
policies of two opposing powers and bequeathing us the resources that have now 
become the subject of such sustained interest and attention.‟30 
 
Mosaddeq's motivation for the bill, as he later informed the Majles, was an editorial in 
Britain‟s Times newspaper censuring as „regrettable‟ the Soviet government's decision to 
press its oil demands without having first informed her allied partners.
31
 In speaking of 
an „unwritten obligation to consult‟, the article gave the unfortunate impression that the 
allies were bound to dispose of Iran's oil resources by tacit mutual agreement.
32
 
 
Irrespective of the law‟s passing – which Kavtaradze promptly labelled „a mistake‟33 – it 
became clear that Soviet authorities in Azerbaijan were already engaged in 
„surreptitious experimental borings‟ and further, it was alleged, importing Soviet goods 
for sale in order to obtain the rials needed to finance and arm elements sympathetic to 
their goals.
34
 The extent of those goals was, indeed, ominously apparent from an Iranian 
Note of protest to the Soviet Embassy on the 5
th
 of November 1944: 
 
„According to a report received from Tabriz, the Soviet authorities in Azerbaijan 
have taken steps to build a medical college and it is understood that they propose 
                                                 
30  Quoted in H. Kirmani.: Az Shahrivar 1320 tå Fajå‟ih-ye Åzerbayjån va Zanjån (From Shahrivar 1320 
to the Disaster of Azerbaijan and Zanjan) Vol. 2, p577-8. 
31  FO 248/1442, Bullard to Foreign Office, December 22, 1944, §2 
32  The Times, 3 November 1944, p5 (article wording verified by author at British Library archives.) 
33   FO 248/1442, Bullard to Foreign Office, 14 December 1944 (Soviet Embassy circular Dust-e Iran.) 
34  IPD, Vol. XII: Annual Report for 1944, §164. 
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to set up other colleges, such as for engineering and agriculture. If this is true, 
since the Iranian Government has hitherto given no permission to any 
Government to take such measures on Iranian soil, it may be presumed that the 
Soviet authorities have acted on their own initiative; an intervention in Iranian 
internal affairs that is not accepted by the Iranian government, nor is it expected 
that the Soviet Government, as a friend and ally of Iran, should have given 
permission for it.‟35 
 
Concerns subsequently intensified when the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, newly-
formed of erstwhile Tudeh members and with full Soviet backing, published its 
manifesto for local autonomy.
36
 Given the Red Army‟s military grip on the region, 
Tehran stood little chance of imposing its writ, and the Azerbaijani National Assembly 
was duly convened in Tabriz in November 1945.
37
 Meanwhile, Iran‟s Kurdish 
population had declared a republic of their own centring on the town of Mahabad, 
following an uprising which also bore over hallmarks of Soviet inspiration.
38
 
 
The turning point in this deteriorating state of affairs came with the narrow appointment 
as Prime Minister of Ahmad Qavam, whose support among the left and presumed 
antipathy toward the Shah (by whose father he had been exiled to Europe and then 
placed under police surveillance for eleven years) facilitated an opportunity for talks in 
Moscow. It became apparent, however, that the neither side was willing to cede any 
significant ground. In a two-hour audience with Stalin, Qavam stated that self-
governance for Azerbaijan was „not consistent with‟ Iran‟s independence: 
 
‘Insofar as is possible within the country's laws, we are prepared to make 
concessions including that, in certain government appointments such as city 
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governors, city mayors and even the governor general аccept suggestions of a 
regional committee established under the oversight of central government.’39 
 
Stalin, for his part, was manifestly unwilling – as the Tsarist authorities before him – to 
accept such a situation in the absence of a commitment toward a less „hostile‟ attitude 
toward Russia, that is to say, a greater economic and political stake in Iran. The ensuing 
joint communiqué, published on the 5
th
 of April 1946, reflected an artful compromise. 
First, the Red Army was to withdraw within six weeks of the 24
th
 of May 1946; second, 
differences regarding the level of autonomy to be accorded Iranian Azerbaijan would be 
settled in a „peaceful manner‟; and crucially, third, legislation for a joint Soviet-Iranian 
oil company would be „presented for the approval‟ of the Majles within seven months. 40 
Qavam and the Soviet Ambassador exchanged detailed notes defining the nature of the 
joint company and its operating conditions: a fifty year lease on an equal profit-sharing 
basis.
41
 Since the lease‟s ratification was contingent on an elected Majles, and in view 
of the fact that the previous Majles had enacted a law postponing elections until the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces, realisation of the agreement thus became contingent on 
the Red Army‟s departure; an impressive feat of diplomacy for which the Shah 
permitted his Prime Minister no credit.
42
 Qavam had secured the departure of Soviet 
forces from Iranian territory without the latter losing face and apparently without any 
intervention on the part of the West, although the exertions of Hussein Ala‟ – Iran‟s 
energetic Ambassador to the United Nations – undoubtedly played a key role. 43 
(Although President Truman would subsequently claim he „personally saw to it that 
Stalin was informed that [he] had given orders to our military chiefs to prepare for the 
movement of our ground, sea and air forces‟, the Shah, by contrast, recalled the U.S. 
Ambassador in Tehran, George Allen, informing him bluntly that the United States 
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wouldn‟t „go to war with Russia for your sake.‟ 44  Neither of these opposing 
recollections is substantiated by documentary evidence.
45
) 
Notwithstanding the Red Army's withdrawal, the Soviet-supported Pishevari regime in 
Tabriz remained fully operational. It became, indeed, progressively clear that Russian 
authorities intended to exert leverage through this channel to secure greater 
representation of pro-Soviet parties in the new (15
th
) Majles in order to secure the 
passing of the oil agreement. Accordingly, on the 2
nd
 of October 1946 the Soviet 
Ambassador made known his impatience for elections. Tudeh activists followed suit by 
initiating a concerted series of strikes and wider agitation in a bid to bolster their 
profile.
46
 The campaign – a  combination of mass rallies, organised strikes and vocal 
demands to arm the trade unions – proved to be a gross miscalculation. Disquieted by 
the Tudeh’s increasingly boisterous disposition, the Prime Minister took steps to curb its 
influence, including the effective exile of his pro-Soviet Chief of Staff, Mozzafar Firuz, 
to Moscow as ambassador.
47
 An illustration of the tactics employed by Tudeh is 
provided in a remarkable note Qavam received from his Firuz, dated May 1946:  
 
„Don't forget that you are only Prime Minister because of Pishevari and his army. 
If you allow the Shah's agents into Azerbaijan, he'll remove you as being no 
longer necessary to him. Our government ought to see in Pishevari and in 
democratic Azerbaijan our reserve forces against reaction.‟48 
 
The elections did indeed, as Firuz predicted, provide the central government with the 
necessary pretext to order government troops into Azerbaijan and restore security. While 
the Shah again refused to permit his Prime Minister any recognition for the course of 
events, it would appear that Qavam himself actually signed the order.
49
 Tabriz was 
recaptured on the 13
th
 of December and the Democrat regime collapsed, its leaders 
fleeing across the border to the Soviet Union. It took the central government just one 
week to re-establish full control, leading the British Minister, Sir Reader Bullard, to 
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conclude with considerable satisfaction that „the Russians have once again misjudged 
imponderables and underrated the ineptitude of their puppets.‟50  
 
Arguably however, the most prominent and detrimental effect of Soviet actions in 
Azerbaijan in fact arose from the mismanagement and alienation of the Iranian political 
elite, epitomised by Kavtaradze's treatment of Mohammed Sa'ed and underlined by 
Ambassador Sadchikov's underestimation of Ahmad Qavam. The extent of the damage 
in this respect is illustrated in a scathing summation provided by Tahmoures Adamiyat, 
Iran‟s Second Secretary in Moscow (1945- 1946): 
 
„During the Second World War, Iran was faced with all the difficulties of a 
country under foreign occupation. We were unable to move our troops into the 
North. They carried off our grain, our flocks, our sheep, our cattle. They cut 
down our forests and took the timber away on their ships. They kept falsely 
declaring that they had brought corn flour for us. In every aspect of political and 
state decision making, they openly forced the implementation of their views, 
making clandestine arrangements and constantly provoking people.‟51 
 
Indeed the shortcomings of Soviet „clumsy tactics‟ were sharply highlighted by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Wheeler, who served as the British Press Councillor in 
Tehran between 1946 and 1950, who observed that Soviet attempts since 1917 to extend 
their influence in the Middle East more widely had been characterised by setbacks, „the 
result partly of Western opposition, partly of Middle Eastern nationalism, and perhaps 
most of all of Soviet miscalculation, crudeness of method and precipitancy.‟ 52  So 
unpopular did Kavtaradze in fact make himself in Iran, that his name was popularly 
rendered as Kavtårzådeh – hyaena spawn.53 
 
The Post-War Environment  
If Soviet ambitions in Middle East had suffered a setback in Iran, the Iron Curtain was 
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successfully descending over Europe. From the Iranian perspective in particular, the 
uncertain environment of the post-war world was brought into sharp relief by the 
Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia on the 25
th
 of February 1948, from which 
„disquieting implications‟ were drawn. 54  The sense of international unease was 
underlined by the subsequent signing, on the 17
th
 of March 1948, of the Brussels Treaty 
(a precursor to NATO), swiftly followed on the 25
th
 of March by President Truman's 
speech to Congress calling for conscription.
55
 The dangers that the latter identified were, 
indeed, already familiar to Iran: 
 
„The tragic death of the Republic of Czechoslovakia has sent a shock throughout 
the civilized world. Now pressure is being brought to bear on Finland, to the 
hazard of the entire Scandinavian peninsula. Greece is under direct military 
attack from rebels actively supported by her Communist dominated neighbors. 
In Italy, a determined and aggressive effort is being made by a Communist 
minority to take control of that country. The methods vary, but the pattern is all 
too clear.‟56 
 
Spurred by these observations, the President began to elaborate a security thesis that 
would hold profound implications for the future trajectory of Iran‟s relations with the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine advocated the provision of financial 
aid primarily to Greece, but also more significantly to Turkey, whose future „as an 
independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important [...] to the 
preservation of order in the Middle East.‟ The speech called more broadly for assistance 
for „free peoples‟ of that region to be made available „primarily through economic and 
financial aid.‟ 57  In the case of Iran however, an exposed geo-political position, 
combined with a febrile domestic political environment and challenging internal 
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security situation – aspects often emphasised by the Shah – guided the kind of aid 
offered. Thus an agreement was reached, and signed on the 6
th
 of October 1947, to 
replace the already substantial U.S. gendarmerie mission in Iran (GENMISH) with an 
expanded army mission (ARMISH), its purview being to enhance the efficiency of the 
Iranian army with respect to its „organisation, administrative principles and training 
methods.‟58 The existing American mission, under the control of Major General Ridley 
and Colonel Schwarzkopf, had been in place since late 1942. Its purpose, enshrined in a 
formal agreement a year later, had been „to advise and assist the Ministry of Interior in 
the reorganization of the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie‟ with U.S. officers, crucially, 
having precedence over Iranian Gendarmerie officers of the same rank. According to the 
provisions of the Agreement, the American chief of the Mission was also entitled to 
recommend to the Iranian Minister of Interior „the appointment, promotion, demotion, 
or dismissal of any employee of the Gendarmerie‟ with no other authority having „the 
right to interfere.‟ Finally, Iran undertook that no officers of other countries could serve 
in the Gendarmerie while members of the U.S. military mission were thus employed.
59
 
The motivation behind these provisions, retained in the 1947 agreement, was clearly 
elucidated in its text; it concerned „the extension of the Truman Doctrine‟ to include Iran 
as „a bastion in both the political and strategic sense, which, if breached, would [lead to] 
Soviet domination of the entire Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.‟60  
 
The implications of a strengthened American military presence were, naturally, not lost 
on Moscow. The increasing interest of U.S. policy makers in Iran, exemplified by the 
agreement of October 1947, was viewed both as a political challenge to Russia's 
influence in Iran and a military threat to the southern borders of the Soviet Union. The 
agreement‟s signing also coincided, unhappily from Moscow's point of view, with the 
Majles' outright rejection of the proposal for the joint Soviet-Iranian oil agreement – 
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somewhat damagingly, it emerged, to have been called „The Stalin Oil Company‟ – less 
than three weeks later.
61
 In an official response to the development, Iran‟s Prime 
Minister, Ibrahim Hakimi, was informed in a note from Moscow that „this hostile 
action‟ on the part of the Majles „while preserving the British oil concession in the 
south‟ constituted „an act of crude discrimination against the USSR‟ making clear that 
the Iranian government bore „responsibility for the consequences.‟ 62  The situation 
further deteriorated when it became public that the Iranian parliament had embarked 
upon negotiations for an American loan to purchase U.S. military equipment. A Iranian 
purchasing team visited Washington in May 1947 leading to a provisional agreement in 
June for a loan of $25 million, to be used for the purchase of excess U.S. military 
stores.
63
 The loan was issued on generous terms: 2.5% interest to be repaid over twelve 
years starting in 1951.
64
 Although referred to publicly as a credit, since the terms of the 
agreement bore obligations for Iran in terms of interest, constitutionally it required 
authorisation from the Majles – secured on the 31st of January 1948.65  
 
Parliamentary approval of the credit led to a flurry of diplomatic exchanges. A Soviet 
diplomatic note, timed to coincide with the debate itself, alleged that „strategic 
preparations‟ were being made on Iranian territory in violation of Article 5 of the 
Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921. It specifically accused General Grow, chief architect of 
the arms credit agreement, of establishing a „monopoly‟ over leadership roles in the 
imperial army for American military officials; of furnishing Iran with military 
equipment „in excess of its requirements‟; of assisting in the construction of an 
„enormous airbase‟ at Qom; and of coordinating reconnaissance flights over Soviet 
frontier posts. „These actions‟, it concluded, „constitute a threat to the Soviet Union‟s 
borders.‟66  The Iranian response, submitted to the Soviet government on the 4th of 
February 1948 and published in the government newspaper Ettela‟at the following day, 
was authored by Prime Minister Hakimi. The Soviet government had, he argued in a 
lengthy and uncompromising note, „no right to concern itself with Iran‟s internal 
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affairs‟, affirming that Iran would build air bases „wherever it pleased.‟ As for the army, 
Hakimi pointed out acerbically, „it is in need of modernisation and new equipment, 
since not only were Iran‟s military stocks depleted in the course of World War II but, as 
the Soviet Union knows better than anyone else, great damage was inflicted on the 
Iranian army in this respect.‟ Having addressed these points, the Prime Minister took the 
opportunity to „draw the Soviet Government's attention to certain truths which are, in 
contrast to the claims made in [the Soviet Government's] note, quite irrefutable‟, namely 
that the USSR had furnished „every conceivable kind of material and moral support to 
opportunists and traitors‟ within Iran during the Allied occupation; had subsequently 
„granted asylum‟ to the latter in the Soviet Union in spite of „strenuous‟ Iranian protests, 
permitting them „to form a detachment on Soviet territory with the intention of invading 
Iran‟ and putting „all the necessary means at their disposal‟; and finally, continued to 
tolerate anti-Iranian radio broadcasts, which, „beyond any doubt are transmitted from a 
single point in the Caucasus under the direct supervision of the Azerbaijan Democratic 
Party.‟ These actions, Hakimi concluded, did constitute a violation of Article 5 of the 
Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 and Iran therefore „called upon the Soviet government to 
terminate their unfriendly activities.‟ The Soviet Foreign Ministry retorted that Hakimi‟s 
counterattack had been „dictated in its entirety‟ by the U.S. Embassy's Press Attaché. 67 
 
In the midst of this robust exchange however, the Iranian Prime Minister made a curious 
admission. Iran, he stated, had approached the Soviet Union regarding the purchase of 
arms, but the price on offer was „not attractive.‟68 This remarkable statement appeared 
to bear witness to a desire on the part of the Iran not to alienate the Soviet Union 
entirely, the U.S. military agreement notwithstanding. And indeed similarly, on the 
opposite side of the border, Moscow's support for the Azeri Democratic forces in exile 
was not quite as fulsome as Hakimi felt bound to believe. Available archival evidence 
suggests that, in reality, Moscow took active steps to marginalise the discredited ADP, 
shifting toward the Tudeh Party as the preferred vehicle for furthering their interests in 
Iran; a fact that Mir Jafar Bagirov, chief Soviet architect of the Azeri separatist regime, 
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openly criticised.
69
 In view of this apparent policy change it has been suggested, not 
altogether implausibly, that Pishevari's sudden demise in a „road accident‟ (June 1947 
just inside Soviet Azerbaijan) was orchestrated by the Soviet secret police.
70
 While this 
remains impossible to verify, it is undoubtedly the case that Pishevari's energetic efforts 
to regroup his forces for an incursion into Iranian Azerbaijan – precisely his occupation 
at the time of the car crash – were inconvenient in light of the Soviet leadership's 
primary aim, evidenced by the shrillness of the accusations made in its note; to stabilise 
its southern borders and to avoid providing any further pretext for establishment of a 
long-term U.S. military presence. The evidence also supports a contention that Moscow 
had always seen Pishevari as expendable. In conversation with Ahmad Qavam during 
their negotiations in March 1946, Molotov had in fact proposed that, if an understanding 
could be reached between the two governments regarding an oil concession, then 
Pishevari „could die or become ill.‟71 Following Pishevari‟s demise, Soviet authorities 
appear to have confiscated his writings, including the two-volume manuscript of his 
History of the Democratic Movement in Iranian Azerbaijan. The leader's body was 
buried, unceremoniously, in an unmarked grave at his country house north of Baku.
72
 
 
Notwithstanding the Soviet Government's tactical shift away from the ADP, the 
prevailing environment – as suggested by the above – remained one of profound distrust 
and official displeasure on both sides. The U.S. military assistant package, which 
Moscow rightly suspected as the first step in what was to become an extensive and 
long-standing arrangement, triggered an significant deterioration in relations, whose 
potential seriousness found reflection in the notably more conciliatory tone of an Iranian 
note delivered to the Russian Embassy on the 22
nd
 March 1948. The document pointed 
out that Iranian policy toward the Soviet Union was based on the UN Charter and 
emphasised a desire to maintain friendly relations with all countries, „particularly the 
USSR‟, on the basis of reciprocity. This attempt to ease the pressure met with no 
success. The Soviet ambassador and his First Secretary were conspicuous by their 
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absence from the Shah's annual levée (held two days later on March the 24
th
) and a 
formal reply to the note followed on March 27
th
, again quoting the U.S.-Iranian 
Agreement of October 1947 in refutation of Iran's assurances, which it compared „with 
similar denials in 1941 about Axis agents in Persia.‟ 73 The prevalent feeling continued 
to be, in the words of one observer, „apprehension about possible Russian action‟, lent 
credence by the increased hostility of Soviet broadcasts emanating from the Caucasus.
74
 
The February 1949 Assassination Attempt on the Shah 
It was in this febrile context that, on the 4
th
 of February 1949, an attempt was made on 
the life of the Shah. The would-be assassin was a young man called Nasser Fakhr-Araï, 
an unemployed and disgruntled former paper mill technician.
75
 As the Shah mounted the 
steps to the law school at Tehran University, which was celebrating its nineteenth 
anniversary, Fakhr-Araï, posing as a press photographer (having obtained his journalist's 
pass through his paper mill connections) shot the Shah several times at close range 
hitting the king in his cheek, hat and shoulder before the revolver jammed. The assailant 
promptly met his demise at the hands of the imperial bodyguard.
76
 It was an 
extraordinarily lucky escape for the Shah and the authorities' response was predictably 
swift and uncompromising: martial law was immediately imposed and a large number 
of arrests were made.
77
 The following day, Dr. Manouchehr Eqbal, in his capacity as 
Acting Interior Minister, made a statement to an emergency session of the Majles. He 
announced that a notebook had been found among the possessions of the deceased in 
which, it was alleged, Fakhr-Araï „admitted he was a member of the Tudeh Party, in 
spite of the fact it was controlled by the USSR.‟78 Although the formulation appeared in 
fact to betray the assassin's ambivalent attitude towards the Tudeh Party‟s alleged 
sponsors, the implication drawn was one directly pointing to a Tudeh-led plot, 
conducted by extension with Moscow's prior knowledge if not active blessing. To 
underline the point, the Soviet book shop and cinema in Tehran were raided by armed 
soldiers and promptly closed down.
79
 
                                                 
73 IPD, Vol. XIII: Monthly Report for March 1948, 5 April 1948 
74 IPD, Vol. XIII: Monthly Report for February 1948, 6 March 1948 
75 M. Sanjabi (2002): Panj Golouleh Baraye Shah, p86 
76 M. R. Pahlavi: Mission for my Country, p103 
77 FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI: Sommerville to the Secretary of State, 4 February 1949 
78 FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI, Sommerville to the Secretary of State, 15 February 1949; IPD, Vol. IX, Monthly 
Report for February 1949, 1 March 1949. 
79 АВПРФ, ф94., оп.38, п.103, д. № 013-ИР л.31, Soviet note of protest dated 17 February 1949. 
 65 
 
British and American reactions to the incident were swift to concur with Dr. Eqbal's 
analysis. The British Embassy reported the Tudeh Party to have assembled „its most 
active members‟ in Tehran on the day of the shooting „under the pretext of anniversary 
celebrations.‟80 The head of the Iranian gendarmerie at Tabriz, it is further alleged, told 
the British Consul he had „certain‟ knowledge of a plot to kill senior army officers and 
of preparations for „Azerbaijan democratic forces‟ to cross over from the Soviet Union 
had the attempt succeeded. And most seriously, the report suggests „foreknowledge of 
[…] events among Tudeh employees at the Kerej [sic] sugar factory and in the town of 
Mianeh, whence arms had recently sent by lorry to Tehran.‟ This evidence, the official 
concluded, „leaves little room for doubt that the attempt […] was intended to be a signal 
for the instigation of wide-spread social disorder.‟81 The U.S. Chargé d'Affairs reached a 
similar if rather more guarded conclusion: „the weakness of the government and general 
lack of cohesion are such that if the Shah had been assassinated, complete chaos would 
have ensued, creating a situation of which the Soviet Government would have known 
how to take advantage.‟82  
 
Soviet officials were appalled. In a strongly-worded rebuke, delivered privately by 
ambassador Mikhail Sadchikov to Foreign Minister Hekmat and subsequently published 
in the Russian daily Izvestiya, Eqbal's speech to the Majles was denounced as „a 
slanderous fabrication […] a mendacious and provocatory action designed to worsen 
Soviet-Iranian relations for the benefit of certain foreign circles.‟83 Officially-sanctioned 
analyses went on the offensive, drawing inferences of their own between an allegation, 
on the one hand, that „in Iran nowadays there is not single ministry [...] where Western 
advisers do not call the shots‟, and on the other, that „the only document found on the 
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deceased was a journalist pass for the reactionary newspaper Parcham-e Islam [Flag of 
Islam], which is close to pro-British clerical circles.‟ 84  The latter claim sought to 
implicate prominent cleric Ayatollah Kashani, whose brother-in-law, cleric Said 
Abdolkarim Shirazi, owned the publication in question.
85
 One official Soviet history 
even went as far as to suggest the assassination was „organised by the American and 
British intelligence agencies‟, an assertion tenuously supported by the discovery that 
Fakhr-Araï's lover, a lady by the name of Mohin Eslami, was the daughter of the 
gardener at the British Embassy.
86
 The „harsh, false and exaggerated‟ nature of the 
Soviet claims elicited an equal and opposite reaction in the Iranian press.
87
 Particularly 
strident was the newspaper Tehran-e Mosavvar. Under the prominent headline „I was a 
Soviet Spy in Iran‟, the paper commenced a remarkable serialisation, which ran for no 
fewer than forty eight weeks (May 1949 to April 1950), following the alleged 
adventures of „Hussein‟, a repentant Tudeh Party member, who recounted having been 
„deceived by Soviet propaganda‟ in 1920, signing a dubious contract with a drunken 
Russian lieutenant in Qazvin, and his subsequent dispatch to Soviet Azerbaijan for 
training in the art of codes and cyphers. Hussein's subsequent travelogue was used as a 
platform for a series of unflattering observations on life in the Soviet Union, ranging 
from the state of its rail system to the black market, endemic corruption, gulags and the 
even prevalence of syphilis. Its centrepiece is a pointedly lurid account of an excursion 
to a collective farm called „The Red East‟, where Hussein discovers that „in a village of 
no more than eight hundred people there were fifty in jail […] all of them unfortunate 
peasants who had ended up there as а consequence of the law against sabotage or 
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tardiness in their work.‟88 The moral of Hussein's ill-fated venture, made repeatedly 
throughout, was clear: „Do not speak frivolously of freedom. For as the оld adage 
teaches us, the sated cannot understand the hungry; those who have not seen the Soviet 
Union for themselves do not understand what freedom really is.‟89 
 
Given the further deterioration in relations these uncompromising public and private 
recriminations undoubtedly reflected, establishing the facts of the failed assassination 
attempt is critical to assessing the incident's broader impact. Most instructive for this 
purpose are the memoirs of leading Iranian Tudeh members at the time, and in 
particular, recent revelations by the Party's then Deputy Head of Inspection (in effect 
responsible for party discipline), Abdollah Argani.
90
 Argani was subordinate in his role 
to Nuraddin Kianouri, an ambitious and influential member of the party and brother-in-
law to key Central Committee member, Abdul Samad Kombakhsh.
91
 The Shah‟s would-
be assassin, Nasser Fakhr-Araï, was Argani's childhood friend and house mate; a „hot 
headed adventurer‟ with a complex family background, who had grown disaffected with 
the „chaos‟ of Iran in general and with perceived corruption among the political elite in 
particular.
92
 When Fakhr-Araï expressed his desire to assassinate the Shah, Argani took 
up the idea. In the aftermath of the failed Soviet experiment in Azerbaijan the Tudeh 
was, as Argani remembered, subject to extreme pressure from the authorities:  
 
„The government was intent on getting rid of us. They would often come on 
some pretext or other to take away members for questioning and carry out 
inspections. They would shoot at our party headquarters from inside their patrol 
cars.‟93  
 
Argani's somewhat naïve logic ran that, with the Shah dead, other contenders for power 
(named as former Prime Ministers Ahmad Qavam and Zia'eddin Tabatabai, Chief of the 
General Staff Ali Razmara, the Shah's twin sister Ashraf Pahlavi, the Shah's brother 
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Prince Ali Reza and Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq) would be „at each other's throats‟ such 
that the Tudeh could quietly take the opportunity to regroup and strengthen its position. 
Argani mentioned his friend's plan to Kianouri, who in turn undertook to raise the 
matter with the Party's Central Committee. In Kianouri's account, when he subsequently 
spoke to Party General Secretary Reza Radmanesh and his deputy Feridoun Keshavarz 
regarding the plan, Radmanesh responded as follows: 
 
„Our party is against assassination on principle and we don't accept it as a means 
for revolutionary advancement. Having said that, if someone wants to kill the 
Shah, we're not about to go and tell him.‟94 
 
Kianouri claims to have then reflected this advice in his response to Argani, whose 
wording both parties agree on: „This is nothing to do with us [the Tudeh], do whatever 
you like.‟95 Keshavarz, on the other hand, has firmly denied that any such conversation 
between Kianouri and the Central Committee conversation took place: 
 
„About four months before the shooting, Kianouri proposed to a meeting of the 
Central Committee that we should provide the Organisation Commission (i.e. 
him) with sufficient funds to acquire a house, printing press, salaried cadres and 
a car. Because, according to him, the party would soon be forced into hiding. He 
suggested that everyone sell their houses and donate the proceeds to the party.‟96  
 
In Keshavarz's view, Kianouri was in fact a „double agent connected with [Lieutenant 
Haj Ali] Razmara‟ (then chief of Staff and subsequently Prime Minister.) Keshavarz 
maintained that Kianouri personally orchestrated the assassination attempt in order to 
rid himself of senior and „more popular‟ party cadres: „didn't his masters – Stalin, Beria 
and Bagirov – do the same thing with their own 'comrades'?‟97  
 
This interpretation appears implausible. Had Kianouri intended such an outcome, he 
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might reasonably have been expected to have take more convincing steps to destroy 
documentary evidence and evade capture prior to events unfolding.
98
 On the other hand, 
key parts of Kianouri's account of his movements on the day of the assassination have 
been shown to be factually questionable.
99
 While the true sequence of events may never 
be determined, what does seem indisputable is that Kianouri did not seek to discourage 
his protégé, Argani, who went on to purchase the revolver used by Fakhr-Araï, a fact of 
which Kianouri was by his own admission aware.
100
 Indeed, Argani has sought to lay 
the blame for the episode at his mentor's doorstep. „I was young‟, he explained, „fiery 
and inexperienced [...] Kianouri ought to have rejected my suggestion and prevented me 
from acting on it, but not only did he not do this, he implicitly welcomed it.‟101 Yet here  
also Argani is too demure by far. Although indeed relatively young (twenty six) at the 
time, the party's Inspection Commission (komissiyun-e taftish), within which Argani 
held the position of Assistant Head of Enforcement (mo'aven-e entezarat), under 
Kianouri, was a powerful body closely linked to the Central Committee, with whom it 
regularly exchanged members.
102
 Similarly worth of note is the fact the party cell 
(houzeh), of which Argani and Kianouri were both members, was convened in the house 
of Abdul Samad Kombaksh, who, in addition to his Tudeh Central Committee 
membership and familial ties to Kianouri, was identified by a CIA analysis at the time 
as „the principle liaison agent with the USSR.‟103 In his memoirs, curiously enough, 
Kianouri himself confirms that Kombaksh was indeed a member of the Soviet 
Communist Party (CPSU) throughout his youth and „more than anyone else enjoyed 
their particular trust.‟104 Thus, while there remains no hard proof to supoort a claim of 
Soviet complicity in the failed plot, available evidence does point strongly towards 
Kianouri and his associates as comprising a faction within the party, whose nascent 
radicalism may have found support from Moscow at the expense of European-educated 
left-wing intellectuals such as Radmanesh and Keshavarz.
105
 This line of argument is 
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further supported by Kianouri's remarkable survival and subsequent rise through party 
ranks, despite strenuous criticism of his involvement in the Fakhr-Araï debacle.
106
  
Unfortunately for Soviet-Iranian relations more broadly, the reality of the assassination 
attempt, and the protagonists‟ indisputable connection to the Tudeh Party had 
compellingly revived the spectre of Soviet interference and communist intrigue. And 
crucially for Iran's foreign relations as a whole, the incident had lent fresh impetus to a 
narrative in which the Iranian and U.S. governments had begun to identify a mutual 
political advantage. The American Chargé d'Affairs in Tehran, acting under instructions, 
suggested to the Shah that the time was „opportune‟ for the Iranian Government to refer 
Soviet interference to the U.N. Security Council and proposed that the American 
government would make a parallel declaration in this case.
107
 In response, the Shah 
suggested a more effective deterrent to Soviet aggression could be provided if „in any 
statement which the U.S. government might make regarding the non-inclusion of […] 
Iran in [the] proposed Atlantic Pact, it could be made plain there had been no lessening 
of [their] determination to resist aggression anywhere.‟108 In which connection, „the 
Shah said the situation in Iran as it existed just prior to the [assassination] attempt 
provided the best possible opportunity for Communism to make headway […] He went 
on to say he hoped he had the sympathy of the US as a great nation struggling for 
freedom and independence of the world. In this struggle, he added, Iran was a most 
important element […] gateway to the greatest oil resources in the world.‟109 The Shah's 
representations were, the evidence suggests, rewarded by a subtle but significant shift in 
American perceptions of Iran's strategic vulnerabilities and importance in the Middle 
East.
110
 This heightened sensitivity, succinctly expressed by a report from the American 
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Ambassador in Tehran would hold profound implications for Soviet-Iranian relations: 
 
„The Russians do not play for fun: they play for keeps. When they were erased 
out of [Iranian] Azerbaijan they departed with the greatest reluctance and 
certainly with every determination to return […] this possibility […] merits 
active and vigilant apprehension.‟111 
 
The balance of evidence however, presents a rather more nuanced picture. Far from 
being resurgent, as the CIA was privately convinced, the Tudeh in fact found itself in a 
position of desperate weakness; subject to increasingly repressive controls and 
successfully infiltrated by government double agents.
112
 The failed assassination attempt 
on the Shah not only revealed clear rifts within the party's leadership, but also 
highlighted the inability of senior figures such as Keshavarz to restrain radicals like 
Kianouri, whose disastrous adventurism had dealt a serious blow to the party‟s ability to 
operate in Iran; it was now outlawed. In the official Soviet version, the incident had thus 
provided both „a pretext‟ for the repression of „the national-democratic movement‟ and 
an unwelcome vehicle through which the Shah could advance his long-held desire for 
constitutional reform.
113
 For Moscow, such reform was synonymous with a tightening 
of the Shah's grip on power, to the general advantage of the West, and specifically by 
„removal from the agenda‟ of items tabled by pro-Soviet members of the Majles aimed 
at limiting British and American influence.
114
 Faced with a wholesale crackdown that 
rudely exposed the fragility of its carefully cultivated local proxy, Moscow was left with 
little option but to salvage the remains of the party's Central Committee. Of its twenty-
four members, only a handful evaded capture, most prominently Radmanesh and 
Keshavarz, who appear to have taken sanctuary in Soviet safe houses and were 
subsequently smuggled across the Caspian Sea in Soviet-Iranian Fisheries Company 
vessels.
115
 Indeed, the palpable sense of frustration on the part of Soviet officials at the 
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turn of events found expression in the words of a reportedly furious Ivan Sadchikov, 
who upon receiving news of the assassination attempt was heard by one of his staff to 
remark, “what is one to expect from these idiots?”116 
‘Dancing on a tightrope’: Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the Soviet Union 
Mohammad Mosaddeq came to power with a popular mandate to nationalise the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company. In doing so, he sought to implement the final clause of a decree 
promulgated by the Majles when it finally rejected Prime Minister Qavam's tactical 
agreement with the Russians for a joint oil company. At the time the Bill was first read, 
in October 1947, the clause in question was presciently viewed by the British with a 
degree of seriousness: 
 
„The Government are charged in all instances where the rights of the people of 
Persia in the sources of the country's wealth, whether above or below ground, 
have been impaired, especially regarding the oil in the south, to undertake the 
necessary measures with a view to redeeming the rights of the nation.‟117 
 
Any notion however, that the British would easily surrender the AIOC – a crucial profit-
making interest at a time of severe financial constraint for the United Kingdom – 
quickly faltered as it became clear, first, that the Company was capable of effectively 
securing an embargo on Iranian oil products and, second, that Dr. Mosaddeq would be 
not be successful in securing American support as a stop-gap for government finances, 
despite sustained pressure on the administrations of Harry Truman and latterly Dwight 
Eisenhower.
118
 So potentially damaging was the latter failure – culminating in January 
1953 with the suspension of American military and budgetary aid for three months – 
that Mosaddeq allegedly kept the letter from President Eisenhower informing him of the 
decision hidden under his pillow.
119
 Against the background of these failures, it has been 
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argued, the Prime Minister increasingly sought to leverage the support of other political 
forces – more specifically, the Tudeh party – in an attempt to consolidate his position; a 
trend that stood in inverse proportion to the waning popularity of his administration 
among both his own nationalist constituency and the country more broadly. This 
apparent reality was most obviously exemplified by the prominent role of the Tudeh 
Party in the riots of July 1952, which in effect forced the Shah to re-install Mosaddeq 
following a short interlude with Qavam as Prime Minister.
120
 The effect on Western 
observers at the time, as archival evidence broadly attests, was to create the impression 
that the Tudeh party might itself constitute a viable (and naturally unappetising) 
alternative to the National Front's rule.
121
 The point was well illustrated in the U.S. 
Embassy‟s retrospective report on the events of 1953: „Although the regime appeared to 
have the means – martial law and plenary power backed up by the security forces – for 
controlling completely all channels for political expression […] it was nevertheless 
having increasing difficulty in demonstrating a large measure of public support for 
itself. It was in this respect that the Tudeh party had its opportunity.‟122 The apparently 
unnerving implications of that opportunity were earlier made explicit in a telegram from 
Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, to his U.S. counterpart: 
 
„The Tudeh party has grown in strength as a result of the policies which 
Musaddiq [sic] has followed since he took office. Now he has been returned to 
power after public disturbances in which the Tudeh party cooperated with his 
followers. The Tudeh are therefore in a good position to make embarrassing 
demands upon him which he could probably not refuse. Even his supporter 
[Ayatollah] Kashani, according to our information, is worried about his 
weakness to the Tudeh.‟123 
 
Western convictions were further strengthened by the autocratic tendencies of the Prime 
Minister, who Eden also argued had „at the expense of the Majles, judiciary, security 
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forces, the clergy, the bazaar and the court, deprived these institutions of some of their 
inherent strength as barriers to Communism.‟ Recently declassified documents present 
the final logical stage in the argument: 
 
„[The Tudeh Party] has recently expended much effort explaining to its members 
why Mosaddeq should be supported in his feud with the Shah, obviously fearing 
severe restrictive measures against it should a new Prime Minister appear […] 
should Mosaddeq himself disappear from the scene, the Tudeh could 
conceivably seize control in his name.‟124  
 
Reinforcing this conception for American officials was the reality on the ground that the 
Tudeh, apparently given greater freedom by the Iranian security forces, was capable of 
physically endangering American interests. On one particularly noteworthy occasion in 
the southern city of Shiraz, Tudeh elements succeeded in „redirecting‟ street mobs 
toward the offices and homes of U.S. technical personnel „with destructive and near 
tragic consequences.‟ Most damagingly from Mosaddeq's point of view, U.S. diplomats 
concluded from the incident that the free reign apparently afforded to the Tudeh was in 
fact a deliberate ploy, sanctioned by the Prime Minister personally, in order „to illustrate 
the type of public opinion which would become dominant unless the U.S. provided the 
kinds and amounts of assistance [Mosaddeq] thought necessary.‟125 
 
The immediate role of America in the subsequent coup of 1953 and the profound 
consequences this event held for subsequent Iranian history has, of course, been 
exhaustively documented and analysed elsewhere.
126
 With the progressive release of 
Western intelligence documents, a reasonably full and desanitised picture now exists of 
Anglo-American strategy and actions both up to and during the coup, even if the actual 
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extent to which CIA dollars contributed to the broader trajectory of events remains a 
mute point.
127
 By contrast, the extent of the Soviet Government‟s interaction with and 
alleged support for the Mosaddeq regime has received less scrutiny. This is despite the 
clear fact that apprehensions regarding the extent of Tudeh party support for the 
Mosaddeq administration (and by extension the Soviet Union at one remove) were 
critical in persuading Western observers of the necessity for supporting the eventual 
coup. Suspicions were particularly galvanised by the mysterious perigrinations of the 
Soviet Ambassador, Mikhail Sadchikov, who left Iran for Moscow on the 3
rd
 of June 
1953, announcing a leave of four weeks „to visit his ailing wife.‟ His return a week later 
by special airplane however, and his subsequent, „closely guarded‟ conferences he held 
with Prime Minister Mosaddeq gave particular cause for concern.
128
 In the absence of 
any press release, the U.S. Chargé d‟Affairs in Tehran resorted to conjecture, even 
speculating that Moscow might be attempting „to obtain Iranian support for Red China 
and related Soviet objectives.‟129 
 
The Soviet archival evidence, then, is of benefit in addressing a hiatus in existing 
histories and permitting a fresh examination of the final days of Mosaddeq's role, with 
some important implications for Soviet-Iranian relations more broadly during the period 
under discussion. Available documents paint a vivid picture of an increasingly embattled 
Mosaddeq, apparently desperate to secure Soviet support in pressuring Britain to loosen 
its blockade and extricate Iran from its deteriorating financial position, yet at the same 
time anxious to avoid the public impression of direct Soviet support wherever possible, 
or indeed to furnish Moscow with any pretext for interference in Iranian internal affairs. 
The effect of this strategy on his Soviet counterparts, in a now familiar pattern, was a 
parallel reluctance to offer concrete assistance unless tangible political gains were on 
offer in return, namely and explicitly, closer ties between Iran and the Soviet Union at 
the expense of the West. Perhaps the most striking evidence of the resulting impasse 
emerges in archival materials from April 1952, which document the Soviet 
Ambassador‟s secret and failed negotiations with Ayatollah Kashani for the sale of 
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Iranian oil to the USSR. On the 11
th
 of April 1952, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrey 
Vyshinski wrote to Stalin to report on the progress of the talks: 
 
„Kashani made a request to Sadchikov [the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran] that, 
in the case of the negotiations regarding the sale of oil being concluded 
successfully, we provide the Iranian government with an assurance that this sale 
will not be utilised as a means or pretext for interference in the internal affairs of 
Iran; and that, if Iran is subjected to external pressure as a result of selling us oil, 
we will not abandon Iran and provide the requisite financial assistance.‟130 
 
The Soviet leadership was evidently unimpressed with this formulation. Although the 
central decision making body – the Politburo – did „sympathise with the position in 
which Iran finds itself‟, and indeed instructed their Ambassador to obtain more detailed 
proposals with regard to the oil sale, they were manifestly unwilling to provide the 
Iranian government with the assurance it sought. The Politburo's directive to the Foreign 
Ministry thus instructed: „If Kazemi [Iranian Foreign Minister] raises the issue of our 
making assurances that the purchase of Iranian oil will not be used to interfere in Iranian 
internal affairs, then you must categorically avoid discussion of this topic, stating that 
such a proposal is lacking in any basis.‟131 
 
As can be discerned in the above exchange, a significant factor for Iranian politicians in 
engaging with Soviet representatives was the fresh and sobering memory of Russian 
interference during and after WWII. Conversely, the Soviet Government‟s refusal to 
provide explicit commitments against interference undoubtedly reflected Moscow‟s 
own sensitivities regarding Western involvement in Iran. The latter issue was once again 
demonstrated in the violent displeasure expressed by Soviet leaders when, less than two 
weeks later, it emerged that Mosaddeq‟s government had agreed to resume acceptance 
of American military aid, ironically in the face of objections from Foreign Minister 
Kazemi that the assurances the Iranian government was required to make in order to 
access that aid would „provoke the Russians.‟132 The Politburo‟s note of protest to the 
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Iranian Foreign Ministry, delivered several weeks later in May, was explicit: 
 
„The Soviet Government considers it essential to draw the Iranian Government‟s 
attention to the fact that, by agreeing to the acceptance of so-called American 
assistance, and in this connection assuming certain obligations toward the U.S., 
the Iranian Government has effectively embarked on a path of collaboration with 
the U.S. Government in implementing its aggressive designs against the Soviet 
Union. Such action on the part of the Iranian government cannot but be viewed 
as incompatible with good-neighbourly relations.‟133 
 
The agreement with the Americans heightened and focused the Soviet leadership‟s 
latent suspicions about Mosaddeq‟s reliability as a partner, reinforced by the memory 
(which remained somewhat raw) of the Prime Minister‟s leading role, as a deputy in the 
14
th
 Majles of 1944, in tabling and carrying the bill that had effectively prevented the 
Soviet Union from obtaining its desired oil concession.
134
 Turning to 1953 therefore, it 
was as a direct consequence of this pre-existing strain in relations that, far from aiding 
the Mosaddeq administration, the Soviet Government, itself in the midst of a difficult 
leadership transition following the death of Stalin, took a substantially less forthcoming 
attitude than the West leaders suspected.
135
 In fact, Moscow sought to take advantage of 
the Iranian Government‟s increasing financial and domestic political weakness in order 
to force concessions on the issues they saw as most pressing at the time, namely, 
renewal of the Soviet-Iranian fisheries concession, favourable resolution of outstanding 
financial issues and, above all, enhancing the security of the porous Soviet-Iranian 
border.
136
 On the latter question, as Soviet documents quite remarkably reveal, 
negotiations between Mosaddeq‟s Foreign Minister Hossein Fatemi and Soviet 
representatives were still underway in Tehran up to 1pm on the 15
th
 of August 1953; less 
than twelve hours before General Nassiri delivered the Shah‟s infamous decree 
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dismissing his Prime Minister and signalling the initial coup attempt.
137
  
 
It may appear somewhat counterintuitive that Moscow would opt, at a critical moment, 
to withhold practical assistance from the Iranian government in respect of its „anti-
colonialist‟ struggle that Moscow had, of course, actively supported at the United 
Nations.
138
 The policy position at which the Soviet government arrived becomes less 
surprising however, when one considers the tactics that Mosaddeq employed. The most 
striking example is provided in a conversation held with the Soviet Ambassador on the 
30
th
 of March 1953. The Prime Minister presented the latest in a series of requests for 
Soviet financial assistance, in this instance proposing to barter Iranian crude in 
exchange for 100,000 tons of sugar: 
 
„Mosaddeq stated that he does not want to play hide and seek with us and 
intends to quite openly explain the goal of his proposition, which is to force the 
other side [the British] to purchase Iranian oil on the basis of conditions 
favourable to Iran. The agreement is […] necessary for the Iranian government 
as a means of counterpressure. Mosaddeq underlined his thinking several times. 
[…] They are threatening Iran with aircraft and naval vessels, said Mosaddeq, 
and we for our part will threaten them with an agreement to sell oil to the Soviet 
Union in return for sugar. Mosaddeq hopes that we will meet with the Iranian 
government‟s wishes, helping Iran to preserve her independence and not 
succumb to the pressure to which she is exposed. […] Mosaddeq said that he 
would await our answer for five days. If we will agree to help him, then he asks 
that we give him a response by Saturday. If we do not provide him with an 
answer within this timeframe, he will consider our answer to be negative. In that 
case, he will lose all hope and be obliged to enter into negotiations with the other 
side and hear what they have to offer him.‟139 
 
The Prime Minister‟s blunt proposal in effect presented his Soviet counterparts with two 
unappealing alternatives: (1) fail to support the ailing Mosaddeq administration and it 
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will be obliged to reach an accommodation with the British; or (2) agree to provide 
support in order that the British may then feel obliged to reach an accommodation with 
Mosaddeq. Either way, British influence was to be preserved. Given the Iranian 
government‟s desperate need, Moscow‟s almost inevitable refusal only served to further 
increase mistrust and tension between the two sides. Nowhere is this deterioration more 
keenly demonstrated than in an extraordinary conversation between Ambassador 
Sadchikov and Dr. Mosaddeq on the 11
th
 of June 1953. The meeting, as noted above, 
gave particular cause for suspicion to the British and Americans. Specifically, the 
absence of any press statement regarding the content of the conversation – as the 
American source put it, „no leaks‟ – strengthened the perception that Mosaddeq was 
negotiating for Soviet support to protect his increasingly exposed position.
140
 In reality, 
it emerges, almost precisely the opposite was the case. As the archival record shows, 
Moscow, far from offering the practical support Mosaddeq's administration so 
desperately needed, in fact sought to exploit the Prime Minister‟s weakness to force 
negotiations on the Soviet-Iranian border, offering in return to release an unspecified 
number of Iranian subjects evidently held in the USSR for violating it. Sadchikov drew 
the Prime Minister’s attention to specific protests on the subject made via the Iranian 
Ambassador in Moscow. Mosaddeq’s reply was uncompromising: 
 
„[He] stated that he knows nothing about this […] If indeed such notes and 
verbal statements have been made, then he will agree to take back those Iranian 
subjects on whose behalf the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Iranian Embassy 
have petitioned. As regards the remainder, their return to Iran is undesirable as 
they are provided with work in the Soviet Union one way or another, whereas in 
Iran they will be unemployed. If the Soviet authorities forcibly deport them to 
Iran then the Iranian authorities will naturally be forced to accept them, but аs a 
retaliatory measure [sic] Iran will deport to the USSR an equal number of the 
Soviet citizens living in Iran.‟141 
 
Having received this ‘strange and unexpected’ reply, Sadchikov next attempted to draw 
Mosaddeq on the border issue itself. The reaction was similarly unforthcoming: 
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„The Iranian government [Mosaddeq said] is burdened with all sorts of troubles 
at the moment, even leaving aside the border issue […] until these are resolved, 
he does not consider it expedient to open negotiations on the Soviet-Iranian 
border. To do so would yet further compound and complicate the position of 
his government, which fact, at a time when Iran is preoccupied with the 
struggle against Britain, would only benefit the British.‟142 
Sadchikov however, was apparently anxious to elicit a more positive response. Pursuing 
his argument more forcefully, he noted that „having served for many years in Iran and 
knowing the feelings of the Iranian people in relation to the Soviet Union, I am certain 
that settlement of border disagreements will be perceived positively.‟ At this juncture, 
Sadchikov reported, Mosaddeq „became tearful.‟ The Prime Minister retorted that „he 
knew best what was in the interests of Iran and the Iranian government‟; that the Iranian 
people‟s thinking was „identical to his own'; finally that „this [Moscow's hardened 
attitude toward Iran] was all a result of the death of great Stalin [sic] and how “he knew 
in his heart that this would happen.”‟ In view of this less than propitious turn of events, 
the unfortunate ambassador began to make his excuses to leave. Mosaddeq asked him to 
remained seated. “What are we going to tell the press?” he asked. There then followed, 
in Sadchikov's account, a half-hour discussion wherein Mosaddeq not only prevailed on 
the ambassador to refrain from any press statement but also asked the latter to inform 
his superiors back in Moscow that he considered dialogue on the border issue to be 
„exhausted‟; that as far as he was concerned their conversation had „not taken place‟ and 
should be „consigned to oblivion.‟ Sadchikov, with barely-disguised irritation, 
concluded his report by describing Mosaddeq‟s performance as a „highly-strung blend 
of deceitfulness, cunning, hypocrisy and histrionics.‟143 
 
While the Soviet ambassador's experience undoubtedly bore fresh witness to the 
ingrained suspicion between the two parties, it would seem that a significant motivation 
behind Mosaddeq’s dramatic behaviour was anxiousness to avoid providing the West or 
domestic pro-Western elements with further ammunition against him. In what perhaps 
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represents one of the profoundest ironies of the period however, by successfully seeking 
not to publicise the nature of his exchange with Sadchikov, the Prime Minister achieved 
precisely the outcome he sought to avoid: his secrecy led American officials to suspect 
and warn of collusion between the two parties when in actual fact the opposite was true. 
And the Soviet leadership too, it may with some justification be argued, again both 
misjudged and mishandled another opportunity to expand their influence inside Iran, 
falling prey to the comfortable conceit, popularised by British diplomats and indeed 
subsequently by the Shah, of dismissing Mosaddeq’s behaviour as irrational rather than 
as a product of circumstances over which they might have had a significant influence 
had they elected to do so.
144
 That this should have been the case was primarily due to a 
narrow preoccupation with the resolution of specific bilateral issues in a manner that 
was both untimely and indeed unhelpful to the Mosaddeq administration, whose needs 
were somewhat more basic; as the Prime Minister at one stage bluntly appraised the 
Soviet Ambassador, ‘we have no money.’145 Equally, however, the evidence strongly 
suggests that Mosaddeq alienated the Soviet Union by so openly seeking to utilise 
relations as a ‘counterpressure’ against the West in place of pursuing any meaningful 
rapprochement. The Prime Minister's conduct of foreign relations in this respect, it may 
be observed, substantially mirrored his approach to domestic politics, aptly described at 
the time by a former Iranian Ambassador in Moscow as ‘dancing on a tightrope.’146 
 
Conclusion 
In assessing the overall trends during this crucial period for Soviet-Iranian relations, and 
indeed for modern Iranian history more broadly, this chapter has sought to evidence the 
largely reactive and opportunistic nature of Soviet policies toward Iran, and the 
consequences of their failure. Compounded by an unfortunate mix of pressure tactics, 
poor timing, and over-concern for the bureaucratic or legalistic aspects of relations at 
the expense of broader political gains, the practical implementation of Soviet policy 
ultimately strengthened an underlying historical narrative, outlined in the introduction to 
this thesis, that proved both convincing and attractive to the Shah and his emerging 
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supporters. The thesis of Soviet grand design and long-range strategic ambition, which 
stood in contrast to the somewhat more prosaic reality of the Moscow’s desire to 
prevent a Western military presence on its borders and secure a greater economic stake 
in Iran, engendered precisely the outcome that Soviet policy makers sought to avoid: an 
expanded military western presence on the USSR’s southern borders. As seen, the 
primary cause for suspicion and distrust between the two sides originated in the 
Azerbaijan crisis and its aftermath. While the truth surrounding the actions and 
inclinations of Ahmad Qavam is, as Ervand Abrahamian has pointed out, so ‘shrouded 
in a fog of half truths and misleading innuendos’ as to make a sober assessment of the 
facts problematic, for the immediate the purposes of this thesis what can be stated with 
some certainty is that both pro-Soviet figures and the wider Tudeh Party apparatus, as 
Mikhail Kavtaradze before them, grossly miscalculated in their efforts to force the 
Prime Minister's hand.
147
 
 
Notwithstanding the Soviet leadership's clear and sustained interference in Iranian 
affairs with respect to the Azerbaijan Crisis, this chapter has concluded that, while it is 
not possible on the basis of existing evidence to support a claim of direct Soviet 
government complicity in the Tudeh-linked assassination attempt on the Shah, it is 
nevertheless clear that the Soviet Embassy‟s apparent links to the party's more radical 
elements, exemplified by the activities and subsequent career of Nuraddin Kianouri, 
turned out to be a strategic error. Not only had the failed assassination led to the 
proscription of the party inside Iran, but resultant infighting between Moscow's protégés 
and the more traditional left-wing intellectuals such as Fereydoun Keshavarz seriously 
limited the party's effectiveness as a potential tool of Soviet policy. And indeed, as one 
scholar of the Tudeh party has shown, the battle for ascendancy between the two wings 
continued unabated in their Muscovite exile.
148
 A further and more obvious 
consequence of the Tudeh leadership's having been driven out of the country was the 
corresponding reduction in its ability to correctly judge and respond to events inside the 
country; a problem that resurfaced in the Party‟s disastrous response to the Islamic 
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Revolution of 1979.
149
  
 
Turning to events of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq's premiership, this chapter has sought to 
present the factual documentary record for the Prime Minister‟s relationship with 
Moscow in the light of its fateful consequences. The importance of such an 
investigation is sharpened by the profound impact that the perceived character of the 
alleged relationship held for the subsequent development of Soviet-Iranian relations, as 
evidenced by the extensive mythologisation by the Shah‟s regime, upon regaining 
power, of Mosaddeq's alleged subservience to Soviet interests.
150
 In his memoir An 
Answer to History, written in exile following the 1979 revolution, the Shah states that 
he personally saw „postage stamps printed in the name of the People‟s Iranian 
Republic‟, which was allegedly to be proclaimed by the Tudeh following Mosaddeq‟s 
putative elimination.
151
 General Fazollah Zahedi, the man appointed by the Shah to 
succeed Mosaddeq, subsequently expressed his appreciation for America‟s „moral‟ 
support in successfully „rescuing Iran from the very brink [of a] Communist abyss.‟152 
Though the validity of such claims may of course be questioned, their impact on the 
future trajectory of Pahlavi foreign policy can hardly be discounted.  
 
By contrast, the archival evidence points to the Soviet leadership's guardedly 
ambivalent and, in the final account, resolutely unsupportive approach toward the 
Mosaddeq's administration. The Kremlin's objectives vis-à-vis the nationalist 
movement, recorded in a series of directives to the MGB Residency in Tehran during 
May and August 1951, were initially „to assess the possibility of using nationalistically-
inclined circles in Iran, […] and other opponents of Anglo-American dominance, for the 
benefit the USSR [...] with the goal of weakening American and British influence.‟153 
The challenge with such a strategy lay in the fact that Mosaddeq, energetically seeking 
to implement his long-cherished principle of neutrality (as proposed to the Majles in 
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1944) did not share Moscow‟s objective of weakening Western interests per se. Rather, 
his goal was to ensure that no single country's political or economic ambitions, 
including those of the USSR, could dictate the interests of Iran as he conceived them. 
Thus, while Soviet policy makers were swift to identify Mosaddeq's rise to power and 
the apparent growth in nationalist feeling against the West as a development with the 
potential to enhance Soviet influence, the Prime Minister himself viewed relations with 
the USSR in more opportunistic terms.
154
 The fundamental incompatibility of these two 
approaches led directly to the impasse of June 1953. It is likely that, had Moscow 
acceded to Mosaddeq‟s pleas for assistance, the financial position of his government 
would have been considerably alleviated. At the same time, neither side appears to have 
fully appreciated the profound impact their abortive flirtation would have the U.S. 
leadership's regional apprehensions. “If”, as Eisenhower told the National Security 
Council in March 1953, “I had $500,000,000 of money to spend in secret, I would get 
$100,000,000 of it to Iran right now.”155 
 
A postscript from the Soviet Archives will be of benefit in framing the following 
chapter of this thesis. On presenting his credentials to the imperial court on the 1
st
 of 
August 1953, the newly-appointed Soviet Ambassador to Iran, Anatoly Lavrent'yev 
(Sadchikov having evidently been replaced for mishandling Mosaddeq and failing to 
advance Moscow‟s objectives with respect to border demarcation)  found that the Shah 
wished to discuss technical assistance and expressed „admiration‟ for Soviet completion 
of the Volga-Don Canal. The Shah, it transpired, had personally order a documentary 
film regarding the canal to be brought for him by the Soviet Embassy.
156
 Similarly 
revealing for the future trajectory of Soviet-Iranian relations was a conversation 
between the Acting Minister of Court and Lavrent'yev on the 13
th
 of August. The former 
bizarrely requested the latter's attendance as a „guest of honour‟ for a dinner at the 
Sa'adabad Palace to be held on the 19
th
 of August, that is, after the impending coup were 
it to have succeeded. Invitations to the dinner, the Minister announced, had already been 
issued; the ambassador‟s absence would naturally „surprise the guests and create an 
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unfavourable impression in society.‟ Lavrent'yev felt unable to respond this „peculiar‟ 
proposition and excused himself on the basis of prior commitments, reporting back to 
his superiors that: „I did not wish to commit myself to anything, nor indeed to oppose 
myself to the court.‟157 
                                                 
157 АВПРФ, ф.094, оп.65, п.403, д. № 033-ИР, л.162: Conversation with the Acting Minister of Court 
 86 
CHAPTER TWO | SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS FROM 1954 TO 1959 
 
 
„Meanwhile, in growing volume, there have been siren voices sounding behind 
the curtain. The Communists too, it seems, can be nice to monarchs.‟  
 
  - BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE, ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1956  
 
„In terms of a response to Iran‟s joining the Baghdad Pact, the proposed press 
article 'Pie with an American Filling' does not concern us unduly, however, it 
must be borne in mind that its publication would give rise to a fresh round of 
slanderous attacks on the Soviet Union, particularly on the part of those Iranian 
newspapers mentioned in it. Such a campaign would not benefit us, as it could 
create an unfavourable context for the Shah's forthcoming visit to Moscow.‟ 
 
- HEAD OF SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY EASTERN DEPARTMENT TO MOLOTOV, 29TH OF MAY 1956 
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Introduction: The Background to the Baghdad Pact 
The fall of Mohammad Mosaddeq‟s administration notwithstanding, there remained on 
the part of the West, and in the minds of U.S. politicians in particular, a wider strategic 
concern at the underlying weakness of Middle Eastern monarchies in general, and the 
susceptibility of Iran to communist penetration more specifically. As the previous 
chapter has pointed out, the reality of Iran's exposed geopolitical position was also 
appreciated by its sovereign, who did not demure from emphasising his country‟s 
putative vulnerabilities in pursuit of a firmer American commitment to military aid. 
Shortly before the Shah's state visit to the U.S. in December 1954, for example, the 
State Department received an „advance copy‟ of a memorandum subsequently delivered 
in person by the Shah to President Eisenhower.
1
 Its core argument ran as follows: 
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„The problem weighing most heavily on my mind at present […] is that of the 
security of Iran. We have over 1,600 miles of border with Russia. Although 
relations now with our northern neighbour are at least formally correct, we have 
no reason to believe that international Communism has abandoned its long-range 
objectives of converting Iran into a Communist corridor to the Persian Gulf, the 
Middle East and South Asia.‟2 
 
The Shah's note proceeded to set out ways in which the Soviet Union might try to „take 
over‟ Iran and concluded that the antidote to Communist ambitions lay primarily in 
raising the Iranian Armed Forces „from their presently weak state.‟ Referring to 
budgetary limitations, the Shah warned that „our common objective of maintaining Iran 
as an economically and politically stable country will not be achieved unless the 
situation regarding its armed forces is remedied [as it has] practically no defensive 
capabilities.‟ Seeking to strengthen the latter case in the regional context, the letter made 
the case for a „carefully calculated balance‟ of Iranian military strength against that of 
Pakistan and Turkey, and by implication, an equal footing in terms of American 
assistance received. In the absence of such a balance, the Shah argued, Soviet forces 
„could easily outflank Turkey by seizing Iran‟ and that the consequence would thus be to 
„turn the Persian Gulf into a Communist sea [and the Russians will then] be in a 
position to seize the major oil fields of the Middle East.‟3 The memorandum closed by 
underlining Iran's willingness to play a „proper role‟ in promoting the security of the 
Middle East, emphasising that Iran was „the key‟ to such a defence.4 
 
The case made by the Shah was, as he no doubt appreciated, persuasive insofar as his 
views closely mirrored those of the U.S. leadership, evident from private National 
Security Council discussions of the period.
5
 The principal difference between the two 
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sides‟ positions however, consisted in the fact that, whereas the Shah desired the 
enhancement of military aid in order that Iran might „contribute its share‟ to a regional 
security arrangement, the Eisenhower administration chiefly had in view the 
geopolitical advantage of adding Iran to its line of defence against Communism in the 
Middle East – subsequently to become known as the „Northern Tier‟ – with Iranian 
capabilities being built up within the framework of that alliance.
6
 In sharp contrast to 
the Shah's ambitions, it was felt that the primary role of the Iranian Armed Forces 
should entail, as a State Department Memorandum put it, „defensive delaying 
capabilities‟; the ability to temporarily withstand a Red Army attack until more capable 
assistance arrived. Crucially, American involvement would not extend to a full-scale 
provision of modern weaponry. Indeed, as the same Memorandum cautioned: „We do 
not want to develop a military establishment in Iran which would be a burden on the 
national [Iranian] economy.‟ The clear intention was that, following the successful 
resolution of the oil dispute with Great Britain, Iran's increased revenues could make a 
„major contribution toward supporting the armed forces, thereby reducing reliance on 
foreign aid.‟7 In short, the U.S. administration saw the provision of military equipment 
as a preferably minimal outlay justified by the principal goal – a defensive alliance – 
whereas the Shah desired that such an alliance be preceded by, or at least subsequently 
entail, a significant strengthening of Iran‟s armed forces. It was a difference of opinion 
with critical future consequences. 
 
Meanwhile, an equally significant shift of foreign policy was underway in Moscow. The 
Stalinist world view had sharply polarised the international stage into the forces of 
imperialism and its adversaries, and the lack of flexibility this implied was further 
exacerbated by a tendency to view its own policy failures through the same ideological 
prism. Hence the failure of Azerbaijan in 1946 was attributed in equal measure to 
Western imperialist intrigue and the machinations of bourgeois elite interest, as 
personified by Ahmad Qavam.
8
 With reference to the Middle East more broadly, there 
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6 The 'Northern Tier' consisted in Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey, whereas the 'Southern Tier' initially 
comprised Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, under Cairo's direction – or at least until Nasser's 
decision to conclude an armaments agreement with Czechoslovakia in 1955. 
7 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 10: Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 9 December 1954 
8 See M. S. Ivanov (1952): An Outline of Iranian History, (Soviet State Political Literature), p49 
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had existed a tendency for political elites to be viewed uncritically as national 
bourgeoisies engaged in oppressing their respective proletariats; socially monogenous, 
faithful agents of their Western imperialist masters. As Geoffrey Wheeler, who served as 
the British press councillor in Tehran between 1946 and 1950, argued, for early Soviet 
foreign policy there was thus no intermediate solution between retention of power by 
the pro-Western bourgeoisies and revolutionary seizure of power by local Communist 
parties.
9
 Following Stalin's death however, a fundamental shift began to take place. 
While the essential aims (expansion of Soviet influence and reduction of Western 
influence) and the predilection for certain methods (diplomatic pressure, broadcast 
propaganda) remained broadly unchanged – an assertion borne out by the Iranian 
experience described in this chapter – there can be no doubt that the political outlook of 
the Soviet Union had developed greater sophistication. A 1956 editorial in the 
influential journal Soviet Orientalism spelled out the nature of the change: 
 
„A characteristic of today's world is the participation in it of all patriotically and 
anti-imperialistically inclined representatives of widely varying social strata and 
religious and political convictions […] all of them are united in their aim of 
freeing their countries from the colonial yoke.‟10 
 
The practical implications of this shift lay in the increased willingness of Soviet policy 
makers and their local proxies to make common cause, albeit opportunistically, with 
sections of society that would in previous years have been considered too „bourgeois‟; 
ideological affiliation assumed a lesser importance next to potential for preventing, 
disrupting or undermining the capitalist West's politico-military control of its „colonial 
hinterland.‟11 As evidenced in the previous chapter, the seeds of this trend were already 
evident in the „moral‟ support afforded by the Soviet Union to the National Front, 
reflected in the actions of the Tudeh, which, although initially hostile toward Mosaddeq, 
became ready to „play the game‟ by siding with the National Front notwithstanding the 
distinctly non-proletarian character of its membership.
12
 As the present chapter will seek 
                                                 
9 Geoffrey Wheeler, Russia and the Middle East in Political Quarterly 1957, Issue 28, No. 2, p134 
10 Soviet Orientalism, 1956, No. 5 (USSR Academy of Sciences Press) 
11 Oles M. Smolanski (1991), The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, p14 
12 IPD, 1951-1953, Iranian Political Developments from the End of March to the Overthrow of the 
Mosaddeq Regime on August 19
th
, 1953: §6. 
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to evidence, this trend not only continued but strengthened in the sense that the Soviet 
leadership actively sought to accommodate with the Shah's regime itself: by actively 
restraining official ire with respect to the Baghdad Pact; through the invitation for the 
Shah to tour the Soviet Union in 1956; and finally by successfully initiating negotiations 
for a Treaty of Non-Aggression in 1959. As will be shown, the degree of Iranian 
responsiveness to such moves varied in line with broader regional considerations (such 
as the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy) and in line with doubt over the U.S. 
government‟s own loyalties (exemplified by the Qarani affair of 1958.) It will be 
suggested that Soviet-Iranian relations during the period cannot be understood in 
isolation from these latter two events. 
 
Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership's profound irritation at Iran's emerging defensive 
alliance with the West, betrayed by Khrushchev privately in 1956 and energetically 
reflected in the hostile asseverations of the clandestine Soviet media that Moscow found 
it expedient to maintain; and at the diplomatic level, a reemergence of the same flawed 
and high-pressure negotiating strategy that had failed in 1944, 1946 and 1953, conspired 
to undermine any substantive prospect of rapprochement. This chapter will thus argue 
that the experimental and dualistic nature of the Soviet government's post-Mosaddeq 
policy towards Iran, embarking upon what the British described as a „relentless 
sweetness and light‟ campaign towards the Shah and his regime, but retaining the 
blunter instruments of diplomacy as insurance against an unfavourable outcome, served 
only to sharpen official incertitude regarding the Soviet Union's „long-range‟ 
aspirations.
13
 Conversely, the Iranian government‟s ambiguous and not infrequently 
evasive policy responses to the Kremlin's overtures – the Shah's decisive pursuit of 
Iranian adherence to the Baghdad Pact, combined with a periodic preference for 
leveraging Soviet-Iranian interactions as a bargaining chip in relation to U.S. military 
assistance – inevitably had a deleterious impact on relations with Moscow. 14 Ultimately 
therefore, and as argued in relation to Soviet experiences with the Mosaddeq 
administration, the broadly incompatable nature of these approaches not only failed to 
address and ameliorate underlying tensions existing between the two governments, but 
in fact exacerbated them. 
                                                 
13 IPD, 1954-1965, Political Summary for 2
nd
 Quarter of 1958, §11. 
14 Ibid., Political Summary for 4
th
 Quarter of 1955 (1017/1/56)  
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Soviet Responses to the Baghdad Pact 
The stated goal of the Baghdad Pact, a Cold War alliance modelled on NATO and 
ratified by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and the United Kingdom over the course of 1955, 
was defence and security cooperation. While the Pact was nominally intended to 
„complement‟ a much earlier agreement between Turkey and Iraq signed in 1946, which 
envisaged collaboration in areas such as tackling cross-border crime, its true blueprint 
was the American-sponsored Turko-Pakistani Agreement of April 1954, the text of 
which called for determining possible „ways and extent of cooperation […] should an 
unprovoked aggression occur from outside.‟15 Membership was open to „any other State 
actively concerned with the security and peace of this region.‟16 In the case of Iran, 
whereas the record shows that U.S. Secretary of State Foster Dulles strongly favoured 
Iranian participation – despite the reservations of existing Pact members (Turkey, 
Pakistan, Iraq and Britain)
17
 – the State Department ultimately tried to delay Iran‟s 
ratification of the Pact over concerns that, following the conclusion of an arms deal 
between the Soviet Union and Egypt, Moscow might view the Iranian decision as a 
retaliatory move brought about by Western pressure.
18
 The Shah however, chose to 
ignore Washington‟s advice and, in an important illustration of his emerging ascendancy 
over the functions of government, let it be known through his Prime Minister, Hossein 
Ala, that it was a case of „now or never‟; the Shah intended, Ala affirmed, to call a joint 
session of the Foreign Affairs committees of the Senate and the Majlis and „lay before 
them his decision without at this time asking for advice.‟19 A contemporary British 
report assessed the atmosphere in the following terms: 
 
„The large majority of Persians were opposed to Persian adherence [to the Pact]. 
The Shah, however, became increasingly keen on joining and the picture has 
                                                 
15 See Behçet K. Yeşilbursa, The American Concept of the 'Northern Tier' Defence Project and the 
Signing of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, 1953-54 in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (July, 
2001), p87; for the 1946 Treaty between Iraq and Turkey see United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 37, 
No. 580, p293 (Protocol 2, Article 5.) 
16 See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents, Vol. 1, Department of State Publication 
6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117 (Government Printing Office, 1957.) 
17 For Iraqi concerns, see FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 9, Memorandum of Conversation, 18 May 1953, §5; 
for Pakistani concerns, see ibid., Ambassador in Turkey to Department of State, 17 September 1953; 
for Turkish concerns, see ibid., Ambassador in Turkey to Department of State, 30 November 1953; for 
British concerns, see FO371/106937, Minute, 1 January 1954. 
18 FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 12, State Department to the Embassy in Iran, 6 October 1955 
19 Ibid., Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 8 October 1955 
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been one of an adroit and determined jockey (the Shah) leading an apathetic and 
recalcitrant horse (Persian public opinion) up to a fence which it is not really 
sure it wants to jump.‟20 
 
On the 8
th
 of October 1955, the Shah delivered his speech from the throne marking the 
ceremonial opening of the Senate and formally declared Iran's intention to join the 
Baghdad Pact.
21
 On the 12
th
 of October, Prime Minister Ala submitted the bill of 
ratification to the Senate, thereby making the Iranian government's decision final.
22
  
 
Given the clear implications of the Pact for the security of the USSR, the reaction from 
Moscow was swift and unsurprising in its condemnation. Soviet Foreign Minister 
Molotov summoned the Iranian Chargé d'Affairs to warn that the Soviet Union attached 
„serious significance‟ to Iran's adherence.23 A written representation followed stating 
that Iranian adherence to an „aggressive‟ bloc, orchestrated by Britain and the United 
States, would violate the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 and undermine peace in the 
Middle East.
24
 The Soviet Ambassador was recalled to Moscow in protest.
25
 An initial 
Iranian response, published in the Ettela'at newspaper on the 16
th
 of October, countered 
that the government had exercised „its sovereign right to take whatever measures it 
considers expedient or necessary to preserve its independence and protect its borders.‟ 
Adherence to the Baghdad Pact, it asserted, „was an entirely natural step.‟26 As Soviet 
archival evidence reveals, the ensuing diplomatic exchanges became increasingly 
acrimonious. An Iranian government note on the 10
th
 of December 1955, describing the 
Pact as „directed exclusively toward the lawful defence against attack in the interests of 
peace and wider security‟, framed Iran's adherence in the context of Soviet „aggression‟ 
during World War II: the Soviet Union had, it stated bluntly, intended „to separate off‟ 
the northern provinces of Iran. The accusation prompted an expansive five-page 
response, approved at Central Committee level, in which the Soviet leadership launched 
an uncompromising rebuttal. Iran, the text alleged, was „closing its eyes to reality‟ in 
                                                 
20 IPD, 1954-1965, Political Summary for 3
rd
 Quarter of 1955 
21 FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 12, Editorial Note referencing Telegram 603 from Tehran, 8 October 1955 
22 Ibid., Telegram 622 from Tehran, 12 October 1955 
23 Ibid., Telegram 880 from Moscow, 13 October 1955 
24 IPD, 1954-1965, Annual Review for 1955. 
25 АВПРФ, ф.0595б, оп.3, п.511, д.1000, л.249: Speculation in the Iranian Press. 
26 AВПРФ, ф.0595б, оп.3, п.511, д.1000, л.231: Iranian response to Soviet Government's Note 
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denying the „aggressive character of the Baghdad military bloc‟, which constituted a 
„tool for the colonial enslavement of economically underdeveloped countries in the 
Near and Middle East.‟ And with respect to World War II: 
 
„The entry of the USSR's forces onto Iranian territory in August 1941 was 
precipitated by the danger of Iran's territory being turned into a bridgehead for 
military action against the USSR, connected with the plots and intrigues of Nazi 
agents residing within Iran. […] If the Soviet Union had not taken this step, and 
if the pro-Hitler faction in Iran had prevailed, then Iran would eventually have 
fallen on the side of Nazi Germany, and would have been crushed, sharing the 
fate of other Nazi satellites; the Iranian nation would have borne heavy 
casualties and deprivations. Wherefore the entry of Soviet forces, far from 
constituting „aggression‟, was rather Iran's salvation. […] Similarly baseless are 
the statements contained in the Iranian Government's Note regarding the Soviet 
Union's supposed interference in Iran's internal affairs [...] These baseless 
statements are apparently necessary in order to deflect public attention from the 
terrorist tactics deployed against the country‟s [...] progressive and democratic 
elements, and implemented by the Iranian authorities with the assistance of their 
armed forces. The Iranian Government cannot and should not expect sympathy 
and support for these actions on the part of the Soviet Government or Soviet 
people; such reprisals deeply offend our sense of humanity.‟ 
 
The draft concludes by placing „responsibility on the Iranian government for the 
possible consequences proceeding from [its] participation in this military grouping.‟27 
The unprecedented tone and length of the Soviet response made clear that Iran‟s 
adherence to the Baghdad Pact, and the direct reference to past Soviet actions by which 
the decision was justified, had unleashed a broad swathe of latent antipathies. The most 
revealing fact about the Soviet draft Note however, was that it never reached Iran. 
Instead, twelve days later, Molotov brought forward a „corrected‟ draft that was 
composed, as the cover note affirms, „in line with an exchange of views within the 
CPSU Central Committee‟ and considerably milder in tone – not to mention shorter – 
                                                 
27 АВПРФ, ф.6, оп.15, п.12, д. № ИР-011, л.3-10: Draft Note, 6 January 1956 
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than its original.
28
 The threat of „consequences‟ had been dropped in favour of more 
restrained formulation pointing out that Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact, and the 
„unacceptable and baseless accusations‟ against the Soviet Union contained in the 
earlier Iranian Note, stood in contradiction to the professions of friendship which 
accompanied it.
29
 The drafting process thus highlighted divisions in the Soviet 
leadership; a compromise appears to have been reached between the airing of official 
displeasure and providing some latitude for future rapprochement. An indication of the 
underlying rationale behind the shift in tone was evidenced in a subsequent Foreign 
Ministry memorandum to the Central Committee. In its response to the „corrected‟ 
Soviet note, Molotov informed his superiors, the Iranian government had „once again 
attempted to justify Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact with references to its allegedly 
defensive character.‟ Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister concluded, „in view of the 
forthcoming visit to the USSR by the Shah of Iran and the possibility of holding 
negotiations with him in Moscow […] the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not consider 
it expedient to engage in further debate with the Iranians on this topic.‟30 
 
The Shah's State Visit to Soviet Union 
Despite his momentous decision to join the Baghdad Pact and thus decisively align Iran 
with the West, it remains a remarkable fact of history that the Shah of Iran became the 
first serving member of any royal family since the Russian Revolution to be invited to 
tour the Soviet Union.
31
 Given that the initial approach had been made prior to the 
events described above (in June 1955 by Marshal Voroshilov, then Chairman of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) the fact that the invitation remained at all was 
perhaps surprising. Credit in this respect was given to the efforts of Iran's newly 
appointed Ambassador to Moscow, Abolhassan Mas‟ud-Ansari, who took up his post in 
December 1955 with the explicit mission, according to the Iranian press, of „mollifying 
the Soviet leadership's displeasure at Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact.‟32 Given the 
visit‟s potential utility in easing tensions with Moscow, it became increasingly clear that 
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31 IPD, 1954-1965, Political Summary for 2
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Shah felt it necessary to take up the invitation. The British and American governments, 
consequently, found themselves caught between two unappetising policy alternatives. 
On the one hand, cancellation of the visit would inevitably be represented by the Soviets 
as Iran yielding to imperialist pressure; „a line of argument which would find fertile 
ground here on which to fall.‟ Equally, were the tour to go ahead, it was felt that worse 
challenges might arise. As the British Embassy in Tehran feared, „the Shah‟s judgement 
is not so good as his intentions: he might become confused and make unfortunate 
statements, or his replies might be deliberately distorted and used for propaganda.‟33 
British concerns in this respect were based on that fact that, at the time of the original 
invitation in June 1955, the Shah had allegedly responded by asking the British 
Embassy „to think out all the questions that the Soviet Government might put to him 
and provide him with the answers.‟34 The monarch even requested that the Foreign 
Office Sovietologists be summoned from London to provide coaching.
35
  
 
Following Iran‟s adherence to the Baghdad Pact however, the evidence points to the 
Shah becoming significantly more assertive. Shortly after the visit was formally 
announced in April 1956, a member of staff from the British Embassy was approached 
by the military governor of Tehran, who intimated the Shah's „concern‟ regarding what 
„action might be taken […] to counter the propaganda effect of an offer [of Soviet aid] 
made during the visit.‟36 The Embassy suspected this „gambit‟ was timed to coincide 
with the the second meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact, held in Tehran from the 
16
th
 to the 19
th
 of April 1956.
37
 Indeed, a month earlier, during a conversation with the 
U.S. Secretary of State, the Shah had remarked on the difficulty in justifying the Pact to 
the Iranian public in light of the fact that neutralism „seemed to be a successful game‟, 
pointing out that the Egyptian Ambassador had „boasted of blackmailing both sides to 
Egypt's advantage.‟ The Shah then requested „perhaps $75 million a year for the next 
three years‟, a figure the surprised Secretary denounced privately as „excessive.‟38 
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The potential for employing the Soviet invitation as leverage vis-à-vis the West 
strengthened when, a month before the visit was due to commence, an announcement 
was made that the Shah and Queen Soraya would be accommodated in the Kremlin 
itself during their tour.
39
 The impetus for this unprecedented decision had again resulted 
from the efforts of Mas‟ud-Ansari, who, apparently acting on his own initiative, had 
dropped a „broad hint‟ that such a gesture would be appreciated by the monarch and his 
entourage. As the British Councillor in Tehran, John Russell, memorably noted, even in 
Tsarist times visiting dignitaries were never accommodated in the Kremlin itself, 
„except for Napoleon, who hardly counts as a guest.‟40 Under the Bolshevik regime, the 
Kremlin no longer functioned as an official residence, with its most suitable building, 
the Great Kremlin Palace, having being reconfigured in 1934 for use by the Supreme 
Council of the USSR.
41
 It even emerged that, in order to provide the Shah and his 
Queen with accommodation of a suitable standard, bathrooms had to be specially 
constructed. The publicity benefits of such a move from the Soviet point of view were, 
of course, clear. Indeed, the Iranian Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Kazemi 
assessed the gesture as „unlikely to be have been made out of disinterested politeness.‟ 
And to underline the point, the Shah, who received the news while on state visit to 
Turkey, insisted that the UK and US governments be immediately informed.
42
 Several 
days later, in an apparently connected statement, he was quoted as follows: 
 
„You have given the Turks 450 planes and Iran only 2 … How can the U.S. be so 
casual about our needs? Our position, my position personally, is greatly exposed. 
The Soviets are planning a most elaborate reception. If they make and publicise 
great offers without strings, where do I stand with my people? I do not trust the 
Soviets, but my people are desperate for aid, progress and development. They 
are impatient. Gold from any hand glitters than same. Tempting offers are bound 
to result in pressures.‟43 
 
That the Shah had in mind the value of Soviet blandishments in extracting a further 
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tranche of financial assistance from the U.S. Government received additional 
confirmation in a memorandum delivered by the Iranian Ambassador in Washington, Ali 
Amini, less than a week before the Shah's departure for Moscow.
44
 In his letter, Amini 
observed that, when it came to financial aid, the United States „had not treated Iran any 
better than some countries which are neutral‟ and bluntly suggested „positive action‟ 
before the trip.
45
 At the same time, Iranian officials were at pains to reassure the West 
regarding the character of the visit. On the 27
th
 of June, for example, the Minister of 
Information publicly affirmed that the trip was „in no way shape or form a step intended 
to lead Iran away from the West.‟46 This was followed, much to the Soviet leadership's 
grave displeasure, by an article in the state-controlled Ettela'at newspaper praising the 
help given to Iran by the West and „distorting‟ the principles of Soviet Foreign Policy, 
with particularly unflattering criticism reserved for the Russian support of Nasser‟s 
Egypt. The offending polemic, written by the paper's editor and prominent pro-
government journalist Touraj Farazmand, characterised rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union as an „alliance with the devil.‟ 47  This defiant tone was mirrored in official 
rhetoric several days later when the veteran Iranian diplomat, Ali Asghar Hekmat, made 
a speech to the Majlis, in which he noted that “Iran has never committed acts of 
aggression against anyone, in stark contrast to our northern neighbour, which has 
repeatedly done so.” Iran's decision to join the Baghdad Pact was thus made, “with the 
simple intention of defending itself from aggression.”48 
 
It was equally evident, however, that Iranian politicians were not ignorant of the 
possible advantages afforded by more stable relations with Moscow. Writing on the eve 
of the Shah's departure, the Ettela'at newspaper – now striking a somewhat different 
note – attached „great significance to possible negotiations on the transit route from Iran 
to Western Europe through Soviet territory‟ since the transit of goods to Europe via this 
route would be „two times cheaper‟ for Iran than the Red Sea route from 
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Khorramshahr.
49
 The timetable for the visit itself placed particular emphasis on the 
technical advances made by the USSR, including excursions to the newly-constructed 
Stalingrad Hydroelectric Station, an area of mechanised cotton production in Tajikistan, 
and a steel foundry outside Kiev.
50
 At seventeen days in total, the trip was also an 
extensive one, with an entourage to match. Although the Foreign Minister, Aligholi 
Ardalan, was not in attendance, the Economics Minister Ebrahim Kashani and Senator 
Mohammad Sa'ed (the former Prime Minister) did feature in the imperial suite, together 
with a sizeable contingent of senior army figures, including Generals Jahanbani and 
Yazdanpanah, both of whom had undergone military studies in Russia.
51
 
 
Yet if interest in Soviet technical and military advances was strong, Khrushchev did 
little to lighten the baggage of latent suspicions the Iranian delegation brought with 
them. Ardeshir Zahedi, who was present in the Shah's entourage as his personal 
adjutant, recounted an exchange between the two leaders during a formal dinner in the 
Kremlin's St George Hall. The First Secretary – allegedly emboldened by a surfeit of 
vodka – unleashed an uncompromising tirade, airing precisely the same irritations that 
Foreign Ministry officials had striven successfully to conceal earlier that year: 
 
„“We ask you to be friends with us and, in turn, you solicit our friendship. But at 
the same time you antagonise us. Should we so wish, we are capable of attacking 
Iran and swallowing you. Whatever forces you put together or military alliance 
you may form, you would be powerless to stand against us. You should know 
that the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent in the face of these pacts.”‟ 
 
Rising to his feet, the Shah ordered a glass of vodka for himself. Vodka having been 
brought, Ardeshir Zahedi recalled his response as follows: 
 
“Today is a good day. It is a good thing that we came here today and heard these 
words. We now know that we have not been mistaken in our assessment [of 
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you]. In these past few days we have heard sentiments from you that could have 
led us to be mistaken, and believe that your policies have changed. Your words 
made a positive impression on us. Today, however, you have exposed yourself. 
Hitherto you have assured us that such words and thoughts belonged to the time 
of Stalin. Now we see that, on the contrary, you harbour the very same thoughts 
and speak the very same language. It was for this very reason that we joined the 
Baghdad Pact and I would emphasise that, if someday you wish to attack us, 
then the Iranian nation will defend their country to the last drop of blood.” 
 
The Shah then drank his vodka, placing the empty glass upside down on the table. The 
Iranian delegation departed the following morning.
52
 
 
While Zahedi's account must be approached with a degree of caution – the passage 
clearly aims to portray the Shah in a positive light – the First Secretary's outburst would 
not have been unusual given the prevailing atmosphere of the time. Indeed, the episode 
bears a close resemblance to a similarly brusque encounter involving the Soviet Leader 
and a British Army General just three weeks earlier.
53
 Khrushchev, a self-styled straight-
talking Ukrainian peasant's son, was famously abrasive in his interactions with certain 
foreign leaders and not known for mincing his words. Khrushchev's warning, if it was in 
fact delivered in the form Ardeshir Zahedi has alleged, was most likely intended as a 
factual reminder of the Soviet Union's superior military capabilities designed to preempt 
and restrain Iranian enthusiasm for further military cooperation with the West. Evidence 
to support this assessment is provided in the extensive tours of the Soviet naval and air 
bases incorporated into the Shah's visit, and by the Iranian Ambassador to Moscow's 
recollection that Marshal Zhukov, Minister of Defence and Chief of the Soviet Armed 
Forces „personally explained their latest weaponry to the Shah.‟ Khrushchev may thus 
have been trying, as Zahedi conceded, „to bring the Shah of Iran to his senses.‟54 
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Whatever the intended effect, the encounter was a diplomatic and political disaster. Far 
from emphasising the benefits of cooperation with the Soviet Union and distancing 
himself from the excesses of his predecessor, Khrushchev apparently ensured that the 
Shah and his entourage returned home all the more firmly convinced of a disturbing 
continuity in Soviet policy toward Iran; of political and territorial ambitions 
disingenuously concealed behind a charade of friendship. And indeed, whether or not 
Zahedi‟s account is accepted as factual (and in either case the account stands an 
important reflection on the Iranian elite‟s underlying apprehensions) the months 
following the visit did indeed see a noticeable shift in Soviet policy toward Iran. This 
was signalled in the abrupt recall of the Soviet Ambassador and his replacement by 
Nikolai Pegov, a senior Party figure and then Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet.
55
 The Foreign Ministry was instructed to present, on behalf of the Supreme 
Soviet, the Shah's daughter Princess Shahnaz and her husband Ardeshir Zahedi with 
conspicuously expensive gifts on the occasion of their marriage, which took place two 
months following Pegov's appointment.
56
 This shift in emphasis away from the Central 
Committee executive and toward the USSR's legislative branch as the primary enactor 
of policy toward Iran appeared to be an attempt to detoxify the brand, and conceivably, 
to address the egregious damage wrought by Khrushchev's alleged remarks. The 
strategy met, privately at least, with little success. Zahedi recalled that the Ilyushin 
passenger aircraft presented to the Shah by the Soviets on the occasion of the visit was 
promptly given away to his brother in law, Mohammad Khatam. The monarch had, he 
wrote, „taken his anger with the Russians to heart.‟57 And indeed the Shah, responding 
to a farewell speech from Marshal Voroshilov, had firmly rebuffed criticism of the 
Baghdad Pact, pointing out that, if Iran found it necessary to take measures for its own 
defence, this was due to „our bitter experience of the past.‟58 
 
The Aftermath of the Iraqi Coup and the Qurani Affair 
Events surrounding the state visit to the Soviet Union provided in many respects a 
forewarning of the Shah's increasing and personal dissatisfaction with the perceived 
                                                 
55 See Guide to the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1898-1991 (entry for Pegov, 
Nikolai Mixailovich.) http://www.knowbysight.info/PPP/04525.asp (accessed 17.05.2013.) 
56 АВПРФ, ф.94, оп.45, п.131, д.6, л.42-3: Foreign Ministry to Nikolai Pegov, 26 October 1956 
57 Khåteråt-e Ardeshir Zåhedi, Volume II, p28. 
58 Quoted in an enclosure to FO 371/120752: The Shah Makes His Point, The Economist, July 21, 1956. 
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lack of benefits accruing to Iran from its adherence to the Baghdad Pact. It was a 
grievance, moreover, that some Western observers privately recognised as legitimate.
59
 
As the British ambassador noted in his review for 1957, a key calculation made by the 
Shah when joining the Pact was that „given Iran's exposed strategic position he would 
be entitled to receive massive military aid‟, an objective that had „not been fulfilled 
according to expectation.‟60 The ambassador's report manifested a growing concern that 
Iran's connection with the West was becoming somewhat atrophied; that the Baghdad 
Pact „honeymoon‟ was, as he put it, „over.‟61 This observation held true for both sides: 
the Shah's persistent emphasis on strengthening the Iranian armed forces, irrespective of 
domestic economic considerations, had evidently begun to breed cynicism in his would-
be benefactors. The U.S. ambassador to Iran, Selden Chapin, also writing at the end of 
1957 and identifying a trend with critical future consequences, framed the policy 
dilemma in the following terms: 
 
„The situation is complicated by fact that Shah's interest in military forces is in 
part emotional rather than logical. We can never really hope to convince the 
Shah that any level of military forces will be adequate to what he imagines are 
his requirements. His psychological bias renders him immune to logical 
persuasion in this field.‟62 
 
If the Shah was dissatisfied with the public level of Western commitment toward Iran in 
general, private apprehensions regarding the reliability of U.S. support for his throne in 
particular were also sharply focussed by the so-called Qarani affair, a military plot 
uncovered in January 1958. General Qarani was among several Iranian officers who had 
                                                 
59 The U.S. ambassador, Seldon Chapin, writing in December 1957, conceded there was 'a legitimate 
basis for Shah's desire for modern equipment and aircraft to maintain his domestic and international 
prestige [and] there is some merit in the position that Iran should not be too clearly differentiated [in] 
comparison with Turkish and Pakistan.' FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 12: Telegram from the Embassy in 
Tehran to the Department of State, 18 December 1957. 
60 IPD, 1954-1965, Annual Review for 1957 (not dated, 10112/58). The head of the Near Eastern section 
at the State Department concurred: it was 'perfectly obvious that Iran […] assumed that adherence 
would be followed by increased aid. FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 12: Memorandum From the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Under Secretary of 
State (Hoover), 22 June 1956. 
61 IPD, 1954-1965, Annual Review for 1957 (not dated, 10112/58) Indeed, in his Annual Review for the 
following year, Geoffrey Harrison openly criticises the Baghdad Pact for its 'non-committal wording.' 
Ibid., 21 January 1959. 
62 FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 12: Telegram to the Department of State, 18 December 1957. 
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worked against the administration of Prime Minister Mosaddeq and was promoted, 
following the 1953 coup, to the army's Vice-Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence, a 
senior role which also entailed oversight of civilian intelligence gathering.
63
 It would 
appear the immediate motivation for Qarani's approach to the U.S. Embassy (to gauge 
American support for the possibility of political change) was the immanent arrival in 
Tehran of Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State; and also, somewhat more 
speculatively, rumours that the Shah was shortly to embark on a reorganisation of the 
military that would unfavourably impact on Qarani himself.
64
 In conversation with the 
U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission and Airforce Attaché on the 22
nd
 of January 1958, Qarani 
sought to highlight the incumbent government's lack of popular support among „the 
Iranian people‟, whose consequent susceptibility to increased Soviet „wooing‟ would 
place the latter in a position to overthrow the government. Qarani‟s position was hence 
that „an urgent a change of governments be brought about now by a pro-Western group 
rather than waiting for the Soviets to take advantage of the present unrest and discontent 
of the people.‟ The conspirators, which included Esfandiar Bozorgmehr – a former 
Minister of Propaganda under Prime Minister Zahedi – asserted that they had a group of 
some two thousand American-educated Iranians at their disposal, who were „ready to 
form from its membership the nucleus of a new government.‟ It was suggested that, as 
an intermediary step, the U.S. should approach the Shah to emphasise the need for him 
to reign not rule.
65
 
 
That opposition figures such as Qarani would seek to approach Western embassies for 
their support was in itself neither surprising nor particularly new.
66
 Rather it was the 
unfortunate error of the U.S. ambassador, after details of the conversation were leaked 
to the press, to attempt to exculpate his staff to Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs by 
acknowledging they had „listened‟ to the „plotters‟ but that it was felt that their plans 
                                                 
63 M. J. Gasiorowski, The Qarani Affair and Iranian Politics in International Journal of Middle East 
Studies (1993: 25), p629 
64 FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12, Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, 10 February 1958. 
65 FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Memorandum for the Record, 6 February 1958. 
66 When the Iranian Foreign Minister suggested that the American Embassy should 'scrupulously avoid 
any contact' with opposition elements, the Ambassador retorted: “What would the Iranians say if their 
Embassy in Washington were told to have no contact with the Democrats […] we are not prepared to 
shut ourselves up in a kind of ivory tower.” FO 371/133009: Secret Minute, 3 March 1958, §3. 
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were „fuzzy‟ and amounted to little.67 He thus succeeded in confirming, from the Iranian 
government's perspective, not only that their had indeed been a plot but that the U.S. 
Embassy, by not reporting it as such to the authorities, had effectively abetted it. The 
Shah made a „great show of indignation.‟68 As Foster Dulles himself conceded, „the 
nature of [our] contacts with opposition elements […] and manner of confirmation by 
the Ambassador, may have raised serious doubts in minds of the Shah and the 
Government of Iran regarding the intentions of US toward present government.‟69 The 
mood was further soured by the emergence of a letter, ostensibly written by Foster 
Dulles to Selden Chapin but in actual fact a KGB forgery designed to buttress imperial 
insecurities, which cited the Shah's „nebulous‟ attempts at reform as evidence that he 
was „about as successful as a politician as he is a husband‟ – an allusion to his 
impending (but not yet public) divorce from Queen Soraya.
70
 
 
Both the Shah and the Americans, however, had subsequent cause to feel increasingly 
nervous. General Qassim's Iraqi coup on the 14
th
 of July 1958, in which the ruling 
monarchy was violently deposed, deeply shocked Iran‟s ruling elite and indeed had, as 
the newly-appointed Foreign Minister Ali Asghar Hekmat conceded in conversation 
with the U.S. Secretary of State, made a „great impact‟ on Iranian public opinion.71 It 
prompted a series of „panic‟ measures on the part of the government, including mass 
military promotions and a call by the Ministry of the Interior for local authorities „to pay 
special attention to local grievances and petitions.‟ The Shah himself initiated a series of 
monthly press conferences, to which all major newspaper editors were invited, where he 
addressed them „at length‟ on his vision for Iran‟s economic progress.72 Of particular 
concern for Iranian politicians was the Iraqi revolutionary regime‟s apparent 
                                                 
67 FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Embtel 1637, 27 February 1958. 
68 FO 371/133009, Secret: Army Officers Plot, 4 March 1958. Qarani was later sentenced to two years' 
imprisonment for 'abuse of power, interference with civil affairs, and concealment of certain events 
from higher authorities': see BBC News Monitoring enclosure, (final) paper in ibid. 
69 FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12, State Department to the Embassy in Iran, 28 February 1958. 
70 The original text of the letter (preserved in FO 371/133009) reveals that it was deliberately back-dated 
to 8 October 1957 (a month when U.S.-Iranian tensions were running particularly high.) A copy was 
passed to the American Ambassador by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 2
nd
 of March, who had 
received it 'from a Senator or Deputy', and copies had also mysteriously appeared on the desks of all 
Tehran newspapers the day before. FO 371/133009: Secret Minute, 3 March 1958. For KGB 
authorship of the forgery, see: C. Andrew and V. Metrokhin (2005), The World Was Going Our Way: 
The KGB and the Battle for the Third World, p171. 
71 FO 371/133010: From New York (Secretary of State) to Foreign Office, 25 September 1958, §2. 
72 IPD, 1954-1965: Political Summary for 3
rd
 Quarter of 1958, 31 October 1958. 
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vulnerability to domestic communist elements. A report prepared by the CIA at the time, 
while conceding there was no conclusive evidence that Qassim himself was a 
Communist, nonetheless offered a bleak outlook: 
 
„Iraq is the scene of a determined and so far effective Communist drive toward 
power […] We doubt [Qassim‟s] ability to stem the movement toward a 
Communist takeover of his regime [...] he has shown himself unwilling or 
unable to take effective action against the steady drive of Iraqi Communists and 
their Soviet backers to consolidate a growing position of power within the 
country and the government.‟73 
 
Hekmat, raising a concern that was to be of important consequence in later years, 
expressed his concern at „attempts which the Iraqi radio was making to stir up the 
Kurdish tribes in Iran, urging them to unite with Iraqi Kurds.‟74 Dwight Eisenhower too, 
illustrating the extent to which U.S. and Iranian regional conceptions coincided, argued 
that a Kurdish uprising could act as a precursor for a full Communist takeover in Iraq; 
„the result would be to outflank both Iran and Turkey and to provide the Soviets with 
their long-desired land bridge to the Middle East.‟75 A unified and USSR-supported 
Kurdish homeland would, in other words, breach the geographic integrity of the 
Northern Tier by connecting Soviet Armenia with northern Iraq – and thus the Gulf. 
 
1959: The Secret Negotiations for a Non-Aggression Treaty with the Soviet Union 
The Shah's decision to secretly enter into negotiations for a Treaty of Non-Aggression 
with the Soviet Union in December 1958 must thus be seen against a background of 
resentment at the perceived inconstancy of American policy toward Iran, coupled with a 
heightened sense of geopolitical and personal insecurity resulting from the revolution in 
Iraq.
76
 Although the U.S. government did ultimately make steps to address the situation 
                                                 
73 FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Special National Intelligence Estimate: The Communist Threat to Iraq, 
dated February 17, 1959, §1 & §6. With respect to Qassim's alleged Communist sympathies, CIA 
analysts thought it was 'more likely that he is an Iraqi nationalist who believes he needs Communist 
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74 FO 371/133010: From New York (Secretary of State) to Foreign Office, 25 September 1958, §9. 
75 FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Memorandum of Discussion, 15 January 1959 
76 The Shah made these points clearly with Western diplomats at several audiences during the crisis. See 
for instance FO 371/140797: From Tehran (Sir Geoffrey Harrison) to Foreign Office, 29 January 
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by formulating a more explicit commitment, the proposal brought forward – an Iranian-
American Bilateral Pact – was considered by the Shah to be insufficient for effectively 
countering the perceived Soviet threat: 
 
„In the form [it] was presented to us it lacked the significance we wanted, and 
we felt it was not giving us the necessary guarantees [...] Feeling militarily 
ridiculously weak, and without such guarantees as, for example, NATO countries 
have, we allowed ourselves to enter into negotiations with the Russians.‟77 
 
The immediate impetus for the visit of the Soviet negotiating team to Tehran however, 
seems to have lain precisely in the Iranian Government's willingness to contemplate 
signing the Bilateral Pact (and thereby substantially enhancing military ties.) Archival 
evidence demonstrates that the Soviet leadership first became aware of Iran's intention 
on the 31
st
 of October 1958: a proposed visit to Iran by Marshal Voroshilov for March 
1959, evidently proposed only a week earlier „in return‟ for the Shah's state visit to the 
USSR, was promptly cancelled; a note delivered personally by Alexei Gromyko to the 
Iranian ambassador in Moscow expressed the view that such a visit would „create a false 
impression‟ and spoke of the need to „reassess the current status‟ of Soviet-Iranian 
relations.
78
 At the same time, the Soviet government again drew attention to Iran's legal 
responsibilities, on this occasion to the „neutrality guarantee‟ implicit in a Soviet-Iranian 
Treaty of October 1927.
79
 The response by Iran's Foreign Minister, Ali Asghar Hekmat, 
was predictably uncompromising: 
 
„Quite apart from the fact that Article 3 of this Treaty does not forbid the 
                                                                                                                                               
1959, §6: '[He] resented what we [...] were doing for India, Yugoslavia, Turkey and even Afghanistan. 
He referred rather bitterly to America's link with last year's Qarani plot and said they might well do 
the same thing again. He had got nothing from siding openly with the West three and ahalf years ago 
and indicated that he was determined to try another tack.' See also specific irritations outlined in FO 
371/140797: From Tehran to Foreign office, 2 February 1959. 
77 Mohammad Pahlavi, Mission for My Country, p122. 
78 Chap dar Iran dar Revayat-e SAVAK, Vol. 3: Soviet Government Note to the Government of Iran, 
dated 31 October 1958, p84-5. 
79 АВПРФ, ф595-б, оп.3а, п.157, д.261, л.51: Iranian Foreign Minister‟s Speech [to the Majlis], 13 
February 1959. Article 3 of the Treaty in question (Treaty on the Guarantee of Neutrality between 
USSR and Iran, signed on the 1
st
 of October 1927) commits both sides against „either de facto or 
formal participation in any political union or agreement directed against the maritime or territorial 
security of the other Party.‟ Soviet-Iranian Relations in Treaties, Conventions and Agreements (USSR 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1946), p99. The Soviet Note of 31 October hence referred to the Bilateral 
Pact as „directly threatening the security of the USSR‟s southern borders.‟ 
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signatories from concluding agreements with the aim of strengthening their 
defences and preserving their security, the Iranian government will take 
whatever measures it feels it necessary to adopt in its own interests and will not 
permit the interference of any foreign government in its internal affairs.‟80 
 
In contrast to 1956 however, and faced with the potentially significant expansion of 
U.S-Iranian military ties, the Soviet government no longer felt in a position to mollify 
their language. In an audience with Hekmat on the 15
th
 of December 1958, Pegov gave 
the latter to understand that the Iran's signing of the Bilateral Pact „would lead to serious 
consequences.‟81 A note followed on the 29th of December 1958, which gave further rein 
to the Kremlin's antipathy. Describing the rationale behind the Bilateral Pact is 
described as „obsolete‟, it proceeded to unambiguously warn that Iran would „run the 
danger of annihilation in the event of hostilities.‟ To emphasise the point, the note 
proceeded to call for „realism‟ on the part of Iran in forming a „comparative 
appreciation‟ of the two countries' relative military capabilities.82 The unprecedentedly 
forthright nature of threat would seem to have been further motivated by the fact that, 
although the Iranian government had sought to provide Moscow with assurances in 
respect of the Pact's nature, it had „not shown them the text‟, in the absence of which the 
Soviet government resorted to conjecture, specifically that the agreement in view 
„would give the American naval forces the right to enter the Persian gulf and to be 
stationed off the Iranian coast.‟83 The note concluded with an offer to avert what it 
described as a „dangerous turn‟ in Soviet-Iranian relations: 
 
„The Soviet Government is ready to exchange views with the Iranian 
Government on […] the best means of pursuing a policy of peace and neutrality 
with guarantees for national security and territorial integrity […] If the Iranian 
Government really wants to preserve friendly relations with the Soviet Union 
and does not proceed to carry out measures for military cooperation with third 
powers damaging to Iranian-Soviet relations and threatening the security of the 
                                                 
80 Ibid., л.59 
81 Ibid., л.72 
82 FO 371/140797: From Tehran to Foreign Office, 7 January 1959, §4 & 6. 
83 Ibid., §11 
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Soviet Union, then the Soviet Government is ready to join the Iranian 
Government in searching for ways of improving their relations.‟84 
 
A Soviet negotiating team arrived in Tehran on the 27
th
 of January 1959. Although the 
question of where precisely the initiative for this sudden development arose was later to 
become the subject of heated dispute, the evidence points to the Soviet government 
having advanced the proposal for negotiations.
85
 Indeed, although the Shah would later 
claim to have „taken the initiative‟86 with respect to the invitation, аn Iranian source 
close to the matter at the time suggests that the stronger impetus came from Moscow: 
 
„In his most recent audience with Foreign Minister Ali Asghar Hekmat, the 
Soviet Ambassador [Nikolai Pegov] let it be known that Khrushchev wishes for 
either he himself or one of his deputies, including [Marshal] Voroshilov, to be 
invited to Iran by the Iranian government on an official visit; and that 
negotiations be held with leading state officials regarding the establishment of 
improved relations and the proposed provision of a loan to Iran […] 
Notwithstanding the Shah‟s personal inclination toward inviting one of the 
Soviet leaders to Iran, the announcement of Pegov‟s proposals have created a 
grave problem for the government since the Americans are strongly against 
negotiations of any sort or enhanced relations with the Soviet Union.‟87 
 
Further evidence of high-pressure tactics from the Soviet side was provided by a two-
week delay in the arrival of the Russian delegation – composed of the Soviet Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Vladimir Semenov), the head of the Ministry's Middle 
Eastern Division (Alexei Pavlov) and Ambassador to Iran (Nikolai Pegov) – which 
appeared deliberately timed to coincide with a Baghdad Pact Council meeting convened 
simultaneously in Karachi.
88
 A report by the Iranian Ambassador to Moscow, 
Abolhassan Mas‟ud-Ansari, and dated shortly before the arrival of the Soviet 
                                                 
84 Ibid., §15 & 16; a „vague but generous aid package‟ was allegedly also offered by the Soviet side. 
FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Department of State to the Embassy in Tehran, 16 January 1959 
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delegation, recorded the apparent result of Moscow‟s blunt strategy. The Iranian Foreign 
Ministry, he wrote, „has received a directive from the government requesting that 
conclusion of any military agreement with the U.S. should be avoided as the Soviet 
leadership intend to react severely to any such [move] on the basis of the 1921 treaty [of 
Friendship].‟ Reflecting differences of opinion within the Iranian government, the 
ambassador added his personal view that „the present circumstances [were] highly 
suitable for rapprochement with the Soviets and the Iranian government ought not to 
miss the opportunity.‟89 The initial proposals advanced by the Iranian side, in the first 
draft of the treaty, were balanced as follows: 
 
Iranian Side 
1. Undertaking not to allow Iranian territory to be used „as a base for 
aggression‟ against the Soviet Union; 
2. Iranian government not to conclude the Bilateral Pact with the U.S.  
 
Soviet Side 
1. Guarantee of Iran's integrity and independence, „including a reference to 
both direct and indirect aggression‟ (i.e. hostile Soviet media campaigns); 
2. Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty „to be recognised by Russia as obsolete.‟90 
 
There was no doubt that the draft, as envisaged above, held significant advantages for 
Iran; the Shah himself considered its wording „very favourable.‟ 91  In particular, it 
contained no explicit requirement that Iran should withdraw from the Baghdad Pact.
92
 
And in terms of its content, as was privately recognised, the text effectively did little 
more than recapitulate the earlier Iranian-Soviet Agreement of 1927.
93
 The Shah was 
apparently forced onto the defensive however, when his Minister of Court, Hussein Ala, 
barely a day after the arrival of the Soviet delegation, divulged the existence of the 
negotiations to British and Pakistani officials and intimated – accurately – that the talks 
                                                 
89  Chap dar Iran dar Revayat-e Asnad-e SAVAK, Vol. 3, Document No. 4954-3-2, 9 Bahman 1337 
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were in their „final stages.‟94 Ala's motive in breaking the news was ostensibly due to 
his being „extremely worried at the turn of events‟; that he had been „unable to move the 
Shah‟ who was in a „very depressed state of mind.‟95 On the other hand, a former British 
Ambassador to Tehran, Sir Roger Stevens considered it „significant‟ that the 
negotiations should have been revealed by Ala – „corrupt and devotedly loyal‟ – and that 
there was, as he saw it, a „large element of bluff‟ in the turn of events.96 The U.S. State 
Department‟s assessment went much further, describing Ala as „basically senile‟ and 
„largely responsible for the blackmail tactics being employed.‟ 97  The suspicion of 
blackmail was, indeed, one shared by President Eisenhower.
98
 Others close to the scene 
disagreed. „I am convinced‟, the British ambassador in Tehran reported, „that the Shah 
has not (repeat not) been bluffing.‟99 
 
Western concerns primarily centred on the precedent such an Agreement would set for a 
member of a „Free World‟ defence organisation to enter into a non-aggression pact with 
the Soviets. The Turkish government similarly felt that a non-aggression treaty would 
threaten their own country by creating „another at least doubtful‟ country on their 
borders, and „give great encouragement to Russia and to pro-Russian elements in 
Iraq.‟ 100  As already noted, with General Qassim's Iraq increasingly pro-Soviet in 
orientation, the „Northern Tier‟ concept was in serious danger of dissolution.101 And 
Iranian neutrality would have added further strength to sentiments expressed by the 
Pakistani authorities during the Baghdad Council meeting with regard to „the small 
value obtained by belonging to the Baghdad Pact in comparison with neutralist 
countries like India and Afghanistan.‟102 The Eisenhower administration decided it was 
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time for a „high level message‟, and a personal letter from the President was duly 
delivered to the Shah on the 31
st
 of January 1959 contrasting Soviet foreign policy, 
which „history demonstrates […] has repeatedly used “friendship” pacts to lull 
prospective victims and make them less alert to their danger‟ with the history of U.S.-
Iranian relations, characterised by U.S. „determination to help Iran in the preservation of 
its independence and integrity.‟ In stating however, that the same „need not depend on 
any particular provision of formal agreements between us‟, the letter crucially failed to 
address the Shah's underlying quest for a more concrete Western military guarantee.
103
 
As grateful as he was for U.S. assistance, the Shah informed the U.S. ambassador, it was 
„not enough […] therefore he was negotiating a non-aggression pact with the USSR to 
give Iran additional security.‟104 
 
A key turning point in the episode appears to have come several days later when, at a 
luncheon attended by the Shah, the British ambassador and the British Minister of 
Defence, Duncan Sandys, the latter „were able to bring home to His Majesty the full 
implications of his actions.‟105 In a subsequent report to the Foreign Secretary, Sandys 
listed the arguments he employed. Making clear that the Baghdad pact might not be able 
to „survive the shock‟ of Soviet-Iranian entente, Sandys' central point ran as follows: 
 
„The proposed Treaty must be looked at from the Russian stand-point. What did 
[they] hope to get from it? They were certainly not afraid of Persian aggression. 
What they hoped to obtain was, first, an immense propaganda victory; and, 
secondly, the weakening, if not the complete dissolution of the Baghdad Pact. 
Having obtained these immediate benefits, the Russians would have nothing 
more to gain from the agreement with Persia. They would quickly find some 
pretext for complaining that Persia was not honouring her side of the bargain 
[and] would start up again their subversive propaganda. The net result would be 
that Persia would, on the one hand, have gained no security from Russia, while, 
on the other hand, she would have isolated herself from her friends.‟106 
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Evidence that Sandys' line of reasoning may have had a crucial impact is provided in a 
remarkable document recording a conversation on the same night held between the 
British Counsellor in Tehran, Sir John Russell, and the Shah at Princess Ashraf's 
birthday party. The Shah abruptly remarked that he „did not know when they [the 
Soviets] were leaving but he would not be seeing them again.‟ When asked whether a 
„change of ground‟ on the Soviet side would tempt him to re-open negotiations, the 
Shah said, „NO, they are finished‟ (capitals in the original text.) Russell even recounted 
that they „drank a toast to the intransigence of the Soviet negotiators.‟107  The impact of 
pressure from western leaders was, indeed, facilitated by miscalculation on the part of 
the Russian delegation. A careful reading of the Soviet version of events suggests that 
the counter draft to Iran‟s proposed text of the treaty, submitted shortly after the 
delegation‟s arrival, failed to accommodate Iranian leaders‟ underlying objectives. In the 
first instance it expanded the definition of „non-aggression‟ to preclude the construction 
or use of military bases in Iran by any third party; a move that would undoubtedly have 
entailed cessation of several joint U.S.-Iranian projects. And critically, it demurred on 
the question of articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty, whose proposed removal was „not 
entirely comprehensible to the Soviet side in as much as, according to available 
information, the conclusion of a military agreement between Iran and the USA 
envisages the potential stationing of U.S. troops on Iranian territory.‟ Having 
established, however, following an audience with the Shah on the 3
rd
 of February – the 
day after Sandys‟ intervention – that such an approach was unacceptable to the Iranian 
side, the delegation sought further instructions from Moscow.
108
 And although the 
Soviet government was forthcoming, unexpectedly ordering acceptance of Iran‟s 
original terms after a delay of two days, the opportunity was no longer available: the 
Shah „had decided to sign the bilateral agreement with the Americans.‟109  
 
The Soviet delegation thus shared significant responsibility for the breakdown of the 
talks. In particular, the documentary evidence substantially suggests that the main point 
of difference was the Soviet delegation, as the Shah later put it, having „stuck rigidly to 
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Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty.‟110 This aroused suspicion in light of the fact that, as 
Russell pointed out to the Shah, the Rothstein Protocol to the 1921 Treaty (which 
explicitly limited the circumstances under which the Soviet government had the right to 
send troops into Iran) had been omitted from an official 1957 Soviet publication on 
Iran.
111
 Such an omission was questionable given that, as noted in the historical 
introduction to this thesis, the Iranian Majles had only agreed to ratify the 1921 treaty 
on the basis of the assurances given in Rothstein's letter.
112
 The apparently deliberate 
suppression of the Protocol, as Russell suggested to the Shah in their conversation, was 
explained by „the Soviet intention to maintain articles 5 and 6 intact for application 
against the use of Iran by any power whom they chose to consider hostile and 
aggressive, i.e. today the United States.‟ 113  That the Soviets should have been „so 
legalistic in clinging to these two paper articles‟ was therefore a clear tactical error in 
view of the Iranian side‟s unambiguous insistence on their annulment. And as the 
British Defence Minister himself conceded: „If the Russians had straight away accepted 
the Shah's conditions, he would almost certainly have gone ahead and signed the non-
aggression treaty.‟114 Moreover, an agreement with Moscow to annul the 1921 Treaty 
was not merely a matter of geopolitical security but also one of economic advantage at a 
time of severe budgetary constraint: 
 
„From what the Shah said, it emerged fairly clearly that the immediate cause of 
the present crisis is financial embarrassment. Half the public expenditure 
planned in next year's budget is military and the Shah fears that this will cause a 
public outcry […] a non-aggression treaty, by removing the danger of Soviet 
attack, would enable the Shah to reduce his forces in the North and thus reduce 
is his defence budget […] if the [the Soviet government‟s] legal right of entry 
were removed he could divert [...] the troops tied up on the Khorasan frontier, 
who were anyway destined to useless destruction by the Red Army.‟115 
                                                 
110  FO 371/140799: Conversation with H.I.M. (Sir John W. Russell), 3 February 1959, §5.  
111  FO 371/140799: From Foreign office to Tehran, 23 February 1959. The Russian publication in 
question was Modern Iran – A Handbook (Soviet Academy of Sciences, 1957) 
112  See also discussion by W. Reisman: Termination of the USSR's Treaty Right of Intervention in Iran in 
The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 74, No. 1 (Jan., 1980), p147f. 
113  FO 371/140799: Conversation with H.I.M. (Sir John W. Russell), 3 February 1959, §5 
114  FO 371/140799: Minister of Defence to Foreign Secretary, 4 February 1959, §8 
115  FO 371/140799: Minister of Defence to Foreign Secretary, 4 February 1959, §5 and §6(b) 
 113 
And as suggested above the Shah had certainly felt, in the months leading up to the 
negotiations with the Soviets, that the U.S. had „taken us for granted‟; that the West, as 
he asserted in conversation with the British ambassador, had treated Iran „as a 
concubine and not as a wife.‟116 The balance of evidence thus suggests that the Shah 
was in fact serious about rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The „Free World‟, as 
noted by British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd in the margins of a Sandys' report, had 
indeed had „a narrow squeak.‟117 The Soviet government, by return, were outraged – 
perhaps understandibly so – at what appeared to be Iran‟s „two-faced policy.‟118 An 
official Soviet postmortem of the negotiations alleged, for example, that the Iranian 
Foreign Minister, Ali Asghar Hekmat, when asked some nine days prior to the 
delegation's arrival whether the Iranian government would refrain from signing the 
Bilateral Pact with America, responded that it would.
119
 Hekmat himself strongly denied 
this charge; both the official Iranian Foreign Ministry communiqué and the Foreign 
Minister's subsequent statement to a closed session of the Majlis carefully avoided 
suggestion of any initiative from the Iranian side.
120
 Whatever the true sequence of 
events, it was clear that Hekmat was in no mood to assume responsibility for the 
unfavourable turn of events, the blame for which „needless to say [lay] with the 
government of our neighbour.‟ Responding to the concerns of parliamentarians 
regarding the Soviet government's obvious anger, Hekmat drew a literary allusion: 
 
„Gentlemen, Iranian history shows that the will of others cannot be forced upon 
Iran through threats and intimidation. Iranians, as their history teaches them, 
understand that a person does not die twice. And if the mortal hour should come, 
then better to face it bravely. Better to die honourably and free than live in 
disgrace and dishonour.‟121 
                                                 
116  FO 371/140797: Tehran to Foreign Office, 28 January 1959 and FO 371/140799: Copy of Minute by 
Mr. D.A.H. Wright to Sir Geoffrey Harrison, 30 January 1959. 
117  Covering note to FO 371/140799, From Tehran to Foreign Office, 11 February 1959. 
118  Pravda, „On Soviet Iranian Relations‟, 13 February 1959, p6. 
119  The allegation was made in an article in the Soviet journal International Life, No. 1, 1961 
120  АВПРФ, ф595б, оп.3а, п.157, д.261, л.97-98: Statement by Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 
February 1959 and л.107: Statement by Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 16 February 1959. In 
point of fact, Ardeshir Zahedi has claimed that Hekmat was instrumental in persuading the Shah of the 
necessity for the negotiations. (Interview with author, Montreux, June 2012.) 
121  A reference to the final words of Rostam, a preeminent hero of Firdowsi's epic The Shahnameh, in 
response to an emissary of an Arab invader of Iran, Sa'd. D. Davis, The Persian Book of Kings, p324. 
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Conclusion 
As the case studies presented in this chapter have sought to illustrate, the increasingly 
executive authority exercised by the Shah over the apparatus of Iran‟s government, 
particularly in respect of foreign and military affairs, became noticeably more 
pronounced during the period.
122
 Although there were dissenting voices, on balance for 
Western observers the Shah continued to constitute „the main element of stability in the 
country.‟123 Indeed, the reforms toward which the Shah was „hesitantly moving‟, as the 
American Ambassador candidly reported in October 1958, „provide[d] grounds for 
cautious optimism that the regime may with luck and skill consolidate its position and is 
not inevitably doomed.‟ 124  Yet such „stability‟ came at a specific price. It was 
dependent, first and foremost, on the loyalty of the army, fear over whose allegiance 
was plainly highlighted by the sweeping promotions brought forward in the months 
following the coup in Iraq.
125
 The provision of modern weaponry was instrumental in 
maintaining that loyalty.
126
 The promise held out in this respect by the Baghdad Pact 
thus played a key role in convincing the Shah in his decision to join; hitherto it was felt 
that, the U.S. Army Mission notwithstanding, Iran had „sat firmly on the fence between 
the Soviet Union and the West.‟127 The strategic shift sat uncomfortably, however, with 
wider budgetary considerations. As the Shah put it privately the Selden Chapin, the 
American Ambassador, „how can you reconcile adherence to a Pact, which in the long 
run is going to cost Iran more money, [with the fact that we] already have a deficit?‟ 
This was an inconsistency, he stressed correctly, on which Soviet propaganda and 
sympathisers were „likely to harp to harmful effect.‟128  
 
Ultimately, as in previous years, the Shah's strategy proved a successful one. Overall 
                                                 
122  The Shah allegedly told the cabinet that he was 'the fountainhead of all authority' in Iran and 
expected to kept informed 'in detail' regarding the activities of government. FO 371/12705: Internal 
Situation in Iran, 23 July 1957. 
123  IPD, 1954-1965, Annual Review for 1961, 3 January 1962; for an alternative view, see the 
remarkably candid U.S. assessment recorded in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Special National 
Intelligence Estimate, 26 August 1958. 
124  FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 11 October 1958 
125  FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 11 October 1959. 
126  FO 371/140799: Minister of Defence to Foreign Secretary, 4 February 1959, §4: '[The Iranian 
Government were] insistent that, for the sake of the morale of the Army, upon whose support the 
Shah's position ultimately depends, adequate supplies of up-to-date equipment must be provided.'  
127  FO 371/140798: Research Department Briefing Paper by F.D.W. Brown, 29 January 1959, §8. 
128  FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 12: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 5 October 1955, §2. 
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American assistance to Iran under the Mutual Security Programme during the 1950s 
was considerable at just under US $700 million for the period 1950-1958, of which a 
substantial but, significantly, decreasing percentage consisted in economic aid.
129
 
Although British observers in particular found what they saw as the Shah's „ingratitude‟ 
and progressively more ambitious requests for American assistance „hard to believe‟, 
what appears to have been at issue during the period, as elsewhere, was not the level of 
American aid per se.
130
 Nor was the central challenge, as the State Department 
consistently argued, that the Shah's personal vision for Iran's defensive requirements 
stood in awkward apposition to their own assessment, although this was undoubtedly 
the case.
131
 Rather, as this chapter has suggested, it was the question of a clear-cut 
security guarantee that was fundamentally at issue. The Shah's state visit to the Soviet 
Union had demonstrated, in the first instance, that Soviet leaders were profoundly 
reluctant to relinquish even an implicit military option in their dealings with Iran; a fact 
evidenced by the startling vitriol of unpublished Soviet documents, possibly reflected 
by Khruschev's alleged warning at dinner in the Kremlin. Compounding this 
unfavourable state of affairs, the pronounced resentment at what the Shah perceived as 
American involvement in the Qarani affair was clearly evident, as was the „shock and 
fright‟ caused by the brutal demise of the neighbouring monarchy in Iraq.132 Another 
key factor was a suspicion, prompted by the proposals brought forward by Anthony 
Eden for a neutral zone in Central Europe, that the Western powers might „come to 
some kind of arrangement‟ with the Soviets and leave Iran „out on a limb‟; a possibility 
to which the Shah was highly sensitive.
133
  
 
The apparent legitimacy of these concerns however, failed to detract from the 
impression, gained by both the Soviets and the Americans as a result of the Shah's 
apparent decision to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union, that blackmail was 
                                                 
129  FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 June 1958, §d(3) 
130  FO 371/140799: Minister of Defence to Foreign Secretary, 4 February 1959, §5 
131  FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Secretary of State Dulles to the Department of State, 25 January 1959. 
132  FO 371/140799: Denis Wright to Sir Geoffrey Harrison, 30 January 1959; for the Iraqi coup, see 
FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: National Intelligence Estimate, 26 August 1958. 
133  FO 371/140797: Tehran to Foreign Office, 2 February 1959, §1(d); FO 371/140799: Copy of Minute 
by Mr. D.A.H. Wright to Sir Geoffrey Harrison, 30 January 1959, §(e). For details of Eden's proposals, 
see Time Magazine: The Paris Conference – Neutral Zone, 30 December 1957. 
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being employed against them.
134
 Commenting on the crisis, a former U.S. Ambassador 
to Iran (1946-1948), George Allen, told Secretary of State Foster Dulles that the Shah 
was „the best blackmailer he knew of.‟135 The British Ambassador similarly detected „an 
element of Dutch auction‟ in the Shah's strategy.136 The analysis in this chapter has 
suggested that this impression may well have been mistaken. While it was clear the 
Iranian government saw nothing fundamentally wrong with the familiar tactic of 
playing both sides – an assertion supported by the approval with which Shah viewed 
Nasser's apparent successes in this respect for Egypt – the decision to engage in 
dialogue with Moscow appeared to be motivated by a genuine concern at the perceived 
inadequacy of Western assurances set against what was felt to be both a present and 
immediate Soviet threat. In such a context, the opportunity presented by the sudden 
willingness of the USSR to negotiate was attractive. And from the Soviet point of view, 
as argued in the introduction to this chapter, neither the Shah's position as a ruling 
monarch nor his pro-Western orientation now presented insurmountable blocks to 
political dialogue, albeit the ideological prism through which senior officials tended to 
view Iran – as a tool of imperialism engaged in perpetuating the „shameful colonialist 
condition‟ of the Middle East and aiding the West in its suppression of the region's 
„national-liberation movements‟ – had changed little in private.137 
 
The conduct of the talks, and manner of their eventual breakdown, greatly added to the 
very same risk which the the negotiations were designed to mitigate. Indeed it appeared 
unlikely, concluded the British Embassy, that Krushchev would „ever forgive the Shah 
for what he regards as a deliberate act of duplicity.‟ 138  Responsibility for this 
unfavourable dénouement notwithstanding, the resultant recriminations were 
symptomatic of a broader underlying issue. As also argued in the previous chapter with 
respect to Mosaddeq‟s negotiations with Soviet representatives, the inability to reach 
agreement was principally caused by a fundamental incompatibility of objectives and an 
ingrained distrust between the two governments. This was evidenced, from the Iranian 
                                                 
134  FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, 30 January 1959: 'While 
we can not read Shah‟s mind, we believe the Shah‟s motive […] was primarily blackmail.' 
135  FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Account of the 394
th
 Meeting of the NSC, 22 January 1959. 
136  FO 371/140797: From Tehran to Foreign Office, 2 February 1959, §3. 
137  АВПРФ, ф.6, оп.15, п.12, д. № ИР-011, л.3-10: Draft Note, 6 January 1956 
138  IPD, Vol. 14, 1954-1965, p644. 
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side, by insistence on the removal of provisions in the 1921 Treaty (which had furnished 
the legal basis for the Soviet invasion of Iran during World War II), and from the 
Russian side, by the strongly negative character of Moscow's response to the Iranian 
Foreign Minister‟s suggestion that „friendship with the Soviet Union should not 
constitute a stumbling block to friendship with other governments.‟139 Though the case 
advanced by the Iranian side in relation to the 1921 Treaty was certainly not without 
legal merit, the fixation with this aspect of negotiations – one side insisting on the 
Treaty's relevance, the other on its inoperability –  effectively hindered engagement with 
the Soviets government‟s principal aim, namely, to secure specific guarantees regarding 
the extent and character of U.S. military presence in Iran. And as the documentary 
evidence shows, by the point when the Soviet delegation had belatedly accepted that a 
quid pro quo in relation to the 1921 Treaty represented the only means through which to 
achieve their objective, the offer had already been rescinded. 
 
The Shah's volte face was unlikely however, to have been solely due to the persuasive 
rhetoric of Western politicians or the deficiency of Soviet negotiators. An important clue 
is provided in the discrepancy between the U.S. Bilateral Pact in its draft form and final 
version. As records of telephone conversations between Eisenhower and J. Foster Dulles 
from mid-1958 show (that is, prior to the Non-Aggression Treaty negotiations), the 
President had been reluctant to permit any „special arrangements‟ with Baghdad Pact 
member states that might exceed the terms of the so-called Mid East Resolution (also 
referred to as the 'Eisenhower Doctrine') of 1957.
140
 Eisenhower specifically ruled out 
any treaty with Iran, believing that „our Mid-East friends are currently tense and fearful 
[…] tending to make them more emotional than thoughtful‟; and that the United States 
„need not be in a hurry to exchange marriage vows.‟141 The Bilateral Security Pact 
however, concluded between Iran and US in March 1959, amounted to precisely such an 
vow. Its key provision stated that: „In the case of aggression against Iran, the 
Government of the United States of America […] will take such appropriate action, 
including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon […] in order to 
                                                 
139  АВПРФ, ф595-б, оп.3а, п.157, д.261, л.109: Statement by Ali-Asghar Hekmat, 16 February 1959. 
140  FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, 28 July 1958, n2. 
141  FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Eisenhower to Dulles, 27 July 1958. 
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assist the government of Iran at its request.‟142 In effect, the Shah had obtained the 
assurance he had sought, namely, an explicit commitment to defend Iran in the event of 
an armed Soviet incursion. The U.S. Embassy in Iran had argued strongly against the 
move. The argument advanced by the Ambassador, Edward Wailes, was prescient: 
 
„Repeated experiences with [...] appeasement show that its adoption and 
execution would foreordain another, and probably more serious, crisis, within 
one year at most. Shah‟s appetite for soldiers and military hardware is 
unrealistically unlimited [...] The Embassy believes that the primary dangers to 
Shah‟s regime are internal, not external, and that useless military expenditures 
weaken rather than strengthen it.‟143 
                                                 
142  Ralph H. Magnus (ed.), Documents on the Middle East (Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, 1969), p84.  
143  FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12: Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, 30 January 1959, §3 
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CHAPTER THREE | SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS FROM 1960 TO 1971 
 
 
„As for our neighbour, the Soviet Union, we are ready to have friendly relations. 
It is necessary in fact to forget the past, and that is why we are ready to think of 
it no more and to base our relations on respect, friendship and good-
neighbourliness. We have proved our goodwill in various ways.‟ 
 
- MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI, PRESS CONFERENCE, 26TH OF NOVEMBER 1960 
 
 
„There is apparently not a drop left in the jar of Mr. Amini's sense. The only 
thing coming from this jar is the stinking smell of decay, which has long 
poisoned the atmosphere of Soviet-Iranian relations. This is the usual process 
when an anti-popular government is in in trouble: it always blames Moscow.‟ 
 
- EDITORIAL IN COMMUNIST DAILY IZVESTIYA, 27TH OF JULY 1961 
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Introduction – A Fresh Nadir 
As the proceeding chapter has argued, the immediate cause for the demise of the Non-
Aggression Treaty negotiations of 1959 was at root one of the mutually incompatible 
assurances sought by the parties involved. Particularly anathema to the Soviet 
delegation was the Iranian side's insistence that any agreement reached should not „run 
counter‟ to their obligations in relation to other governments; whereas, the possible 
implications of such commitment remained ill-defined.
1
 More damagingly, the 
acrimonious unravelling of the talks yet further entrenched conviction on each side of 
the other's duplicity and insincerity, undermining any positive value the talks might 
have held. The Soviet leadership, it became progressively clear, viewed the outcome 
                                                 
1  Архив Внешней Политики Российской Федерации (Russian State Archive for Foreign Affairs, 
hereafter АВПРФ), ф595б, оп.3а, п.157, д.261, л.109: Statement by Iranian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, 16 February 1959 
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with a keen sense of grievance. As Khrushchev wrote to the Shah, Moscow had „trusted 
Iran's word‟ that the Bilateral Pact with the United States would not be signed: 
 
„This confidence was misplaced. Soviet-Iranian negotiations [were] ruptured not 
by the fault of the Soviet Government […] the Iranian Government signed the 
military agreement with the United States, which was as a surprise and a 
provocation to the Soviet Union.‟2 
 
The verbal démarche delivered by the head of the Soviet delegation in advance of its 
abrupt departure from Tehran on the 11
th
 of February 1959, published in Pravda two 
days later, was unprecedented in its detail: some four thousand words in Russian. 
Charging Iran with „cancelling out‟ the trend toward improvement in relations, the 
Kremlin placed a particularly dark interpretation on the breakdown of negotiations: 
 
„The unfriendly conduct of the Shah-in-Shah's government bears an indisputable 
relation to their collusion with certain foreign powers, who envisage making use 
of Iranian territory аs a springboard for aggression against the Soviet Union […] 
Such collusion signifies nothing other than an about-face in the Iranian 
government's policy, leading Iran into the ranks of those who oppose the Soviet 
Union […] no agreeable conclusion can follow from this.‟3 
 
As the recriminations mounted, reinforced by a particularly venomous press campaign 
in the Soviet media, the Iranian government felt compelled to act. In a private Aide-
Mémoire to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at the end of April, the Iranian ambassador in 
Moscow delivered what appears to have been an appeal for calm: 
 
„The Shahinshah's Government does not wish to engage in rehearsing the 
various steps and background that culminated in [...] the Soviet delegation's visit 
                                                 
2 The National Archives (TNA): The Public Record Office (PRO): FO 371/149769: From Tehran (Guy 
Millard) to Foreign Office, 27 September 1960, summarising Khrushchev's recent letter to the Shah. 
3 Text in Pravda, 'On Russian-Iranian Relations', 13 January 1959, p5. Use here of the word 
'springboard' (platzdarm) is purposely intended to recall Article 6 from the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 
1921, which explicitly warns against the use of Iranian territory as a 'base for military action' against 
Russia. See: League of Nations Treaty Series, 1922, Vol. IX, No. 268, p403. 
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to Iran […] All these events are now in the past and judgement of them belongs 
to history. If however the Government of the USSR –  as it stated in its Aide 
Mémoire of the 28
th
 of December 1958 – is really concerned […] with the goal 
of preserving friendly relations between our two countries, and of working 
together with our Government, then it must be asked by what route the Soviet 
Government wishes to achieve this. Surely the route chosen by the Soviet 
Government […] the unacceptable and unjust statements of senior government 
figures, or the unseemly broadcasts by Soviet radio stations […] cannot be the 
way to attain its supposed objective.‟4 
 
When this attempt toward conciliation failed to produce any results however, the Iranian 
Government appeared to sanction stronger action. The Iranian media, monitored closely 
by the Soviet TASS agency in Tehran, struck back robustly against what it saw as the 
illicit propaganda published by the latter.
5
 In one instance, it was observed, the Jahan 
newspaper even called for Iranians working at the Soviet Embassy to be „seized and 
sent to the gallows.‟ Worse, on the 9th of May 1959, an Iranian member of staff tasked 
with distributing the Soviet Embassy's Axbar bulletin was accosted by a policeman in 
the course of his duties and „hit in the face.‟ Five days later, the same employee was 
arrested together with his chauffeur and allegedly pressured „to sign a statement 
confessing that they been ordered by top Embassy officials to deliver anti-government 
leaflets and publications.‟ All this had happened, in the version of events presented 
personally by the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Abolhassan 
Mas‟ud-Ansari, „with the full knowledge of the Iranian authorities‟ who were 
attempting to create „intolerable conditions for the work of Embassy.‟ In this 
connection, the note further alleged, repeated representations to Iran's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had failed to stem death threats „of clear inspiration‟ to Embassy staff.6 
Although the Russian Archives contain no record of any formal Iranian response to this 
unprecedented set of accusations, which were accompanied by a direct warning of a 
break in diplomatic relations, a note addressed two weeks later to the Head of the Soviet 
                                                 
4 АВПРФ, ф.94, оп.48, п.136, д.012, л.32: Aide-mémoire, 30 April 1959. 
5 TASS, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, was the USSR's centralised agency for monitoring, 
collation and distribution of local or international news. The Foreign Ministry was provided with a 
systematic and extensive series of relevant translations from the Iranian press by its bureau in Tehran. 
6 АВПРФ, ф.94, оп.48, п.136, д.011 л.17-18: Verbal Note, 28 May 1959. 
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Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department by Ambassador Ansari provides an insight 
into the immense delicacy of the situation: 
 
„In relation to your conversation with me yesterday at the reception in the 
Kremlin regarding the arrest of two Soviet Embassy employees in Iran, I would 
ask you to re-check the report that you have received, because I have received 
confirmation yesterday both by telegraph and in writing of their release. It seems 
to me there may be a regrettable misunderstanding here? Please do let me know. 
If contrary to my expectations these two gentlemen remain under arrest, I will 
take the appropriate measures from my side.‟7 
 
Notwithstanding the resolution of this apparently grave diplomatic crisis, the underlying 
strain remained palpable. Fundamentally, as seen from Moscow and as the Soviet 
Ambassador Nikolai Pegov protested at an audience with incoming Iranian Prime 
Minister, Jafar Sharif-Emami, Iran's about-face in its dealings with the Russian 
delegation „constituted an affront to Soviet prestige.‟8 A particular target of Soviet ire 
was Sharif-Emami's immediate predecessor, Manouchehr Eqbal, whom Radio Moscow 
held to be a „filthy spy of Western imperialism‟, asserting that he had „personally 
torpedoed‟ the negotiations. 9  The latter charge was not, it must be noted, without 
justification. An analysis of Iranian Government opinion at the time of the negotiations, 
attributed to the Turkish Foreign Minister and based on first-hand meetings, clearly 
identifies that Eqbal was not in favour of rapprochement.
10
 Indeed, as Sharif-Emami 
acknowledged in a frank conversation with the British Counsellor in Tehran, the 
increase in Soviet ill-will was largely attributable to their delegation's „treatment‟ in 
Iran, and in particular, to Eqbal having „gone out of his way to show his hostility to 
them.‟11 In point of fact, Eqbal's virulently anti-Soviet views were aired publicly in a 
speech he made on National Uprising Day in August 1960, shortly before his 
replacement as Prime Minister. A BBC News Monitoring report, preserved in the British 
archives, carries the following editorial note on the speech's contents: 
                                                 
7 АВПРФ, ф.94, оп.48, п.136, д.2, л.53: Ansari to Pegov, 13 June 1959. 
8 FO 371/149769: Tehran to Foreign Office, 4 October 1960, §2. 
9 FO 371/149769: Tehran to Foreign Office, 13 September, 1960. 
10 FO 371/140797: Ankara to Foreign Office, 30 January 1959, §3. 
11 FO 371/149769: Tehran to Foreign Office, 8 October 1960, §3. 
 123 
„Eqbal was heard to say that a Soviet leader received 20,000 tomans a month 
whereas a Soviet worker received only 250 tomans – so much for Soviet 
equality; that thousands of people were rotting in Soviet prisons; that 
Khrushchev was forgetting the forced labour camps when he said his labourers 
would only work for four hours a day in future; and that Khrushchev could not 
bear to see Iran prosperous. Apparently addressing the Russians, Eqbal said: You 
tell lies, you commit injustices, you are highwaymen and robbers.‟12 
 
Prime Minister Emami opted to set a rather different tone. Against what he characterised 
as the „unnecessarily belligerent‟ attitude of the previous administration, he strove to 
restore a modicum of normality in relations.
13
 Emami's more accommodating attitude 
was witnessed, for instance, in the number of Iranian government officials attending the 
1960 October Revolution celebrations held at the Soviet Embassy, in marked contrast to 
previous years.
14
 In effecting this change, the incoming Prime Minister undoubtedly 
sought to reflect wider public concerns. As one British official admitted, there existed „a 
very large body of opinion‟ that considered Iran simply could not afford to be on poor 
terms with her significant northern neighbour.
15
 In military as well as domestic political 
terms, Iran was in a conspicuously weaker position than her Baghdad Pact neighbours 
and hence, as the Shah himself argued, an attractive target for Soviet propaganda.
16
 
 
Insofar as military guarantees were concerned, the Shah was belatedly prepared to offer, 
in a letter to Khrushchev in August 1960, an assurance that Iran would not „permit 
missile bases of a Foreign Government to be established on Iranian soil.‟ In adding a 
significant caveat however, namely, that the Iranian government nevertheless reserved 
the right to acquire weapons, including missiles, in the same manner as any country, the 
assurance did go far enough for Moscow.
17
 And in any event, the Soviet President's real 
concern, indicated in his eventual response, was not with missile bases per se, but rather 
                                                 
12 FO 371/149768: Rizaiyeh Radio in Persian, broadcast on 19 August 1960. 
13 FO 371/149768: Tehran to Foreign Office, 9 September 1960, §3. 
14 FO 371/149770: Tehran to Foreign Office, 10 November 1960, §2: 'The Prime Minister, the Minister 
of Court, the Foreign Minister and several other members of the Cabinet, together with the President 
of the Senate and the speaker of the last Majles were all present and stayed for most of the reception.' 
15 FO 371/149768: Tehran to Foreign Office, 2 August 1960, §7. 
16 FO 371/149769: Tehran to Foreign Office, 24 September 1960. 
17 FO 371/149768: Iranian Offer of 'Assurances' to the USSR, 12 August 1960. 
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what Khrushchev saw as the broader implications of the Bilateral Pact: 
 
„In this connection, I attach importance to the use of Iran's airspace by the U.S. 
Air Force, which exploits it for espionage flights […] Attention is also drawn to 
the aerial manoeuvres of October 17, which took place under the aegis of the 
Bilateral Agreement, when aircraft operated with napalm arms and gave an 
exhibition of atomic bombing.‟18 
 
Yet if the military situation was far from satisfactory, there was evidence that Soviet 
leaders took consolation in the fragility of Iran's internal economic and political 
situation. The U.S. journalist Walter Lipmann, in his celebrated interview with Nikita 
Khrushchev for the New York Herald Tribune in April 1961, reported the Soviet 
President's frank appraisal of Iran's prospects: 
 
„He said that Iran has a very weak Communist Party but that nevertheless the 
misery of the masses and the corruption of the Government was surely 
producing a revolution. “You will assert”, he said, “that the Shah has been 
overthrown by Communists, and we shall be glad to have it thought in the world 
that all progressive people in Iran recognise we are the leaders of the progress of 
mankind.” […] In his mind, Iran is the most immediate example of the inevitable 
moment in history in which he believes so completely.‟19 
 
It would appear that this, to say the least, unfavourable section of the interview was 
initially suppressed by the Iranian Foreign Ministry. When approached for an 
explanation by an Iranian Senator, one Foreign Ministry official allegedly responded 
that Khrushchev's remarks were „very bitter and repugnant to us and it was not in our 
interest that the thought of the people should be stirred up by them.‟20 The private effect 
                                                 
18 FO 371/149770: Tehran to Foreign Office, 10 November 1960 (the 17
th
 of October was airforce day). 
Evidence that overflights of the Soviet Union operating from Iran were indeed happening is 
discernible in FO 371/149768: Mr Guy Millard to Foreign Office, 2 August 1960: 'I think the 
omission [from the Shah's letter to Khrushchev] of [an] assurance about flights is a gain.' (§5) 
19 FO 371/157618: Tehran to Foreign Office, 27 April 1961: Extract from New York Herald-Tribune, 
April 18, 1961: An Interview with M. Lipmann. For the full interview text see: Survival (International 
Institute for Strategic Studies), Volume 3, Issue 4 (1961), pp154-158. 
20 FO 371/157618: Tehran to Foreign Office, 1 May 1961.  
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of Khrushchev remarks, inevitably, was a further deterioration in relations, a situation 
that worsened yet further when Prime Minister Ali Amini came to power.
21
 Lacking a 
coherent political programme and indeed an elected Majlis, Amini sought to „gain time‟ 
with an ambitious agenda for reform.
22
 In doing so, he earned himself the strident 
opposition of a still-potent political force in Iranian politics, the National Front, not least 
by having co-opted some of the latter‟s own ideas for reform.23 At the same time, the 
Amini administration proved itself „much less receptive than was its predecessor to 
Soviet enticements.‟24 As a result, Communist radio outlets began to actively incite 
revolt against the new Prime Minister, who was held to be a „servant of the United 
States.‟25 In the most serious incident, it was alleged by the Iranian newspapers Setareh-
ye Iran and Ettela'at, Moscow Radio made common cause with the National Front in 
advance of one particular demonstration (21
st
 of July 1961) by calling upon „the 
peasants from around Tehran and elsewhere in the provinces to go into the city to take 
part in the protests.‟26 The Ettela'at article also reported that the Soviet military attaché, 
Colonel Kouzmenko, was witnessed moving by car among the demonstrators.
27
 The 
Soviet Ambassador, summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained somewhat 
improbably that the attaché „merely happened to be there at the time‟, having been en 
route to his summer residence outside the capital.
28
 The Soviet media on the other hand, 
responding to the accusations of interference, made little attempt to disguise their views: 
 
„These broadcasts contained the truth about Iran, the truth about the pillaging of 
the Iranian people by the foreign predators who have a free hand with Amini's 
blessing. This is the same truth which is well known to the people of Iran and 
which the present rulers of Iran would like to keep hidden.‟29 
                                                 
21 FO 371/157618: Tehran to Foreign Office, 27 April 1961. A proposed 'good will' mission to Moscow, 
to have been headed by Sharif-Emami, was postponed indefinitely as a result of the Lipmann 
interview. See also article by Time Magazine, „Iran: Time, Gentlemen, Please‟, 9 June 1961. 
22 Iran Political Diaries (hereafter 'IPD'), 1954-1965: Annual Review for 1961, dated January 3, 1962 
23 Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter „FRUS‟), 1961–1963, Vol. XVII: Memorandum 
From Robert W. Komer to President Kennedy, 4 August 1961. 
24 FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. XVII: Paper Prepared for the Iran Task Force (undated, but prepared for 
meeting of the same held on 2 August 1961), §8. 
25 Ibid., under 'Political' sub-heading. 
26 FO 371/157618: From Tehran (Chancery) to Foreign Office, dated July 26, 1961, §4 
27 FO 371/157618: From Tehran (Chancery) to Foreign Office, dated July 26, 1961, §5 
28 „Russia Accused of Meddling in Iran‟, The Times, July 24, 1961; FO 371/157618: From Tehran (Sir 
Geoffrey Harrison) to Foreign Office, 1 August 1961. The audience took place on the 23
rd
 of July. 
29 FO 371/157618, BBC News Monitoring: 'Izvestia' on Iranian Anti-Soviet Provocation, 27 July 1961. 
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The Foreign Ministry formally protested to the Soviet ambassador, in an audience 
reportedly lasting three hours, that such broadcasts were „incompatible with 
friendship.‟30 In an indication of the seriousness with which the episode was viewed, an 
editorial in Ettela'at took grave exception to what it saw as this „careful mincing of 
words‟, accusing the Minister of „over-indulgence in diplomatic decorum‟ and 
demanding that Soviet interference in Iran's internal affairs be referred to the United 
Nations.
31
 It was certainly true that the incident appeared to reflect a preference, from 
the viewpoint of Soviet policy makers, for offering moral support to dissident elements, 
irrespective of their ideological provenance and thereby apply pressure to the Shah's 
administration, at a time of severe economic strain, with the medium-term goal of 
undermining ties with the West and thereby restoring greater balance in relations with 
Moscow. Indeed, it would be hard to understate the disquiet with which the state of 
affairs was seen from both within Iran but also for U.S. politicians, whose alarm is 
recorded in a memorandum written for President Kennedy by Robert Komer – 
„Blowtorch Bob‟ of Vietnam fame32 – a member of the National Security Council: 
 
„The gut problem is still political - how to keep in power a regime which still 
seems by far the best bet for achieving a controlled revolution in Iran [...] we are 
treading the thin edge of potential disaster for which Khrushchev sits patiently 
waiting […] we must treat this as a crisis situation […] desperate times call for 
desperate measures.‟33 
 
This somewhat hawkish assessment notwithstanding, the present chapter will argue that, 
at a time of comparatively diminished Western attention to the Middle East – not least in 
the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the war in Vietnam – the Shah‟s regime 
ultimately opted to steer a more neutral course between the interests of the West and 
                                                 
30 FO 371/157618: Tehran to Foreign Office, 24 July 1961. 
31 FO 371/157618: Tehran to Foreign Office, 26 July 1961, §5. 
32 Komer joined the U.S. National Security Council following a fifteen-year career in the CIA and 
served on the U.S. National Security Council from 1961-1962. He later headed the notorious Phoenix 
counter-insurgency program in Vietnam (a targeted assassination programme directed a members of 
the NLF, or Việt Cộng.) Komer owed his nickname to Henry Cabot Lodge, the U.S. ambassador to 
South Vietnam, who was reported to have said 'that arguing with Mr. Komer was like having a 
flamethrower aimed at the seat of one's pants.' See: Robert Komer, 78, Figure in Vietnam, Dies 
obituary by Tim Weiner in the New York Times, April 2000. 
33 FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 17: Robert W. Komer to President Kennedy, 4 August 1961. 
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those of Moscow, maintaining the political support of the former and achieving a 
significant improvement of relations with the latter. Thus and remarkably, against the 
singularly impropitious background outlined above, a constructive equilibrium was 
obtained in relations with the Soviet Union. Since the underlying convictions of the 
Iranian elite in respect of the USSR remained fundamentally unchanged however, (as 
did the Soviet leadership‟s suspicions of Iran) the balance achieved was a precarious 
and temporary one. And as the Shah continued to see matters, the pressure to his regime 
came not in fact from opposition groups per se but rather from „the Communists, with 
[National Front] partisans and allies being largely [their] willing dupes.‟34  It was a 
conception that would have momentous consequences in the years ahead. 
 
1961 - 1963: A Necessary Thaw 
The „desperate measures‟ proposed by Robert Komer, coupled to the U.S. decision to 
decisively back the Amini administration, led to a package of $15 million dollars in 
budgetary assistance designed to stabilise its finances.
35
 By the end of August 1961, the 
American Ambassador, Julius Holmes, felt able to speak in more positive terms: 
 
„Barring some unforeseen development [...] I anticipate [Amini] remaining in 
office for a considerable period, providing that we continue the help we are 
giving him. Without this he has frankly said he could not have survived.‟36 
 
The so-called „Mosaddeq-ist‟ elements of the urban middle class, for their own part, 
continued to be hamstrung by their lack of unity and inability to agree upon a political 
programme beyond functioning as outlet for general discontent. Furthermore, these 
groups continued to be „quietly but effectively repressed‟, as the chief of Iranian 
intelligence services, Hassan Pakravan, reassured Western diplomats: „at least for the 
immediate future there is no reason to feel uneasy.‟ 37  The clandestine Soviet radio 
stations, on the other hand, continued to roundly denounce the „disgraceful atrocities‟ 
visited upon National Front demonstrators by the security forces. Indeed, the July 1961 
                                                 
34 FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 17: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 6 June 1961. 
35 FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 17: Copy of Letter to the American Ambassador, 11 August 1961. 
36 FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 17: Ambassador to Iran to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for N. 
Eastern and S. Asian Affairs, 27 August 1961. 
37 FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 17: Paper by Robert W. Komer, 20 October 1962.  
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disturbances were only put down by what the British euphemistically characterised as 
„prompt and severe action.‟ 38  Moreover, to the extent that the „flood of hostile 
propaganda‟ bore, as the British ambassador conceded, a direct relationship to the 
„brittleness of the internal situation‟, it became increasingly clear that continued rule 
without a Majles and the Shah‟s close personal association with the burgeoning reform 
programme held considerable perils.
39
 But whereas Western representatives „spoke 
emphatically of ministerial responsibility and Shah‟s need for protection from public 
criticism of the necessary but unpalatable acts of government‟, the Shah took a sharply 
different view. Referring to the absence of „responsible‟ political parties and Iran's lack 
of „real‟ parliamentary tradition, the consequence of free elections would be, he 
asserted, an „irresponsible Majlis composed of self-seeking politicians.‟ The choice thus 
lay between between the risks of democracy and „rule by decree without Parliament for 
two or three years while reforms went forward.‟40 While such a scenario was, as the 
British and American ambassadors candidly agreed, „preferable to another rigged 
election‟, the Shah would not only bear the burden of unrest in the country but also be 
obliged to deal with „what most Iranians (including himself) feel is the less than 
satisfactory state of their country's relations with both the USSR.‟41 
 
It was in the pressing context of a need for greater domestic stability, therefore, that a 
fresh rapprochement with the USSR was sought under Asadollah Alam, appointed as 
Prime Minister in July 1962. A key court confidante and firm advocate of improved 
relations with the Soviet Union, Alam took steps to address one a central point of 
tension between the two countries: he offered an unilateral commitment on foreign 
missile bases.
42
 The Soviets at first „balked‟ then counter-proposed with a text that was, 
it would curiously appear, substantially similar to that rejected by the previous Iranian 
administration seven months earlier.
43
 In both instances, and with significant 
implications for the wider Cold War, the Soviet side pushed for the inclusion of one 
                                                 
38 FO 371/157618, BBC News Monitoring: Observer in Izvestia on Iranian Anti-Soviet Provocation, 27 
July 1961, p2; IPD, 1954-1965, Annual Review for 1962, 14 February 1963. 
39 IPD, 1954-1965, Annual Review for 1961 (Sir Geoffrey Harrison), 3 January 1962. 
40 FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 17: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 31 October 1961. 
41 FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 17: Political Prospects for Iran, 7 September 1962, §4. 
42 FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 12: Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council 
Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 14 September 1962. 
43 The originally proposed Soviet text is in: FO371/164190: Tehran to Foreign Office, 9 February 1962. 
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specific clause; to the effect that, although foreign-operated missile bases would not be 
established on Iranian territory, Iran could reserve the right to acquire weapons under its 
own control on Iranian territory. Robert Komer of the National Security Council 
considered this „very interesting‟: 
 
„Think of Cuban analogy. What if Sov[iet]s were able to say “we recognize right 
of a country on our border to have missiles under its own control, but US won't 
allow this right to Cuba.” […] I'm glad Holmes talked [the] Iranians out of any 
such statement.‟44 
 
The analogy was prescient, coming as it did shortly before the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Seen from Moscow's point of view, assurances were felt necessary not only in respect of 
foreign-controlled missile bases but also against the prospect of „Iranian‟ weapons 
systems that might be under American control in practical terms. The latter state of 
affairs was, it must be remembered, already a reality in neighbouring Turkey.
45
 The key 
danger for the Iranian side therefore was that, if a clause explicitly describing Iran's 
right to possess weapons „under its own control and supervision‟ were included in 
Alam's exchange of notes, the Soviets would be able to object to any equipment that 
required technical assistance from Western personnel, since „supervision‟ was a term 
naturally open to a variety of interpretations.
46
 The inclusion of such a clause would 
further, as the U.S. ambassador notably pointed out, preclude the deployment of nuclear 
warheads in Iran „should these ever be involved‟ since such weapons would naturally 
remain in U.S. custody. The clause was thus omitted in the final text.
47
 There can 
however be little doubt that, with the delivery of Alam's undertaking on missile bases, a 
rubicon had been crossed in terms of Soviet-Iranian relations. In finally meeting the 
implicit Soviet demand during the 1959 negotiations – a written assurance against the 
use of Iranian territory to militarily threaten the USSR‟s borders – the declaration acted 
                                                 
44 FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 12: Memorandum, 14 September 1962. 
45 The official announcement of the Jupiter IRBM deployment in Turkey ran: 'In addition to provision of 
the missiles themselves, the United States will extend training assistance to enable the Turkish armed 
forces to man and maintain the missile under the operational control of SACEUR [Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe – an American 4-star general.]' Quoted in Nur Bilge Criss (1997): Strategic 
nuclear missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959–1963, Journal of Strategic Studies, 20:3, p112. 
46 FRUS, 1961–1963, Vol. 12: Memorandum, 14 September 1962. 
47 For the text of the declaration, delivered by Foreign Minister Abbas Aram to the Soviet Embassy on 
15 September 1962, see: Department of State, Central Files, 788.56300/9-1562. 
 130 
as a catalyst for renewed efforts to improve economic and political ties. It was a task 
lent further urgency by Iran's deteriorating political environment during the course of 
1963.
48
 And unlike in earlier years, the Kennedy administration was disinclined to act 
upon the Pentagon‟s clarion calls apropos the fragility of Iran‟s internal security, nor 
was the president in any mood to be pressurised by Iran's nascent detente with 
Moscow.
49
 Approached by the Department of Defence regarding possible measures to 
ameliorate the situation, the President‟s reportedly responded “hell no.”50 
 
1963: The State Visit of Brezhnev to Iran 
President Kennedy was, in fact, planning a rapprochement of his own. His conciliatory 
speech of June 1963, calling for a „fresh start‟ in relations with Moscow, and the 
subsequent nuclear test ban treaty – signed just over a month later in the Kremlin Grand 
Palace to the strains of Gershwin's „Love walked in‟ – had further added to a growing 
sense of optimism among Soviet leaders.
51
 The apparently favourable turn in U.S.-
Soviet relations, combined with the febrile Iranian political environment of 1963, 
presented a policy opportunity in Iran that was not lost on Moscow. And from the 
Iranian perspective too, the invitation extended to Leonid Brezhnev (then Chairman of 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet but an increasingly obvious candidate as 
Khrushchev's successor) was no doubt partly motivated by the appreciation that such a 
move was not only unlikely to meet with American resistance, but also held out 
significant promise with respect to economic cooperation in areas of mutual interest. 
Thus, on the eve of Brezhnev's arrival in Tehran (16
th
 of November 1963, precisely one 
                                                 
48 See Ali M. Ansari (2001) The Myth of the White Revolution: Mohammad Reza Shah, 'Modernization' 
and the Consolidation of Power in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Jul., 2001), p20. FRUS, 
1961–1963, Vol. XVIII: Telegram to the Embassy in Tehran, 28 January 1963, n3. The June protests 
followed the arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini for speaking out against land reform and voting reforms 
allowing for the emancipation of woman.  
49 Lyman Lemnitzer, the senior U.S. Army general ultimately responsible for American military 
assistance and operations in Iran at the time, reported in June 1963: „In view of the mounting 
dissatisfaction among an increasing number of diverse and geographically dispersed elements in Iran, 
the current threat to internal security is greater than at any time since the Shah was forced to flee [...] 
in August 1953.‟ Lemnitzer recommended as countermeasures: (i) the supply of U.S. food aid to tribal 
areas; (ii) to 'expedite' police training in riot control; and (iii) 'special psychological operations 
assistance' by the U.S. Information Agency (i.e. a broadcast media campaign.) FRUS, 1961–1963, 
Vol. XVIII: Memorandum from V. H. Krulak of the Office of the Special Assistant for 
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 June 1963. 
50 Quoted in Stephen McGlinchey (2012): Building a Client State American Arms Policies Towards Iran, 
1950-1963 in Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 2, p40. 
51 W. Taubman (2004): Khrushchev: The Man and his Era, p603-4 
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week before Kennedy's assassination) „Radio Iran Courier‟ (Peyk-e Iran, broadcasting 
from East Germany) sought to underline the potential opportunities on offer: 
 
„In recent months a favourable situation and atmosphere has ben created for the 
expansion of relations and the establishment of Iran-Soviet good-neighbourly 
relations […] the Iranian rulers should, instead of following their blind class 
prejudices, instead of carrying out the enslaving orders of their imperialist 
masters, make use of this favourable situation, which can provide very sincere 
aid with no strings attached.‟52 
 
The willingness to adopt a more pragmatic approach toward Iran was duly reflected in 
Brezhnev's speech at a banquet at the Golestan palace, attended by the Shah and the 
heads of the Warsaw Pact missions. Drawing on the example of Soviet relations with 
Afghanistan, Brezhnev emphasised – in what must have appeared to Iranian leaders as a 
refreshing departure from Khrushchev's approach – that „differing assessments of 
international life‟ no longer constituted „an insurmountable obstacle to co-operation‟: 
  
„Different social orders and ways of life exist in the USSR and Afghanistan. 
However, despite this relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan [are 
developing] very well. These relations are built […] on the principles of peaceful 
coexistence of States with different social systems. It goes without saying that 
these principles may be fully applied in relations between all States with 
different social systems. This is our firm belief, and the general line of the 
foreign policy of the Soviet Union is based on it.‟ 
 
In his reply, the Shah took up this theme and, mirroring Brezhnev's own words, sought 
to play down the significance of Cold War alignment, highlighting a reciprocal 
willingness on the part of Iran do pursue a more independent policy: 
 
„[Our] slight difference in political systems and different approaches to one or 
other international problem need not be an obstacle to the establishment and 
                                                 
52 FO 371/170382: BBC News Monitoring report, Radio Iran Courier in Persian, 17 November 1963. 
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development of good neighbourly relations […] when I say that it is in our 
interests and is our desire to live in good-neighbourliness with such a good 
neighbour as the Soviet Union, these words are the expression of our 
independent policy.‟53 
 
Several days later, addressing a joint session of the Senate and Majlis, Brezhnev went 
further, sounding a conciliatory note on recent Soviet-Iranian history. In doing so he 
implicitly recognised that the impact of Soviet apologism for (and Khrushchev's 
actively unrepentant attitude toward) past Russian actions in Iran continued to cast a 
long shadow over Iranian government attitudes in relation to the Soviet Union.
54
 
Khrushchev's future successor, by contrast, took a different view: 
 
„I do not want to stir up the past or to recall temporary complications that there 
have been in relations between our countries. Water which has once left a stream 
will not return to it. I will only say that we in the Soviet Union have always been 
pleased when we have managed to remove these complications and to settle 
Soviet-Iranian relations in the normal way.‟55 
 
Leonid Brezhnev's visit – as Moscow Radio was quick to point out – was strictly-
speaking the first by a Soviet head of state to Iran in the history of relations between the 
two countries.
56
 Furthermore, in an highly symbolic gesture, Brezhnev laid a wreath at 
the tomb of Reza Shah and observed a minute's silence – a point of protocol that Soviet 
Ambassador, Anatoly Lavrent'yev, had studiously avoided ten years earlier.
57
 
 
                                                 
53 FO 371/170382: BBC News Monitoring Report, Speeches given by Brezhnev, 18 November 1963, (c). 
54 In an exchange of letters between Khrushchev and the Shah in 1960, for example, Khrushchev 
expressed himself 'deeply surprised' by the Shah's reference to Soviet actions during WWII, which he 
insisted had been 'a military necessity […] based on Treaty rights [...] designed to prevent Iranian 
territory from being used by German forces for the invasion of the Soviet Union. It had not been a 
hostile action.' FO 371/149769: Tehran to Foreign Office, 27 September 1960. 
55 FO 371/170382: BBC News Monitoring Report: Brezhnev's Speech to the Senate and Majlis, Tehran 
home service 05.50 GMT, 21 November 1963, received in archives 27 November 1963, at Tab (b). 
56 FO 371/170382: BBC News Monitoring Report: Text of Commentary by Shams al-Din Rahimov: 
Moscow [Radio] in Persian at 18.30 GMT, 16 November 1963, Tab (d). 
57 FO 371/170382: BBC News Monitoring report: Arrival and Engagements (Abstract of reports), 
Moscow [Radio] in Russian, 12.30GMT, 17 November 1963. For Lavrent'yev's refusal to lay a wreath 
see АВПРФ, оп.65, п.403, д. № 033-ИР, л. 134: Record of Conversation with Head of the 
Protocolary Department at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 August 1953. 
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This careful exercise in diplomatic decorum and wilful amnesia was matched, however, 
by significant progress on practical matters of mutual interest. In point of fact, the first 
sixteen months of Alam's premiership leading up to the visit had seen the signing of a 
number of significant Irano-Soviet agreements: to finally delimit their mutual border, 
codify transit arrangements and enhance trade.
58
 The most substantive of these (signed 
in Tehran on the 27
th
 of July 1963) – was an economic and technical agreement, 
providing for the joint construction of a hydro-electric dam across the Aras river on 
Iran's north-eastern border with Russia. As a result of Brezhnev's visit, Moscow further 
undertook to build grain silos, revive Iran's fishing industry in the Caspian by 
redredging the port of Bandar-e Pahlavi (modern day Bandar-e Anzali), and to extend a 
credit of US $35 million in economic assistance.
59
 The overall value of the package was 
valued by internal Iranian government correspondence at some US$250 million 
dollars.
60
 In a pattern that was to become a significant point of benefit in subsequent 
years, repayment of the credit was achieved by means of a barter arrangement for 
Iranian cotton and dried fruit.
61
 Indeed, the arguments in favour of enhanced trade with 
the Soviet Union were clear in the sense that, whereas the Soviet Union manufactured a 
wide variety of goods required by Iran (namely, industrial and agricultural equipment), 
Iran was a key producer of raw materials required by the USSR's more industrialised 
economy. Under the initial trade quotas agreed by Alam in 1962, for example, Iran was 
to export cotton, wool, hides, rice and lead-zinc ores in return for Soviet machinery, 
cars, tractors, sugar and chemicals. To facilitate this exchange, the transit agreement 
provided for a 25% discount on rail freight charges in the respective territories.
62
  And 
as Brezhnev accurately reminded the Senate and Majlis: 
 
                                                 
58 The initial agreement on trade quotas was concluded shortly after Alam took up office, in August 
1962; instruments of ratification of the Transit Agreement were exchanged in Moscow on November 
5, 1962; the Frontier Control Agreement was ratified in Tehran on November 5, 1962 (FCO 
371/175718: Tehran to Foreign Office, 'Irano-Soviet Relations: 1962-1964, 2 September 1964; IPD, 
1954-1965, Annual Review for 1962, 14 February 1963.) Brezhnev referred effusively to the border 
agreement in a speech during his visit, leading a British Foreign Office official to note (correctly) in 
the margin of the document: 'It took 6 years.' The fact, however, only served to emphasise the positive 
change in Soviet-Iranian relations that had taken place under Alam. 
59 FO 371/170382: Tehran to Foreign Office: President Brezhnev's Visit to Iran, 30 November 1963. 
60 Chap dar Irån beh Revåyat-e SÅVÅK, Ketab-e Panjom, Ravåbet-e Irån va Shuravi: Document 
300N/526, dated 22 Aban 1342 / 13 November 1963. 
61 FO 371/170382: BBC News Monitoring Report: Radio Iran Courier, 17 November 1963. Tab (a). 
62 FO 371/175718: Tehran to Foreign Office: Irano-Soviet Relations', 1962-1964, 2 September 1964, §2.  
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„During the first years after the great October Socialist Revolution, when the 
economy of our country was incomparably less developed, our countries 
engaged in extensive and all-round trade with profit to both sides. Now that the 
Soviet Union has become one of the greatest industrial Powers in the world the 
opportunities for mutually profitable economic co-operation […] are, of course, 
many times greater.‟ 
 
So eager was Brezhnev in his speech to emphasise Soviet goodwill toward Iran, that he 
even took the opportunity to announce an ambitious plan to divert Siberian rivers 
(which ordinarily flow into the Arctic) to the Volga basin and hence to the Caspian in 
order to arrest its falling water levels.
63
 The Shah himself, in an audience with the 
British Ambassador after the visit, confessed that Brezhnev „could not have been nicer‟ 
and moreover had made no attempt to coax Iran away from her Western allies; he felt 
the Russians now „recognised where Iran stood and were prepared to accept her as she 
was.‟ 64  Equally remarkable however, was the manner of the public reception that 
greeted Brezhnev‟s arrival in Tehran, recorded in a field report by the SAVAK: 
 
„The welcome accorded to Brezhnev by the people has been unprecedented 
among all official visits by heads of state to date. Even during the visits of 
Queen Elizabeth and Eisenhower the crowds of well-wishers did not reach a 
fifteenth [sic] of that gathered along the Shahanshah and Brezhnev‟s route 
[through Tehran] yesterday. As reported by special agents who were themselves 
standing among the crowd at various points along the route, ninety percent of the 
crowd had come of their own free will to watch the motorcade and Brezhnev‟s 
carriage pass by. The majority of shop owners along the route, unlike in the past, 
even allowed people into their premises so they could get higher than street 
level. […] Ordinary people and members of the lower and middle classes 
showed extraordinary emotion and […] an unfortunate rumour has arisen among 
the people that, because Brezhnev lent out of the carriage to answer well-
wishers‟ questions while the Shahanshah sat demurely in the back, that the 
                                                 
63 FO 371/170382: BBC News Monitoring report: Brezhnev's Speech to the Senate and Majlis, Tehran 
home service 05.50 GMT, 21.11.63. 
64 FO 371/170382: Tehran  to Foreign Office, 30 November 1963: p4. 
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Shahanshah was saddened by the manner of the people‟s reception of Brezhnev 
since the king and queen‟s own parades have never previously been greeted with 
such a degree of enthusiasm.‟65 
 
No doubt partly due to the success of Brezhnev‟s visit (and the political advantage 
which the document also alleges that the Tudeh Party attempted to derive from it) the 
Shah remained intensely wary of the Soviet Union. Nor indeed had the success of 
Brezhnev‟s visit diminished Soviet mistrust of the Shah. Communist radio stations in 
particular continued to be highly sensitive and critical of Western influence in Iran. In 
one revealing instance, Radio Iran Courier responded robustly to a speech made by the 
American ambassador, Julius Holmes, „carefully-timed‟ to coincide with Brezhnev's 
arrival, wherein he had pledged American support against any „malign system imposed 
by force on others.‟66 Protesting this „ugly political gesture‟, the station charged the 
Iranian government with serving colonial interests by providing the U.S. with an „arena 
to stage their propaganda.‟67 The fact and timing of Julius Holmes' speech, however, 
appeared more indicative of the unease with which the developing Soviet-Iranian 
rapprochement was viewed in the West. „It would be unwise‟, reported the British 
ambassador, „to assume from the Shah's and his government's reactions to Brezhnev's 
visit that their loyalties can be taken any more for granted today than in the past.‟ The 
Shah, he added as if by way of explanation, „is a man of moods and suspicions.‟68 
 
1964-1965: Soviet-Iranian Economic Engagement and the Esfahan Steel Mill 
There can be little doubt that the conclusion of Khrushchev's chairmanship of the Soviet 
Communist Party opened up new possibilities in Soviet-Iranian relations. 
Notwithstanding the latter's confident prediction in 1961 that Iran was to experience an 
„inevitable moment in history‟, the Shah's regime continued to stubbornly defy his 
expectations. Against the background of a serious and widening Sino-Soviet split at the 
time, the leadership in Moscow had actively sought to cultivate a longer-term, and less 
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overtly dogmatic position with respect to the Middle East; a policy shift exemplified by 
the clear shift in rhetoric accompanying Brezhnev's visit.
69
 Indeed, the Soviet economic 
delegation that arrived in September 1965 to discuss plans for construction of a steel 
mill was described by the Shah as „manifesting an almost unbelievable cordiality.‟70 
This shift was justified in ideological terms by the need to develop the Iranian 
proletariat to a material level where it would become amenable to socialism, hence the 
significant increase in economic aid and, in stark contrast to previous years, even mild 
support for the Shah's reform programme.
71
 Cynicism on the part of the West at this 
more nuanced approach was expressed by the British ambassador, Sir Denis Wright, 
who characterised Soviet intentions in the following terms: 
 
„They may well have estimated that the Shah's current programme of reform 
carries the seeds of its own destruction in the opposition and dissension it creates 
at various levels of Persian society and in the disillusionment that may ensue 
[…] from administrative shortcomings. Accordingly, it may not be too fanciful 
to suggest that the Russians see it to be in their own interest overtly to encourage 
the Iranian Government to pursue their reform programme without the 
distraction of Soviet hostility.‟ 
 
The overall objective was thus, in Wright's analysis, to manoeuvre the Soviet Union into 
a position where it might be able to „step in to help those who stand ready to exploit the 
resultant confusion‟ of any future revolution.72 The ambassador's analysis would appear 
to be at least partly corroborated by a Tudeh document obtained by the CIA in 1965, in 
which Soviet policy objectives were described as „cultivating the land‟ in advance of the 
Shah's inevitable demise and the imposition of socialism.
73
 Indeed, as early as 1959, a 
Tudeh informer warned his SAVAK handler that the Soviets were „even willing to 
                                                 
69 Oles M. Smolanski (1991), The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, p14; for details on the 
Sino-Soviet split see W. Taubman (2003): Khrushchev: The Man and his Era, p605-6 
70 FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 9 September 1965. 
71 FO 248/1620: Tehran to Foreign Office, 2 November 1966, §11. 
72 FCO 371/175718: 'Irano-Soviet Relations: 1962-1964, 2 September 1964, §4. 
73 FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22: Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, §8(2), 
quoting document CAS NIT-6894 (no date given.) Despite a Freedom of Information request and 
subsequent formal appeal to the CIA, the author has regrettably been unable to obtain this document. 
 137 
suspend their threatening propaganda to dupe the western world.‟ 74  Such private 
justifications were no doubt partly intended to assuage the concerns of Tudeh party rank 
and file (both within Iran itself, and its no less vocal contingent in exile), whose plenum 
of January 1965 the same year continued to stress the necessity „to fight for the 
overthrow of the existing anti-national and anti-democratic regime.‟75 Just as the Soviet 
Embassy had sought to distance itself from Tudeh's more extremist elements in 1949 
however, the official line taken with the party inside Iran continued to evidence 
Moscow's preference for tempering the party's ambitions in the service of broader 
political and economic goals. 
 
Iran's improving ties with her significant northern neighbour were not, however, merely 
a logical corollary of greater restraint in Soviet policy nor product of economic good 
sense. The shift also reflected increasingly strained relations with the United States. 
Particularly detrimental in this respect was ongoing litigation in the U.S. surrounding 
the Gudarzian affair.
76
 The latter, an Armenian-Iranian residing in the United States, had 
fraudulently contrived to obtain control of bank accounts belonging to the Shah's 
brother and sister, apparently through the use of forged documents.
77
 The affair had, as 
the State Department privately acknowledged and evidently without exaggeration, 
„incensed the Shah more than any previous incident in U.S.-Iranian relations during the 
past ten years.‟78 The constitutional inability of the State Department to intervene in the 
legal proceedings against Gudarzian proved immensely damaging given that it 
coincided with the „passage‟ through Iran's parliament of a Bill extending immunities 
and privileges to American military personnel in the country.
79
 By the candid admission 
of one American official, the Shah had „rammed [the Bill] through the Majles, at our 
insistence and with considerable risk to his domestic position.‟ Washington should, he 
predicted, „expect difficulties in relations so long as the Shah [feels] he has been 
obliging our requests whereas we do not lift a finger to keep his family from being 
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harassed unjustly in our courts.‟80 The episode thus, in unwelcome conjunction with 
existing grievances over the U.S. Government's perceived failure to „understand‟ Iran's 
military needs, conspired to place the Shah in a „blue mood‟, leading Armin Meyers, the 
new U.S. Ambassador in Tehran to warn his superiors of the need to  furnish „evidence 
[that] Washington still loves him.‟81 
 
Given such a context, the more cooperative shift in Soviet policy both enabled a rapid 
succession of developments. At the diplomatic level, the Soviet Legation in Tehran 
opened an economic bureau to assist in the implementation of technical aid.
82
 No less 
significantly, the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society in Tehran resumed its provision of 
Russian lessons, with an allocation of scholarships for Iranians to study in the USSR.
83
 
These moves toward positive engagement culminated in the Shah's state visit to the 
Soviet Union in June 1965, the first for nine years, which was marked, as the Iranian 
Foreign Minister Abbas Aram pointedly informed the American Ambassador in Tehran 
following his return, by the „unusual warmth‟ of the reception; a recollection borne out 
by first-hand accounts.
84
 The most notable aspect of the visit was the renewal of a 
previous Soviet offer to build a steel mill in Iran (SAVAK documents reveal that the 
proposal was raised as early as September 1960), and which in turn led to a Soviet 
delegation being invited to Iran to examine the possibility.
85
 An outline agreement was 
swiftly concluded on the 5
th
 of October 1965, whereby the Soviet side undertook to 
construct a steel foundry in exchange for the construction of a natural gas pipeline to 
deliver Iranian gas to the southern Soviet Republics.
86
 The arrangement undoubtedly 
represented an improvement on the terms of earlier discussions, which had evidently 
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envisaged an initial capital outlay by the Soviet side, followed by Iranian repayment at 
2.5% interest.
87
 Indeed, as the Shah argued (and previously interested Western consortia 
reluctantly conceded), the Soviet offer amounted to a „virtual gift‟ since the steel mill 
would be paid for in natural gas that was otherwise wasted through flaring.
88
 And in 
broader terms, there continued to be a strong economic argument for an indigenous 
Iranian steel-making facility. It was estimated at the time that Iran imported half a 
million tonnes of steel annually, a figure with the potential to rise markedly. 89 
Notwithstanding the strength of the economic case however, the project was not 
without its challenges. As one Soviet Embassy official in Iran at the time later 
admitted, the mill itself was inconveniently positioned in relation to the raw materials 
its operation required. Thus ‘securing the smooth operation of the facility’ entailed 
the separate construction of iron ore and coal mines in Vaqf and Kerman, 
respectively 500km and 800km away from Esfahan, and in order to bridge this 
substantial logistical gap, over 1,000km of new railtrack needed to be laid.90  
 
The merits or demerits of the plant’s construction were, however, largely beside the 
point. For Moscow, the Esfahan project presented a golden opportunity to crown the 
growing rapprochement with a flagship collaboration, and at the same time, showcase 
the practical advantages of engagement with the USSR to the wider region. And for 
the Shah and indeed many Iranians, the steel mill was a less a question of economic 
necessity than a point of national pride; a tangible symbol of Iran's modernisation 
programme and a specific aspiration that it was felt the West had consistently 
frustrated. 91  Comments in this regard made by Prime Minister Hoveyda to an 
American business representative in Tehran, and recorded in a telegram apparently 
intercepted by SAVAK, were highly revealing of the transition in official thinking:   
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‘It is as if the Americans have lost their famed dynamism. We wanted to work 
together with them on building the steel mill […] but they were neglectful of 
this matter and the Russians took the opportunity. We have achieved more with 
the Soviets in the course of a few months than we have with the Americans in 
eight years. […] Our foreign policy has changed, yes, but it is now more stable. 
We have a common border of four thousand kilometres with the Russians and it 
is only natural that we should have a mutually beneficial relationship with them. 
[…] The Soviet offer attracted our attention in two respects: speed of 
implementation and ease of repayment. The Americans didn‟t attach much 
important to this subject, which they ought to have in a country like Iran that is 
developing rapidly.‟92 
 
Thus, the firm emphasis placed by the Iranian side on the need for accelerated 
economic development – a concept with which Soviet industrialists would have been 
comfortably familiar – explained the lack of success on the part of the Americans in 
forestalling the project's realisation. In this respect it was clear that Hoveyda’s 
bullish attitude very much reflected the official line: 
 
‘Now that Soviets have made attractive offer, the Iranians are somewhat 
irritated by Western admonitions regarding the dangers of dealing with the 
Soviets. Shah points out to virtually every listener that students in U.S. 
demonstrate against him, students trained in England almost assassinated him 
this spring, so what worse can happen if he sends technicians to be trained in 
Russia in connection with steel mill?’93 
 
And indeed, as Abbas Aram's personal secretary Farhad Sepahbodi subsequently 
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recalled, the Soviet side had jokingly argued the very same point during the bilateral 
talks in Moscow: 
 
„“Why don't you send more Iranian students to our country? They'll just study 
harder. You have forty thousand in America and they return as nasty leftist 
troublemakers. Instead, send them to us and we guarantee you that they will 
return to Iran as good capitalists.”‟94 
 
 
 
1966: The Crisis over Soviet Arms 
The increasingly confident character of Iran's economic engagement with the USSR was 
undoubtedly a function of the Shah's developing „irritation‟ with the West and reflected, 
in turn, the mounting domestic political pressures for Iran to adopt a more neutralist 
position in its foreign policy.
95
 The spectre of Soviet infiltration, however, continued to 
prove itself an effective means to extract concessions from Washington. Nowhere was 
this procedure more bluntly evidenced than in the Shah's decision to consider the 
purchase of arms from the Soviet Union, a development that first came to light in July 
1966.
96
 When the American Ambassador, Armin Meyer, first raised the subject, the 
Shah began by emphasising that his approach to the Soviets was not intended as a threat 
but rather that the motivation was one of „basic economics.‟ If Western oil consortia 
failed to increase their off-take of Iranian crude to a level that met with what the Shah 
saw as the country‟s requirements, then Iran would have „no choice but to look to 
sources of supply other than traditional suppliers.‟97 In plainer language, the asking 
price for U.S. arms was felt to be too high: a curious reversal of the situation faced by 
Prime Minister Hakimi in 1947 when he informed the Majles that the decision to 
purchase American arms owed to the unattractiveness of the Soviet offer.
98
 
 
The high cost of U.S. military equipment, and the stiff terms on which that equipment 
                                                 
94 F. Sepahbodi, Accompanying the Shah on a Visit to Communist Russia, The Iranian, 25 April 2003 
95 FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 7 July 1966, §14 
96 FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 7 July 1966, §2 
97 FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 7 July 1966, §4 
98 See Chapter One, n69. 
 142 
was provided, owed partly to congressional restrictions on the military assistance 
budget, and partly to the size of the government's existing credit to Iran, amounting to 
some US$400 million at the time. The most prominent difficulty faced by U.S. policy 
makers however, was a reluctance (or practical inability) to offer purchase credits at 
lower than the market rate of 5.5%.
99
 By contrast, the Soviets were offering terms of 
2.5% over ten years, with repayment in natural gas, „exploitation of which has long 
been futilely asked by the Iranians of [the Western-run] oil consortium.‟100 The Iranian 
complaint centred  particularly on the proposed cost of F-4 fighter jets and Hawk anti-
aircraft missiles, which the Shah felt were necessary to defend Iran's gulf oil 
installations against threats from Iraq and Egypt, both of which possessed Soviet SAMs 
(surface-to-air missiles) and MiG fighter jets.
101
 Although conceding that the 
vulnerability identified by the Shah was indeed genuine, the challenge for the public 
U.S. position, as an article in the New York Times spelled out at the time, was that a 
concessionary arms deal to Iran would be hard to justify in the context of the Vietnam 
war. It was felt that those allies who could afford arms ought pay for them. Iran, with its 
US$600 million annual oil revenue, fell into this category.
102
 And given the sensitivities 
of the time, the Shah's approach to the Soviet Union also had a broader (and negative) 
psychological impact on American officials. The U.S. Ambassador, for example, reacted 
strongly to the Shah's suggestion that the American people could be „persuaded of the 
wisdom‟ of Iran purchasing non-sensitive arms from the Soviet Union: „I said this is 
simply not realistic. On contrary, the fact that he has been such an admired and 
responsible friend is likely to cause the added bitterness of jilted lover.‟103 
 
It was, indeed, a high-risk strategy. Responding to the crisis the U.S. Secretary of 
Defence, Robert McNamara, asserted – and not for the first time in U.S.-Iranian 
relations – that it „would not be proper for the United States to be blackmailed.‟ The 
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, even went so far as to assert that he „would not object to 
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a little loosening‟ in U.S. ties to the Shah.104 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as in previous 
years, took a firmly opposite view, considering it essential to maintain U.S. military 
primacy in Iran and exert every effort to prevent the Soviets „gaining a foothold.‟105 
This would entail, in effect, capitulation to the Shah's demands.
106
 The final position 
reached, at the decision of President Johnson, was somewhere in between these two 
extremes. The Shah's demands would be partially met by a scaling down of costs for the 
Hawk missiles and accelerated delivery schedule on the F-4 fighter jets.
107
 The Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Affairs, Townsend Hoopes, was 
dispatched to Tehran to deliver this news and to reiterate, not for the last time, the 
limitations on military assistance imposed by Congress.
108
 The Shah's strategy had thus 
scored a qualified success, but only narrowly. Once again, an unhelpful impression of 
bluff had been formed vis-à-vis the Shah's approach to Moscow. This was lent credence 
by the observation that, just as the potential admission of Soviet military personnel to 
Iran was unnerving for the U.S. government, so too, it was suspected, would the 
prospect of selling sensitive equipment to a country with a heavy U.S. military presence 
be unpalatable to the Soviet government.
109
 Accordingly, while the development was 
initially viewed with some alarm, the relatively measured U.S. reaction, in contrast to 
previous episodes, reflected an increasing acceptance of Iran's engagement with the 
Soviet Union, a relationship that was now seen as something to be managed rather than 
actively prevented. In this vein, one of President Johnson's advisors offered the 
following postmortem on the arms crisis: 
 
„While the Shah will increasingly move toward a position more independent of 
us, we have managed to keep him from jumping too quickly this time. Some 
independence is to be expected and is healthy. We just want to be sure he doesn't 
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go too far too fast and get us in hot water. For the moment, we've succeeded.‟110 
 
1967: The Soviet-Iranian Oil Agreement 
In the event, the Iranian government did decide to purchase military supplies from the 
Soviet Union, albeit equipment that did not fall into the category of what Prime Minister 
Hoveyda termed „prestige products.‟111 In other words, the purchase of MiG jets and 
surface-to-air missiles was ruled out, however, orders were placed for items such 
armoured personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns, jeeps and trucks.
112
 Although the 
Americans expressed concern at the magnitude of the transaction, the decision, 
Hoveyda sought to reassure the American Ambassador in January 1967, was „heavily 
conditioned‟ by the ease of repayment.113 As in the case of the Esfahan steel mill, this 
was to be almost entirely in natural gas, delivered through the pipeline then under 
construction. That Iran should opt to finance purchases from the Soviet Union through 
this route made natural economic sense; it not only, in effect, deferred payment for 
goods and services by three years but preserved valuable foreign exchange by engaging 
Russia in a „triangular‟ trade relationship, whereby Iran was, in practice, materially or 
financially compensated for hydrocarbon transit sales to Eastern Europe.
114
 
 
Significantly, the Shah began to emphasise a secondary strategic benefit from trading 
with the Soviet Union in this manner. There existed, it was thought, „some advantage‟ in 
keeping the U.S.S.R. partially dependent on Iran for a commodity like gas.
115
 Whereas 
Iran, owing to the expense involved, was not in a position to finance pipelines to 
Europe, the integrity of the Soviet Union as a whole depended in no small measure on 
Moscow's ability to diversify its existing hydrocarbon resources in order to maintain 
hegemony over, and ensure the dependency of, its European satellites.
116
 Minutes of a 
meeting in June 1969, for example, between the British Embassy's Commercial 
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Counsellor and a representative of the Iranian Mining & Engineering Group (the 
National Iranian Oil Company‟s contracted pipeline constructor) sheds further light on 
the arguments made in Iranian government circles, prominent among which were that: 
(i) it was thought the Baku oil fields were dying and that within four years the Soviet 
Union would become a net importer of oil; and (ii) the Esfahan steel-for-gas deal 
„would give the Russians – feeling increasingly menaced by China – an additional 
vested interest in Iranian stability.‟ Thus, for the Iranian leadership, the transfer of 
Iranian gas to the Caucasus represented more than simply a means of payment; it was a 
political tool, by which the Soviet leadership could be the more deeply invested in Iran's 
stability and economic progress.
117
 As a separate British dispatch also reported: 
 
„He [the Shah] maintains that, although his mistrust of Soviet intentions and 
objectives has not diminished […] agreements of this kind in fact give Iran some 
diplomatic leverage with the Soviet Union since the latter will come to rely for 
the performance of their own economic goals on the supplies of Iranian gas.‟118 
 
It was undoubtedly this line of thinking that underpinned a subsequent, and in political 
terms, remarkable development in Irano-Soviet relations. The Joint Communiqué on 
Economic Cooperation, signed in Tehran on the 15
th
 of April 1967, went much further 
than any previous agreement of its kind.
119
 It not only affirmed the desire of both sides 
to substantially increase the delivery of gas to Soviet Azerbaijan by doubling the 
pipeline‟s capacity, but also announced that the National Iranian Oil Company would 
„cooperate‟ with the U.S.S.R. to explore and exploit oil in Iran's „free zones‟, by which 
was meant those areas recently relinquished by, or outwith the concessionary remit of, 
the Western-based consortia.
120
 The agreement, if translated into practice, would have 
constituted not only an appreciable enhancement of the Soviet Union's economic 
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foothold in Iran but also, as seen through Western eyes, the realisation of Russia's 
„historic dream‟ sought since the Majles threw out Prime Minister Qavam's proposed oil 
agreement in October 1947.
121
 The British were particularly concerned that areas in 
Southern Iran and the Gulf, including areas recently relinquished by the Consortium 
would, ipso facto, fall into the category of free zones; an impression greatly 
strengthened by a remark attributed to the Minister of Court, Asadollah Alam, to the 
effect that while the Soviet Union's initial concessionary area was likely to be in the 
Caspian basin, exploitation in the south of Iran „might come later.‟122  
 
Several weeks later, the Shah confirmed in an audience with the British ambassador that 
he had indeed decided to allow the Russians to prospect around Shiraz and Kirmanshah, 
and deliberately so, since „he did not want it thought‟ that the Russians could only 
operate in northern Iran: dividing Iran into spheres of influence as had occurred in 1907 
was, he said, „unconscionable.‟123 The Shah proceeded to show considerable irritation 
when the ambassador suggested he consider the „possible effects‟ on the market of Iran 
selling oil northwards: 
 
„Would the Western oil companies [he asked] undertake not to increase their off-
take of oil from Libya, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait? If they were prepared to give a 
guarantee of favourable treatment for Iranian oil he would be ready not to sell 
Iranian to the USSR.‟124 
 
This revealing statement provided further illustration of how the Shah continued to view 
relations with the Soviet Union. Namely, that economic cooperation with the Soviet 
Union could be selectively and expeditiously deployed in order to jolt the West, and in 
particular its vested business interests, from what some Iranian officials saw, not 
without reason, as their inadequate attention to Iran's needs. It would be a mistake, 
however, to assume that such a strategy was universally popular. In point of fact, the 
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proposed oil deal was later subjected to a number of caveats. Dr. Sari Asfia, head of the 
Plan Organisation and close confidant of prime minister Hoveyda, privately let it be 
known that, should the Russians wish to increase their off-take of Iranian natural gas as 
envisaged in the protocol, or uplift oil, they would have to finance the additional pipe 
involved.
125
 And in a separate conversation, Dr. Manouchehr Eqbal, the former prime 
minister (1957-1960) and at the time a senior executive in the N.I.O.C, disavowed any 
involvement in the oil agreement, stressing that he was out of the country at the time it 
was signed. Furthermore, he intimated, concessionary areas in southern Iran were 
„unlikely‟ to be granted unless the Soviet side would be prepared to operate on a 
reciprocal basis, that is, Iranian companies could explore for oil in the southern Soviet 
states should they so wish.
126
 Eqbal was, as evidenced in the introduction to this chapter, 
well-known for his anti-Soviet views. Finally, in August, confirmation came from the 
Prime Minister himself that, since the Consortium had now „promised‟ to increase its oil 
off-take from Iran, there was „far less urgency‟ in obtaining increased revenues from 
alternative sources.
127
 
 
By placing the episode in its wider regional context, the underlying dynamic behind and 
motivation for exploring oil arrangements with the U.S.S.R. becomes more obvious. 
Notwithstanding what the Shah regarded as discriminatory Western arrangements with, 
for example, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Iranian government had enjoyed a 
substantial revenue increase as a consequence of the recent Arab-Israeli war and the 
ensuing Arab oil boycott, and that therefore, as the British ambassador put it, „trouble 
developed.‟128 In effect, the unprecedented oil windfall of 1966 had demonstrated, to the 
Iranian government's mind, what the Consortium were actually capable of delivering. 
By extension, and with important consequences that will be explored in the following 
chapter, this observation had the effect of raising future expectations on which 
ambitious plans for economic growth were then based; whereas, the Consortium sought 
to argue that oil off-take at 1966 levels was neither practical politically (that is, in 
                                                 
125  FCO 17/382: Iran / Soviet Union Economic Agreement, 25 April 1967, §3; for a biography of Dr. 
Asfia see entry in A. Milani (2008): Eminent Persians: 1941-1979, Vol.  2, pp 92-95. 
126  FO 17/382, Folio 43: Irano-Soviet Relations, 27 May 1967, §3. 
127  FCO 17/382: Visit of Iranian Prime Minister to Moscow, 10 August 1967, §8. 
128  FCO 17/351: Annual Report on Iran, 3 January 1968, §14. 
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relation to their wider regional commitments) nor sustainable economically.
129
 There 
also existed a clear desire, witnessed in negotiations with the Consortium at the end of 
1966, for Iran to „get into the business‟ of marketing oil not under the Consortium's 
direct control in order to diversify the government‟s revenue streams. 130  Economic 
engagement with Moscow, therefore, presented an attractive means both of reducing 
dependency on the Consortium, to whose production quotas fluctuations the Iranian 
economy was indeed vulnerable, and at the same time, apply targeted pressure to the 
West.
131
 In this connection, and  following a now familiar theme, as an Iranian 
government report leaked to the U.S. Embassy allegedly concluded, „the only way to 
get one's way with the Americans is to be difficult.‟132 
Conclusion 
The archival evidence, particularly from the Soviet side, leaves little doubt as to the 
grave damage inflicted on relations by the abortive „Friendship and Non-aggression 
Pact‟ negotiations of 1959. One notable passage, from an official statement made to the 
Iranian foreign minister by the Soviet delegation before their departure from Tehran, 
and subsequently published in the Communist daily Pravda, was particularly mordant: 
 
„We now see that, on the part of the Shah-In-Shah's government, all this was 
nothing more than an ill-intentioned game calculated, above all, to mislead 
public opinion in Iran [...] True, in the course of both official and unofficial 
meetings, and even today, we have listened to no few verbal assurances of 
friendship and good intentions, spoon-fed to us by individuals responsible for 
Iran's foreign policy in relation to the USSR. But as a wise Persian adage says, 
talking about halva doesn't sweeten one's mouth.‟133 
 
Given the level of animosity thus aroused, it might be expected that Communist 
elements would have sought to take advantage of Iran's deteriorating internal situation 
                                                 
129  FCO 17/351: Annual Report on Iran, 3 January 1968. 
130  FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22: Briefing Memorandum for Acting Secretary of State, 25 October 1966. 
131  See Shah's comments in ibid.: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 2 November 1966, 
§11. 
132  Ibid., Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 2 March 1966, §1. 'It is clear that there is now 
concerted campaign to increase oil off-take and obtain wanted military equipment from West, coupled 
with threat to reorient trade patterns if traditional orientation does not yield desired results.' 
133  (Ba halva halva goftan dar dahan shirin nemishevad.) Pravda, 13.2.1959, p5. 
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during the early 1960s. And indeed, this chapter has presented evidence that they 
endeavoured to do so. 1961 in particular saw Soviet broadcast hostility (both 
clandestine and official) at a peak, with stations such as Radio Iran Courier 
(broadcasting from Eastern Europe) and the National Voice of Iran (broadcasting from 
Soviet Azerbaijan) capitalising the considerable unrest in Iran, and seeking to emphasise 
exploitation of Iranians by “foreign monopoly capital.” 134  Yet as Iranian politics 
progressed fitfully through the Shah's „directed revolution‟, Soviet policy makers found 
themselves presented in many respects with the same dilemma facing American 
interests: a lack of viable alternatives.
135
 The Shah's position was still widely viewed as 
precarious. In March 1962 the American Ambassador, Julius Holmes even went as far as 
to inform his superiors that, through continued support of the monarchy, the U.S. was 
„obliged to lean on a weak reed.‟136  The awkward fact remained however, that no 
„moderate‟ elements existed to bridge what Holmes diplomatically identified as the „gap 
between the neo-Mosaddeqists of the urban middle class and more traditional […] 
elements of society‟: 
 
„The former elements, while highly vocal and critical, possess no unity among 
themselves. They are not so strong, nor are they likely […] to able to take power 
here without important military collaboration. The only singleness of purpose 
they have is to take over. They cannot agree on a political programme.‟137 
 
The resultant Soviet policy in Iran, as argued above and indeed mirrored elsewhere in 
the Middle East, appears to have been a greater acceptance of its „national-bourgeois‟ 
regime, a shift which entailed the gradual replacement of overt propaganda activities 
with more restrained criticism of „reactionary‟ elements and a parallel effort to expand 
the USSR's foothold in the region through the promotion of generous and „disinterested‟ 
economic assistance. The latter element was naturally juxtaposed to the inherent 
„dangers‟ of Western aid, which was presented in contrast to its Soviet equivalent as 
having innumerable strings attached.
138
 The role of the Tudeh party became 
                                                 
134  FO 248/1620: Soviet Policy in Iran (Paper by British Embassy, Tehran), 2 November 1966, p1, §2. 
135  FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 22: Memorandum, 13 June 1963, §4(a). 
136  FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 22: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 7 March 1962 
137  FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 22. Ambassador in Iran to Assistant Secretary of State, 27 August 1961. 
138  FO 248/1620: Soviet Policy in Iran, 2 November 1966, p1, §5. As the paper highlights, this 
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substantially less relevant in furthering Moscow's objectives on the ground. This arose 
partly in consequence of the party's effective decimation during the late 1950s, partly 
due to inevitable disillusionment among the surviving rank and file in the face of the 
new softening in Soviet policy toward the Shah, and partly due to the National Front 
having emerged, despite its lack of internal coherence, as a more potent oppositionary 
force.
139
 In point of fact, Prime Minister Hoveyda, briefing the British Counsellor in 
Tehran regarding his official visit to Moscow in 1967, remarkably claimed the Russians 
had disavowed any connection with the Tudeh in Iran and even asserted that „for all 
they cared he could arrest and imprison all of them.‟140 
 
As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, the Soviet „softening‟ was reciprocated from 
the Iranian side. In this regard, the clear fissures that emerged in the relationship with 
the U.S. may be said to have both presaged and promoted greater cooperation with the 
Soviet Union, extending even to the limited purchase of military equipment. Privately, 
American officials were willing to admit that Soviet policy had become more 
„sophisticated‟ and that it might indeed be possible, as the State Department's Country 
Director for the Soviet Union privately admitted to a British official in Washington, for 
Iran „to have better relations with the Soviet Union without being swallowed the 
bear.‟141 Practical evidence for this shift was widely evidenced by the plethora of barter 
agreements entered into by Iran with Soviet and Eastern Bloc nations during the 
period.
142
 Although burgeoning ties with the USSR, as the machinations surrounding the 
purchase of Soviet arms in 1966 bore witness, continued to represent an effective 
bargaining chip with the West, there was growing evidence of its wider pragmatic 
potential, particularly in respect of Iran's industrialisation drive; a point consistently 
emphasised in the rhetoric of Soviet leaders.
143
 The shift in policy saw its physical 
realisation through some significant joint projects: the Aryamehr steel mill at Esfahan; a 
machine tools manufacturing plant in Arak; the trans-Iranian trunk gas pipeline from 
                                                                                                                                               
constituted a signficant shift from earlier Soviet attitudes, since during the 1950s their policy to Iran 
was largely 'conditioned by the belief that the Shah [...] was likely to disappear, and it therefore aimed 
to ensure the regime that followed him was sympathetic to the Communist line.' (Ibid., §2.) 
139  Ibid., §11; E. Abrahamian (1999), Tortured confessions p92. 
140  FCO 17/382: Visit of Iranian Prime Minister to Moscow, 10 August 1967, §3. 
141  FO 371/186675: British Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, 8 September 1966, §3. 
142  See for instance FO 17/382: Supplemental Trade Agreement, 19 January 1967. 
143  See in this connection Podgorny‟s speech in FCO 17/1219, Irano-Soviet Joint Communique (BBC 
New Monitoring translation from Echo of Iran, Vol. XVIII, No. 67, 31 March 1970, p3, paragraph 3.) 
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Khuzestan to Astara; a hydro-electrical dam on the Aras river bordering Soviet 
Azerbaijan. The importance attached to these achievements found clear expression in 
the Shah‟s speech to the Soviet Premier, Dmitri Kosygin, during his 1968 visit to Iran: 
 
„The independent policy of Iran and the interests of the Iranian nation 
necessitate, to the greatest extent possible, the improvement and expansion of 
industry and agriculture. We are grateful for the many instances of your earnest 
collaboration with us. At this very moment, several huge projects are in the 
process of being realised through by our working together. We have been able to 
demonstrate collaboration in areas of common interest; […] your assistance in 
relation to the steel mill has been a particular cause for our happiness and 
gratitude. From our side we will endeavour as far as we can to assist your 
economy in cases where the need may arise, for instance with the construction of 
the important Trans-Iranian Gas Trunkline. Such mutual cooperation can not 
only continue but even expand daily.‟144 
 
Notwithstanding the stability achieved, as it were „publicly‟, in relations during the 
period under review in this chapter, the Shah's private views on the Soviet Union 
remained far from positive.
145
 While such expressions of scepticism were undoubtedly 
useful in reassuring the Shah‟s Western allies that Iran‟s fundamental orientation 
remained unchanged, it was nevertheless clear that the Shah‟s underlying belief in the 
„long range‟ objectives of the Soviet Union remained unshaken, with the objectives 
themselves being consistent with those of Tsarist times.
146
 Supporting this view were, as 
illustrated in this chapter, the undiminished clandestine propaganda broadcasts from the 
Caucasus and elsewhere. Tellingly in this connection, when asked by the British 
ambassador why he had not raised this issue with the Soviet Premier during his 1968 
visit, the Shah responded that it would be no bad thing if the broadcasts continued since 
                                                 
144  Maju’eh-ye ta’lifåt, nutqhå, payåmhå, musåhåbehå va bayånåt-e A’låhhazrat-e Humåyun-e 
Mohammad Rezå Shåh Pahlavi, Nashriyeh-ye Kitåbkhåneh-ye Pahlavi, 1347 / 1968, p5018. 
145  See also in this respect the Shah‟s concerns about the extent of communist infiltration in 
neighbouring Afghanistan. FCO 17/184, Folio 7, Afghanistan and the R.C.D, 25 February 1968, §3. 
146  FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22: Telegram to the Department of State, 14 March 1968, §4. '[The Shah 
said] the Soviet system has failed in competition with West and world war is out of question for 
them, so they trying to dominate the Mid-east and its oil as a means for destroying Western 
industry.’ 
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„although they attacked him personally, they also disclosed the Communists' real 
intentions toward Iran.‟ 147  And as the American Embassy reported, „a number of 
dossiers concerning suspicious activities on the part of the Soviets are piled up on the 
desk of the Shah.‟148 With regard to Soviet leadership itself, the Shah's views were also 
sharply unflattering. In a remark that held important implications for the years ahead, at 
his first meeting with President Nixon's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, the 
Shah delivered his verdict on Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny, by „pointing to his 
head and shaking it, indicating that he wasn't very smart.‟149 And Western observers, for 
their own part, remained reasonably confident that the Iranian government would not 
„inject any particular warmth into the Irano-Soviet marriage of convenience.‟150 
 
                                                 
147  FCO 17/383: Mr. Kosygin's Visit to Iran, 2 May 1968, §11. 
148  FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22: Ambassador in Iran to Secretary of State, 22 October 1966, §6. 
149  FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E4: Memorandum of Conversation, 11 April 1969, p1. 
150  FCO 17/1219: Sir Denis Wright to Foreign Office, 9 April 1970. 
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CHAPTER 4: SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS FROM 1972 TO 1979 
 
 
„At the conclusion of the discussion, President Nixon agreed to furnish Iran with 
laser bombs, F-14s and F-15s. He asked the Shah to understand the purpose of 
American policy. “Protect me”, he said. “Don't look at détente as something that 
weakens you but as a way for the U.S. to gain influence.”‟1 
 
- MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, SA'DABAD PALACE, TEHRAN, 31 MAY 1972 
 
 
„Détente does not and cannot possibly mean the freezing of the objective process 
of historical development in the region. Détente does not represent an insurance 
policy for rotten régimes […] nor does it obviate the necessity for social 
changes. This is a problem for the people themselves.‟2 
 
- RADIO PEACE AND PROGRESS (MOSCOW), 25 JUNE 1976 
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Introduction 
As the preceding chapter has sought to demonstrate, Soviet-Iranian relations emerged 
from the turbulent 1960s in a substantially less fraught position than they had entered 
them, albeit that relationship could not be characterised as particularly cordial. The 
conclusion of Khrushchev presidency and clarity on the subject of missile bases, 
combined with expanding Soviet economic engagement in Iran all combined to effect a 
degree of normalisation in relations. To deploy a Soviet diplomatic euphemism of the 
                                                 
1    Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter „FRUS‟), 1969-1976, Vol. E-4, Memorandum of 
Conversation, 31 May 1972. 
2 Quoted in Shahram Chubin, Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf, Adelphi Papers No. 157, Spring 
1980, p47 (note 32). As the station's editor himself confirmed, broadcasts broadly echoed the 
Kremlin's line. See discussion in Open Society Archive: Radio Free Liberty Background Reports, HU 
OSA 300-8-3, dated 8 July 1970. 
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time, there now existed an „atmosphere of sincerity and mutual understanding.‟3 British 
cynicism regarding the Irano-Soviet „marriage of convenience‟ notwithstanding, the 
evidence suggests that the Shah and his government, while suspicion of the U.S.S.R. 
and fear of Communist subversion remained deeply ingrained, were willing to pursue a 
more balanced relationship with Moscow on its own merits.
4
 Indeed, as the Shah had 
pointedly remarked to the American ambassador during the arms crisis of 1966, he 
hoped that negotiations with Washington on that subject would not undergo the same 
„agonising wranglings‟ as in the case of what President Eisenhower had, he alleged, 
sneeringly dubbed Iran's insistence on having a „damn steel mill.‟5 At the same time, the 
improvement in relations brought greater possibilities for applying pressure to Western 
allies in areas of perceived deficiency. 
 
The favourable turn in relations was further cemented in October 1970 by the 
inauguration of the Iranian Gas Trunkline from Khuzestan in Iran to Hajikabul in Soviet 
Azerbaijan, boosting Iran‟s natural gas exports by some 60% in its first year of 
operation.
6
 The barter trade credits accruing to Iran as a result, with the attendant 
increase in both Soviet bloc delegations visiting Iran and agreements signed, led the 
British ambassador in his annual report for the same year to speak of a 'growing 
economic dependence' between Iran and the USSR.
7
 Although the latter statement may 
appear somewhat incongruent in the context of the West's substantially increased 
presence in Iran during the mid-1970s, the extent of bilateral investment, both political 
and economic, was indeed significant. The Soviet commercial share of Iranian military 
purchases in the five years 1967 to 1971, for example, reached 26%; more than all 
                                                 
3 'Искренность и полное взаимопонимание.' The phrase typically indicates that the two sides do not 
see entirely eye-to-eye but are willing to overlook differences in the cause of pragmatism. For a 
example see: Foreign Relations of the Soviet Union in 1966, Soviet-Afghan Communiqué, p48. 
4 See e.g. the Shah's letter to President Johnson in FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22, Telegram from the 
Department of State to the Embassy in Iran, 7 March 1966. The letter makes clear that the attractive 
interest rates offered by the Soviets was a significant factor in the Shah's decision to purchase ground 
forces equipment from the U.S.S.R. 
5 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4, Memorandum of Conversation, 14 March 1966, §7. The Shah alleged 
that the Americans had attempted to 'sabotage' an earlier British bid (FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22, 
Telegram from the Embassy in Iran, 31 August 1965, §9c). The British record however, reveals that 
the bid was economically unattractive; Iran was requested to front two-thirds of the required capital. 
The National Archives (TNA): The Public Record Office (PRO), FO 371/180800, 'Soviet Aid to Iran' 
(draft submission, October 1965), §2 & 3. 
6 FCO 17/1513: Iran – Annual Review for 1970, 5 January 1971, chronology on p7; Shahram 
Chubin, The Foreign Relations of Iran: a developing state in a zone of great-power conflict, p80. 
7 FCO 17/1513: Iran – Annual Review for 1970, 5 January 1971, §13. 
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European countries combined, Britain included.
8
 Examination of published Soviet 
economic data suggests that, between 1965 and 1969, non-military trade between Iran 
and the U.S.S.R. expanded nearly sevenfold.
9
 The Shah himself, in a 1972 speech to 
Soviet leaders, enthusiastically acknowledged a further fivefold increase.
10
 Earlier in the 
same year, a detailed CIA report estimated Iran to be in receipt of Russian economic 
credits and grants totalling US$521 million.
11
 From a political perspective too, a 
willingness to reciprocate the Soviet policy of „good neighbourliness‟ served not only as 
a counterweight to the ambitions of Moscow's Arab clients, who the Shah increasingly 
saw as a threat to his hegemonic aspirations in the Gulf, but also to undercut the 
domestic criticisms of the Left.
12
 
 
In light of the positive state of affairs described above, it has not unreasonably been 
claimed that the momentous turning points for Iran of 1971 (the Tehran Oil 
Agreement
13
) and 1973 (the Yom Kippur War and the Oil Embargo) heralded, in their 
turn, significant changes in the dynamics of the Soviet-Iranian relationship.
14
 The effect 
of the former, arguably the more important of the two, was to establish the Shah in a 
position of „moral leadership‟ in the region and allow for a 30% increase in Iran's 
military budget for the Iranian year 1350 (commencing March 1971.) Thus, Shahram 
Chubin, in his 1980 monograph on Soviet-Iranian relations, identifies the period from 
1974 to 1979 as a „reversion‟ to the hostile position seen in the early 1960s, arguing that 
„Iran's broadly activist [regional] policy [...] together with growing Soviet involvement 
in Asia, resulted in increased rivalry and disagreement on a widening number of 
                                                 
8 Britain's share during the same period was 8%. See CIA: Recent Trends in Iranian Arms Procurement, 
dated May 1972 (FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. E-4, Document 181). The analysis presents its figures in 
terms of total arms deliveries (Table 1, p3), however, by excluding from these calculations American 
weaponry and training provided gratis as part of the Military Assistance Programme (Table 2, p4), 
Moscow's commercial stake appears to be substantial. 
9 Внешняя Торговля СССР, Статистический Озбор за 1966 год (Foreign Trade of the USSR, 
Statistical Review for 1966), p251-3, and ibid. series for 1969, p224-6. During 1965, the USSR 
exported 13.8 million roubles' worth of goods to Iran and imported 16.3 million; in 1969, exports were 
145.4 million roubles and imports, 50.8 million.  
10 Maju’eh-ye ta’lifåt, nutqhå, payåmhå, musåhåbehå va bayånåt-e A’låhhazrat-e Homåyun-e 
Mohammad Rezå Shåh Pahlavi (The Collected Writings, Speeches, Letters, Interviews and Statements 
of His Royal Highness Mohammad Reza Pahlavi), p6060. 
11 See Department of State: Intelligence and Research, Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid 
and Trade in 1972 (Washington DC, August 1973.) 
12 FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: National Intelligence Estimate 34-69, 10 January 1969, §23. 
13 For an overview, see FCO 17/1716, Iran in 1971, 20 December 1971, §5. 
14 „Price Quadruples for Iranian Crude Oil at Auction‟, New York Times, 12 December 1973. 
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issues.‟15 Foremost among those tensions was, unsurprisingly, Iran's extensive military 
purchases from the USA, viewed from Moscow as the centrepiece in an American 
neoimperialist strategy: 
 
„The question of America's 'modernisation' of Iran's armed forces cannot be 
viewed in isolation from the wider imperialist policy being pursued by 
Washington in the Persian gulf. At a press conference in Tehran, Henry 
Kissinger openly announced that Iran's military purchases “coincide with our 
aims.” He underlined the “stabilising role” played by Iran in America's Near and 
Middle East policy, thereby giving to understand that Washington has assigned 
Iran a special role as standard-bearer for American strategy in these regions.‟16 
 
The Soviet viewpoint was not without its justification. It is indisputably the case that, 
with British withdrawal from her Gulf protectorates, America under the Nixon Doctrine 
indeed looked to Iran as successor in the role of regional security guarantor; the Shah's 
eyes were, as a British report noted (perhaps somewhat piqued at their diminishing 
influence) „lifted to higher horizons.‟17 Yet it would also be erroneous to paint Iran as 
the passive tool of America's regional interests. As argued in the introductory chapter to 
this thesis, fundamental to the Iranian rayonnement, and by extension its military 
pretensions, was a profound desire to restore Iran's past glories and dignity against a 
uncomfortably proximate history of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, most 
prominently, by the Soviet Union during World War II and the former imperialist 
powers more broadly.
18
 Indeed, as the British Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham 
trenchantly observed in his celebrated 1971 dispatch on the 2,500
th
 Anniversary 
Celebrations for the Iranian monarchy held at Persepolis that year, although the glories 
of ancient Iran were a central source of inspiration to Iranian nationalists of the time, 
„the events of the immediate past have greater psychological significance.‟19 Building 
                                                 
15 Shahram Chubin, Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf, Adelphi Papers No. 157 (1980), p20. 
16 Izvestiya, 26 August 1976: 'A Dangerous Course' (A. Leonidov) 
17 FCO 17/1716, Iran in 1971 (Annual Report) 20 December 1971, §3 
18 The description (by British Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham, FCO 8/2261, dated 31 December 1973, 
§11) of the Shah's foreign policy as a 'rayonnement on the Gaulist model' is apt given the Shah's deep 
personal admiration for de Gaulle. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Réponse à l'Histoire, Éditions Albin 
Michel (Paris, 1979), p180 
19 FCO 17/1517, The Dynasty Blessed by the Gods, dated 11 October 1971, §2. 
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on this point, it will argued here that the foremost element in the Shah's strategic 
outlook during the period continued to be an overriding preoccupation with perceived 
Soviet ambitions in the Gulf, which, however tentative, chaotic, or unsuccessful they 
may have been in reality, were viewed as unambiguous evidence of a communist grand 
design. In the words of one Iranian Foreign Minister of the period, Abbas-Ali 
Khalatbari, the Shah viewed Soviet activity in the Middle East as „an extended hand 
with fingers probing‟ Iran‟s immediate neighbours.20 
 
Notwithstanding the seemingly inflexible nature of such suspicions however, this 
chapter will contend, and in contrast to Chubin's own schema, that the turbulent events 
of the 1970s did not, despite often quite convincing appearances to the contrary, 
represent a marked deterioration in Soviet-Iranian relations. Rather, the relationship was 
paradoxically strengthened. The specific contention will be that, by drawing a clear and 
firm distinction between rhetorical and practical interaction (a methodological necessity 
noted at the outset of this thesis), a surprisingly pragmatic picture emerges, on both 
sides. In particular, it is suggested that the ostensible Soviet narrative of „objective 
historical development‟, while undoubtedly genuinely held by some, belied and to some 
extent provided cover for a more sober assessment of the realities. Ideological 
differences aside, Iran remained a central player in the region, in whose economic and 
political stability the Soviet Union had an increasingly substantial stake.
21
 
 
Three case studies are presented in support of the above claim. With respect to Iraq's 
Soviet-financed arms build-up and Iran's own American-financed support for the 
Kurdish rebellion, it is observed that this considerably more serious source of tension 
found an effective, if ruthless resolution in the Algiers Accord of March 1975; an 
agreement which Soviet officials insisted – to the singular disbelief of the Western 
officials at the time – that Moscow had in fact instigated.22 It will be argued that the 
importance attached by the Kremlin to maintaining relations with Iran produced a 
                                                 
20 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Shah's deep concern re. increasing Soviet pressures, 1 June 1970, §4. 
21 By 1973, the Iranian Gas Trunkline (IGAT) was supplying 9 billion cubic metres of natural gas to the 
Soviet Union annually, supporting 50% of Soviet exports. See: Asnåd-e Låneh-ye Jåsusi, Vol. 50: CIA 
Report 'Outlook for Soviet Oil and Gas', p30; Marshall I. Goldman, The Oil Crisis In Perspective, 
Daedalus, Vol. 104, No.4 (Fall, 1975), p139. 
22 FCO 8/2502, Folio 7: Foreign Office to Embassy in Tehran, 31 July 1975, §5. 
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cautious and flexible approach toward Iraq, in which commercial interests often took 
blunt precedence over political or strategic ones.
23
 Mirroring this, the Shah's agreement 
with Saddam Hussein to „sell out‟ the Kurdish insurgency evidenced a willingness to 
accommodate with Moscow, even, as this case demonstrated, to the major discomfiture 
of the United States.
24
 The trend toward accommodation continued into 1976 and 1977, 
when the Shah‟s growing perception of Communist inspiration behind domestic 
opposition to his rule and discomfiture at a hardening in U.S. attitudes on the subject of 
oil pricing led to further concessions to and cooperation with Moscow. Finally, an 
analysis of Soviet actions both leading up to and during the Islamic Revolution of 1979 
arrives at the conclusion that the upheavals of this period were not welcome to the 
Soviet leadership, who were both slow and ill-prepared to take advantage of events. 
Contrary to the Shah's subsequent rationalisation of the Iranian clergy as „sorcerers' 
apprentices‟ – unwitting stooges of international communism supplied with agitators 
from „outside‟  – it is suggested that the Moscow's vehicle of choice, the Tudeh party, 
was in no position to exercise influence over the revolutionary clerics.
25
 The Soviet 
leadership itself, it is further argued, was primarily concerned with guarding against the 
possibility of American intervention and protecting its commercial interests inside Iran. 
There is substantial evidence that Moscow realised they had a great deal to lose as a 
result of the Shah's fall from power, a fact underlined by their strenuous – but ultimately 
fruitless – efforts to curry favour with the post-Revolutionary regime.26 
 
A Narrative of Soviet Encirclement: The Shah's Evolving Regional Outlook 
 
„Mr. Goronwy Roberts, the Foreign Office envoy, assured us that Great Britain 
intended to remain in the Gulf “for as long as might be expected.” Three months 
later, the English were packing their bags! The security of the Gulf had to be 
guaranteed, and who but Iran could fulfil this task?‟27 
                                                 
23 Oles M. Smolansky (1991), The USSR and Iraq, The Soviet Quest for Influence, p21. 
24 The collapse of the Kurdish rebellion freed up Iraq's military to turn its attentions on Israel. See 
conversation between Kissinger and Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, in Andrew Scott Cooper 
(2011), Oil Kings, p243-4. 
25 M. R. Pahlavi, op. cit., p218 
26 See, for example, Moscow's refusal to condemn Iran's leadership during the hostage crisis. Alvin Z. 
Rubenstein, The Soviet Union and Iran under Khomeini, International Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Autumn 
1981), p605. 
27 M. R. Pahlavi, op. cit., p174 
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The British decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf – communicated by Goronwy-
Roberts to the Shah on the 7
th
 of January 1968 – was indeed, as Foreign Office records 
privately concede, „unpalatable and very different‟ from assurances the Minister had 
given only two months previously.
28
 The timeframe for the withdrawal itself however, 
was considerably less abrupt, with all British troops to have left the Gulf by the end of 
1971 – within three years of the announcement.29 As the Shah  increasingly emphasised 
to American officials in the months and years that intervened, an opportunity had arisen 
for Iran to play „the dominant role‟ for security in the Gulf as Britain's „only logical 
successor.‟30 Iran, in the Shah's view, was to be a bulwark against subversive regional 
forces and „aggressive designs‟ in the Persian Gulf that other riparian states could not be 
expected to adequately counter.
31
 The expression of these convictions, it might be 
argued, can be best understood in the context of the imperial trips to Washington that 
they typically preceded and the inevitably central feature of those visits: vocal requests 
for American support in expediting Iran's armed forces buildup.
32
 While there is ample 
evidence to support such a view, this section will rather focus on the increasingly 
entrenched narrative of Soviet encirclement in which the Shah‟s drive towards military 
„credibility‟ found its primary basis, and indeed the chief component of which was 
identified by the American Ambassador to Tehran as the Shah's „absolute obsession‟ that 
failure to strengthen Iran's military posture would result in the loss of the Gulf to radical 
Arabism „encouraged by the Soviets‟ following the British withdrawal.33  
 
Most obviously central to the conception of Soviet-supported radical Arabism were the 
rival hegemonic pretensions of neighbouring Iraq, underlined by its Ba'athist regime‟s 
ongoing attempts to rally littoral states to the cause of „protecting the Gulf's Arabism.‟34 
                                                 
28 FCO 18/849, Iran: Annual Report for 1968, dated 2
 
January 1969, §1; Jeffrey R. Macris, The Politics 
and Security of the Gulf: Anglo American Hegemony and the Shaping of a Region, p157, 
29 See text of Wilson's announcement in The Annual Register: Record of World Events, 1968, Vol. 210. 
30 FRUS 1969-1976, E-4: Intelligence Note 743, 17 October 1969, p1-3. 
31 See Shah's statement at Persepolis press conference, quoted in FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: State 
Department Research Study, 28 January 1972; for Shah's belief that other Gulf states could not 
'contribute significantly' to regional security see in ibid,  Intelligence Note 743, 17 October 1969, p2. 
32 An excellent illustration of the interplay between the Shah's regional ambitions and defence needs is 
provided in:  FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Memorandum of Conversation, 1 April 1969, p3. 
33 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Telegram from the Ambassador in Iran, 1 April 1970. For the Shah's 
arguments in favour of a 'credible' Iranian position (as opposed to military supremacy), see ibid., 
'Iran's Need for Adequate Military Establishment'), October 13, 1969, §3. 
34 Oles M. Smolansky with Bettie M. Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, p150 
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Particularly unsettling implications were drawn from Iraq's „reckless behaviour‟ in 
respect of the reignited Shatt al Arab waterway dispute, which was viewed as a direct 
product of the expanded Communist influence in Iraqi affairs and the apparently related 
influx of Soviet arms and military advisors.
35
 The Shah's concerns over Iraq were 
heightened yet further in 1970 by the Iraqi government's accord (in effect a peace 
agreement) with the Kurdish rebels: the „March Manifesto.‟36 Although mediated by the 
Soviets primarily out of interest in a promoting their ally's stability and development, 
the peace deal was viewed in Tehran as a capitulation by the Iraqi government to 
Kurdish demands for autonomy, resulting from Moscow's „direct pressure‟; the Shah 
noted with some disquiet that communist elements were present at both sides of the 
negotiating table.
37
 This impression was further strengthened by the subsequent visit of 
leaders from the Democrat Party of Kurdistan to Moscow and by an exchange of notes, 
prominently reported in Pravda, in which the two sides underlined their „favourable 
disposition toward each other.‟38 The effect of these two developments, as perceived by 
the Shah, was to advance the „Soviet plan‟ both of increasing the Iraqi military's 
capacity for intrigue elsewhere (because resources would no longer required to fight the 
Kurds), and, as a long-range objective, establishing an autonomous, communist state of 
Kurdistan capable of „overcoming‟ the geographical barrier of Turkey and Iran and 
providing the Soviet Union with its allegedly long-sought route to the Gulf.
39
 It was 
thus in a broad conception of Soviet geopolitical strategy that Iran's support for the 
Kurdish rebellion during the early 1970s, explored later in this chapter, found its 
genesis. For the Shah, Iranian support for the Kurdish rebellion constituted an insurance 
policy against the possibility of a „dangerous and more purposeful regime‟ assuming 
power in Baghdad.‟40 
 
                                                 
35 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Memorandum of Conversation, 1 April 1969, p4; for overview of the 
Shatt Al Arab dispute in 1969 see ibid., Intelligence Note 295, 22 April 1969; for Shah's key concerns 
on Iraq's weaponisation see ibid., Memorandum of Conversation, 22 October 1969, p2. 
36 Oles M. Smolansky with Bettie M. Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, p70 
37 FRUS 1969-1976, E-4, Telegram from the Embassy in Iran, 19 March 1970; for the Russian viewpoint 
see Aleksei Vasil'yev in Pravda, 11 March 1971 quoted in Oles Smolansky, op. cit., p74. 
38 See Pravda, 28 April and 30 June 1970. 
39 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Soviet-Iraq Threat (Shah's Views),12 March 1969. 
40 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: National Intelligence Estimate, 10 January 1969, §19. The specific 
danger envisaged by the Shah, elaborated in a later conversation with the U.S. ambassador, was that 
the Soviets would succeed in combined the Kurds, the Ba'athist and the Communists to form a 
national front government. See ibid., Telegram 2604 from Embassy in Tehran, 4 May 1972, §10. 
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Within Iran itself, underlying sensitivities toward perceived continuity in Russia's 
„historical objectives‟ were brought into stark relief by an apparently more mundane 
incident in June 1970.
41
 In conversation with Hushang Ansari, the Iranian economics 
minister, a high-ranking Soviet member of the recently-formed Joint Iran-USSR 
Economic Committee caused considerable strain by „pointedly‟ invoking the 1921 
Soviet-Iranian treaty in challenging the Iranian government's consideration of a joint 
venture (with an American company for exploitation of timber resources on the Caspian 
coast.) Although the unnamed delegate quickly dropped the subject – Ansari reportedly 
had reacted „with some spirit‟ – this unfortunate and poorly-judged intervention was 
singled out by the Shah as further evidence of „thinly-veiled‟ Soviet intimidation, and of 
Moscow's wider designs for becoming the „arbiter‟ of the Middle East.42 The impression 
of concealed motives in Soviet policy received further apparent corroboration when, 
later in the same month, the death of Iran‟s leading Shi‟ite cleric, Ayatollah Hakim, 
prompted sustained lobbying on behalf of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini by clandestine 
Communist radio stations. Seda-ye Melli-ye Iran (The National Voice of Iran, 
broadcasting from Baku) inveighed against the „coup d'etat regime's […] dirty designs‟, 
specifically its attempts to appoint a „stooge‟ (Shariat-Madari) as Hakim's successor, 
while Radio Iran Courier, now broadcasting from Bulgaria, approvingly noted 
Khomeini's „struggle‟ in support of „freedom, democracy and anti-imperialism.‟43 
 
Thus, apprehension over regional Soviet ambitions, as in Iraq, combined with less 
obvious suspicions and irritations nurtured by heavy-handed local Soviet diplomacy and 
the excesses of Communist broadcast stations, distilled in the minds of the Shah and his 
close confidantes to form a broader perception of Soviet encroachment and 
expansionism. In such a context, allowing for the possibility that a Soviet official could 
commit an undirected faux pas, or that clandestine radios, located on the periphery of 
the USSR, might pursue a radical agenda independently of direct central supervision 
was irrelevant. What mattered was that such observations informed an overall picture 
and provided apparent corroboration of a wider thesis concerning Soviet activities and 
interests on Iran's immediate periphery – India, Baluchistan, Afghanistan – and 
                                                 
41 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Telegram from Embassy in Tehran, 4 May 1972, §10. 
42 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Tehran Telegram 2333, 1 June 1970, §2 & §4. 
43 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: 'Selecting a New Leader for Shi'ite Islam', 7 July 1970, p3. 
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producing a regional outlook of which the USSR-Iraq Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation, signed in April 1972, represented the nightmarish apotheosis.
44
 Its Article 
8, specifically, was viewed as „ambiguous‟ and potentially hostile toward Iran: 
 
„The two high contracting parties will, in the event of a situation developing 
which endangers the peace of either of them or constitutes a threat to peace or a 
violation of peace, hold immediate contacts to coordinate their positions in the 
interest of eliminating the developing danger and re-establishing peace.‟45 
 
It is revealing however, that U.S. officials (from whose memoranda of conversations 
with their Iranian counterparts the above survey is purposefully drawn) took a 
significantly more nuanced view of Soviet policy in the region. The State Department's 
stance, outlined clearly in a letter of June 1970 to the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, 
cautioned that Moscow's relations with Iraq had „not been uniformly harmonious‟ and 
called for circumspection: 
 
„While we agree with Iran that there is no room for complacency, we nonetheless 
do not believe that Soviet power and influence in the Middle East or the Gulf 
should be overdrawn […] we believe that Soviet efforts to become arbiter of 
Gulf and entire Middle East [as perceived by the Shah] face formidable 
obstacles.‟46 
                                                 
44 In conversation with Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt, chief CIA architect of Operation Ajax and a close 
personal friend, the Shah described the treaty as 'most disturbing … a fulfilment of [my] worst 
dreams.' FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Mr. Kermit Roosevelt's Meeting with the Shah, 8 May 1972, §2f. 
The Shah saw India as the aggressor in the Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971 (in the context of 
their then recently-concluded Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union); with Nixon's support and 
knowledge, Iran re-directed American arms to Pakistan, fearing that its break-up would create 
opportunities for Soviet expansion, specifically, an independent Soviet-supported Baluchistan. See 
George Washington National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 79, Document 28, 4 
December 1971. With respect to Afghanistan, the Iranian government were 'very concerned' about the 
régime of Mohammed Daoud Khan, even suspecting the latter was a trained Soviet agent. FCO 
8/2265, Conversation with the Iranian Ambassador, 23 January 1974, §2 
45 Text of treaty as translated in Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq (Washington: Middle East Institute, 
1978), p241. For the Iranian reaction to the treaty, see: FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Tehran Telegram 
2604, 4 May 1972, §10. 
46 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Telegram from the Department of State, 6 June 1970, §4. For an 
elaboration of this viewpoint, see ibid., Special National Intelligence Estimate 34-70: 'Iran's 
International Position', 3 September 1970, §24, which identified extensive splits within the Ba'ath 
party and an unwillingness on the part of Arab states 'to accept Soviet direction' as factors limiting the 
development of Moscow-led Arab radicalism. 
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Going further, a report by National Security Council staff prepared for President Nixon 
and his chief adviser Henry Kissinger, in advance of their crucial May 1972 meeting 
with the Shah, identified the latter's „overreaction‟ to the situation in Iraq as itself a 
contributory cause to regional instability. It concluded, significantly, that the Soviets had 
proceeded with caution in Gulf for fear of upsetting bilateral relations with Iran, on 
which „they seem to place a fairly high value.‟47 In point of fact, the Soviets had been at 
great pains to stress that the 1972 Treaty was not directed against Iran.
48
 There was 
cause to believe the Soviet side had in fact refused a request by Saddam Hussein (then 
the civilian Ba'ath Party leader) that the U.S.S.R. guarantee to intervene in the event that 
Iran attacked Iraq.
49
 In the event however, and crucially, the Shah „did not want to be 
told‟ that the Kremlin might have an interest in restraining its clients.50 Nor, it may 
equally be noted, did Nixon insist on arguing the point. In the context of America's 
investment in Iran, and the invaluable facilities provided by Iran to the U.S., the 
President's formulation quoted at the head of this chapter, requesting that the Shah 
protect him, appeared carefully designed to reflect and encourage the Shah's aspiration 
for regional leadership, against a backdrop of détente in Europe which, as seen from the 
Sa'dabad palace, had „freed up‟ the Soviets for increased activity elsewhere.51  
 
Iran, Iraq and the Kurdish Rebellion ‘Trump Card’ 
As suggested above, it was the Soviet-Iraqi Friendship Treaty of 1972, and specifically 
the commitment by Moscow to „concrete measures‟ for strengthening Iraq's defence 
capabilities, that provided the immediate catalyst for Iran‟s expanded arms procurement 
programme.
52
 In a revealing interview of June 1972, the Shah left the chief of the 
                                                 
47 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, 17 May 1972, p2. 
48 Asnad-e Laneh-ye Jasusi, Vol. 47: Discussion with Soviet 1
st
 Secretary Vladimir Vlassov, 20 April 
1972, §2: Vlassov relates that the Soviet Ambassador personally called on Iranian Foreign Minister 
Khalatbari to offer his government's reassurances, which the latter received 'without enthusiasm.' 
49 FRUS,1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Briefing Paper – Iraqi Politics in Perspective, 18 May 1972, p6. 
50 FRUS,1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Memorandum of Conversation, 31 May 1972, p2. The overflying rights 
provided to the U.S. military by the Iranian air corridor to East Asia were 'irreplaceable.' (Ibid., Tehran 
Telegram 1665 Part 1, 23 March 1972, §2.) Similarly, the CIA listening stations located in Iran, were 
seen as providing information of the 'most vital importance to [American] national security.' (Ibid., 
Memorandum for Henry Kissinger, 16 April 1970.) 
51 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4: Tehran Telegram 2642, 6 May 1972; for fuller elaboration of the Nixon 
doctrine as applied to Iran, see briefing paper by Kissinger in ibid., 29 June 1972, §III, 1 (p7.) 
52  See text of joint Soviet communiqué following Iraqi President Al-Bakr's trip to Moscow published in 
Pravda, 20
 
September 1972, quoted in R. Freedman (1982) Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East 
Since 1970, p99; for a detailed assessment of the balance of military power between Iran and Iraq at 
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American military mission in Tehran, Major General Elis Williamson, in little doubt as 
to his motivation in securing all advanced weaponry „short of the atomic bomb‟: 
 
„His Imperial Majesty stated that the recent USSR / Iraqi agreement has forced 
him to change his views with respect to the Middle East Area. Since the signing 
of the USSR / Iraqi pact, the Shah says he is completely willing for the U.S. to 
come into this area if it will do so with quality […] a few corvettes [small, 
lightly armed warships] are not appropriate.‟53 
 
Precipitated by suspicion of Iraq, and buoyed by rising oil revenues, the extent of the 
quality the Shah had in mind became fully apparent in February 1973 with the 
announcement of what was, at the time, the largest military sales agreement ever 
concluded by the U.S. Defence Department.
54
 It was a revelation that brought the 
delicacy of the Soviet position into sharp relief. The following month, in a visit to Iran 
to inaugurate the Soviet-built Esfahan steel mill, Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin 
delivered a speech that was instructive both for the indirectness of its criticism of the 
Iranian arms programme as for its implicit defence of the Soviet military assistance to 
Iraq. Referring to „those states bordering Iran and the Soviet Union‟, Kosygin noted: 
 
„If we want the security [of these states] to be based not on an arms race […] but 
on the continued relaxation of tensions and the strengthening of mutual trust 
among countries, then the efforts of each party concerned are required. 
Conversely, the militant policy of one country will inevitably inflame the 
situation in an entire region […] forcing its neighbours to take measures to 
defend their national interest.‟55 
 
Mutual trust was, however, an element severely lacking in the increasingly tense 
triangle of Iraqi-Soviet-Iranian relations. „The Shah‟, as Henry Kissinger tersely briefed 
                                                                                                                                               
the time of Nixon visit to Tehran, see FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-4, Recent Trends in Iranian Arms 
Procurement (CIA, May 1972), §29-30 and Table 9 
53 FRUS, 1969-76, ibid. Vol., Memorandum [Tab A] attached to Memorandum from Harold Saunders 
(NSC) to Kissinger, dated 12 June 1972, §9; see also: Andrew Scott-Cooper, Oil Kings, pp67-70 
54 R. Freedman, op. cit., p105. The Shah's particular insistence on expedited delivery of F-5E aircraft 
underlined the concern with Iraq (the F-5E having a superior dogfight capability than Iraq's MiG 21s.) 
55 Text of speech in Pravda, 16
th
 of March 1973 
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Nixon's confidante John Connally, dispatched to Tehran to follow up on the President 
Nixon‟s commitments of May 1972, „is concerned that the USSR may find ways to 
facilitate the overflow into Iran‟ of instability that had developed in Iraq. 56  An 
agreement had in fact been concluded, as an additional but secret result of Nixon's and 
Kissinger visit, for the CIA to provide arms and funds (euphemistically termed a 
„subvention‟) to Kurdish fighters in their struggle against the Iraqi central government 
in Baghdad; an undertaking viewed as so sensitive that the U.S. administration's panel 
of experts responsible for authorising it were provided with a single piece of paper, 
containing a three line outline of the operation drafted by Henry Kissinger and 
underneath which they were presented with two options: „Authorise‟ or „Other.‟57 The 
logic in supporting the Shah‟s request has been made explicit in recently-declassified 
record of conversation: 
 
„Kissinger: What I want is for the Politburo in Moscow to be in a frame of mind 
not to get involved in further adventures in the Middle East. I want them to recall 
that […] Iraq turned out to be a bottomless pit. I want them to tell anyone who 
comes with a recommendation for renewed activity in the Middle East to go away. 
I want the Shah to help in this strategy.‟58 
 
The Shah's success in securing American support for the Kurdish insurgency thus 
reflected a coincidence of interests. In respect of U.S. regional commitments, as events 
during the Yom Kippur war of 1973 were to prove, the overextension of Iraqi forces by 
the Kurdish conflict substantially limited their ability to assist the Arab cause against 
Israel; a reality that the Ba'athist regime publicly lamented.
59
 And indeed, at its height, 
the insurgency required the active deployment of no less than eighty percent of the Iraqi 
Army.
60
 The Iranian government's quest for financial stability was a second factor. Two 
separate entries in Court Minister Asadollah Alam's diary strongly imply – although 
                                                 
56 FRUS, 1969-76, Vol. E-4, Backchannel Message from Kissinger to Connally, 29 June 1972, §I(a); 
Connally had recently left his post as Treasury Secretary and was Nixon's preferred successor in the 
White House. See: Andrew Scott-Cooper, op. cit., p420, n67 
57 CIA: The Pike Report (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1977), p196; for a further example of Kissinger's 
unique approach, see FRUS, Vol. E-4, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, 15 June 1972. 
58 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 27: Memorandum of Conversation, 23 July 1973 
59 See FCO 8/2094: Al-Thamra, 'How did Iraq Get Into the Battle?', 11/12 October 1973, §3a & d. 
60   FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 27: Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research: 
„Iran‟s Intervention in Iraqi-Kurdish Struggle Growing‟, 18 November 1974 
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they do not explicitly state – that Kurdish fighters had previously been tasked by the 
Shah with sabotaging Iraqi pipelines in order to restrict Baghdad's revenue stream, 
thereby enhancing investment in Iran's own oil industry.
61
 It is nevertheless clear, in this 
instance as elsewhere, that the impact of history was a crucial governing influence. 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani, then leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party, had previously 
spearheaded Iraqi Kurdish elements in support of the Soviet-inspired Mahabad 
Republic, formed on Iranian territory during World War II and coterminous with the 
Pishevari regime in Tabriz. Following the short-lived Republic's collapse, Barzani fled 
to Soviet Azerbaijan.
62
 The Shah saw support for Barzani‟s Kurds in their conflict with 
Baghdad as a means to prevent the potential creation of an autonomous, Soviet-
sponsored Kurdish homeland on Iran's borders.
63
 More broadly, it was thought that the 
political stabilisation of Iraq – which maintenance of the Kurdish insurgency naturally 
precluded – would aid Communism's „long-term‟ objectives by furnishing Baghdad 
greater latitude to create „mischief.‟64 This concern was, it must be emphasised, not 
without merit and was a perception energetically reinforced by the Iraqi media, 
monitored closely in Iran, which frequently pronounced Baghdad's support for those 
engaged in anti-Iranian activities.
65
 
 
Iran's renewed attempts to weaken the Iraqi regime through subvention of the Kurdish 
insurgency, as a means of curtailing Soviet regional ambitions, also came against a 
wider background (1969-1972) of deteriorating Iran-Iraqi relations. The ongoing dispute 
regarding sovereignty of the Shatt Al Arab waterway, and Baghdad's territorial 
pretensions with respect to Iran's southern province of Khuzestan, which it saw as Arab 
territory, had at times threatened to escalate into open military conflict.
66
 Conversely, 
Iran's decision to assert its claim to the disputed Gulf islands of Tunb and Abu Musa 
prior to the British withdrawal at the end of 1971 had proven an unwelcome challenge 
                                                 
61 Asadollah Alam (Trans. Alinaghi Alikhani and Nicholas Vicent, 1992), The Shah and I, pp38-42. 
62 Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih (1974), The Foreign Relations of Iran, p178 
63 FRUS, 1968-1976, Vol. E-4: Soviet-Iraq Threat (Shah's Views), 12 March 1970, §2(b). 
64 FRUS, 1968-1976, Vol. E-4: Shah's Views on Procurement, 19 March 1970, §3. 
65 For an example, see: FCO 17/1732: Irano / Iraqi Relations and the Kurds, 19 January 1972, §1 
66 R. Ramazani (1975), Iran‟s Foreign Policy 1941–1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing 
Nations, pp417–18. For evidence of the Iraqi government's policy regarding what it saw as its 
'defensive' pronouncements on Khuzestan, FCO 8/2315: 'Iran / Iraq', 18 December 1974, §2. 
 167 
to the Ba'ath party's efforts to promote pan-Arabic solidarity.
67
 In response, the Iraqi 
government had broken off relations with Tehran and sought to apply pressure by 
deporting en masse to Iran some 40,000 Iraqi citizens „of Iranian origin‟, predominantly 
Kurds, precipitating a major humanitarian crisis in Iran, representations to the U.N. on 
the part of the Iranian government, and a virulent press reaction inside Iran that served 
to underline the situation's volatility. „For us to continue behaving towards the Baghdad 
junta‟, urged the semi-official newspaper Keyhan in article entitled Time to Act, „as if it 
were a government in the accepted sense of the term, would be quite unwise.‟68 It was in 
the context of these pre-existing tensions, enhanced by and viewed against Iraq's 
alignment with the Soviet Union, that the Iranian government elected to re-launch the 
Kurdish insurgency in 1972; a decision in fact acted upon before U.S. financial support 
for the move was forthcoming.
69
 In a subsequent conversation with the British 
Ambassador, Peter Ramsbotham, the Shah openly described Iran's support for Barzani 
as his regional „trump card.‟70 
 
Thus, the state of affairs reached by the point of Kosygin's visit to Iran in 1973 was far 
from serving Moscow's interests. As one scholar of the period has convincingly argued, 
the escalation of rivalry between the Iran and Iraq, in both of whose economic 
development and political stability the Soviets were actively invested, confronted the 
Soviet policy makers with an uncomfortable dilemma.
71
 On the one hand, wholehearted 
practical support for Iraq held out a significant risk of alienating Iran. On the other, the 
increasingly obvious reliance by the Kurdish fighters on Iranian support was 
unpalatable and undermined Moscow's ability to affect a resolution that would ensure its 
continued importance as an actor in Iraqi politics.
72
 In the immediate context therefore, 
as shown in Kosygin's speech above, Soviet leaders sought to deemphasise military 
assistance to Iraq (even offering privately to sell MiG fighter aircraft to Iran) while 
                                                 
67 FRUS, 1968-1976, Vol. E-4: Shah's View on Tunbs and Abu Musa, 10 December 1970, §1. 
68 For Iranian representations to the U.N. on this issue, see FCO 17/1732: Irano-Iraqi Relations, 20 
January 1972, directly echoing the Shah's own views evidenced in ibid., Extract from Shah's Press 
Conference, 15 January 1972. 
69 FCO 17/1732, Folios 2, 17 & 18: Irano-Iraqi Relations and the Kurds, 10–20 January 1972. 
70 FCO 8/2094, Folio 20: Iraq / Iran, 19 April 1973. 
71 Oles M. Smolansky, The USSR & Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence, p163. 
72 Ibid., p164; CIA: The Pike Report, p196. 
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applying pressure on both sides to pursue rapprochement.
 73
 Further evidence of 
Moscow's efforts in this direction was provided by Iraq's surprise public request of 
October 1973 to resume diplomatic ties with Tehran.
74
 Made at the height of the Yom 
Kippur war, which provided a convenient smoke screen, the announcement's appeal to 
other „friendly countries‟ to support the move strongly suggested the decision was 
intended to meet with Moscow's approbation.
75
 The approach however, failed to 
produce an improvement. The Shah had „every intention‟ of maintaining his Kurdish 
card. Iranian assistance to the Kurds expanded to include heavy artilliery and British-
supplied anti-aircraft weapons.
76
 Border clashes continued to escalate.
77
  
 
Faced with this deterioration, the Soviet leadership at first continued to pursue a policy 
of mediation between Baghdad and the Kurds. Yevgeny Primakov, a prominent Arabist 
and personal confidante of Mustafa Barzani with close ties to the Kremlin, was secretly 
dispatched to Iraqi Kurdestan in an effort to coax K.D.P. officials round to Moscow's 
viewpoint.
78
 When Primakov found himself unable to prevail upon Barzani however, 
the Soviet leadership evidently decided that a bolder intervention was required. In 
November 1974, during a „friendly business visit‟ by the Shah to the U.S.S.R., at the 
latter‟s invitation, the Soviet president made his government's feelings plain. 79 
Slamming his fist down on the table, a visibly agitated Brezhnev appraised the Iranian 
monarch „most frankly […] that the existing tensions between Iran and Iraq do not 
accord with the interests of peace.‟80 Taken aback, the Shah struck a concilliatory tone: 
„I would only like to note that if in its relations with us Iraq would take the same 
position which you, our great neighbour, adhere to in your relations with us […] there 
would be no problem with this question.‟81 
                                                 
73 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 27: Telegram from the Embassy in Iran, 7 April 1973, n3. 
74 See also Hoveyda's assessment in FCO 8/2094: Iran/Iraq Relations, 9 October 1975, §2. 
75 FCO 8/2094: Iran – Iraq Diplomatic Relations, 8 October 1973, §3 
76 FCO 8/2094: Iran/Iraq Relations, 11 October 1973, §2. 
77 For details see Hussein Sirriyeh, Development of the Iraqi-Iranian Dispute, 1847-1975 in Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1985), pp. 489; Yearbook of the U.N., 1974, p252ff.  
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Примакова [Declassifying Primakov], Газета <<Аргументы и Факты>> [Arguments and Facts], 
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79 'Shah Begins Moscow Talks', The Financial Times, 19 November 1974, quoting TASS news agency; 
see also FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 27: Memorandum from Walters to Kissinger, 7 October 1974. 
80 Asadollah Alam, The Shah and I, p398. 
81 FCO 8/2265: Visit of Shah [to USSR], 25 November 1974, §2. 
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The Shah's words came against an atmosphere of nervousness in Iranian government 
circles over rumours – curiously enough originating in Moscow – that the United States 
was plotting to lever the Shah from the throne for his role in raising oil prices.
82
 Indeed, 
the Moscow visit came against a significant background of official U.S. displeasure on 
this topic – including a ‘spirited’ exchange between Iran’s OPEC representative and a 
visiting State Department official – and the tension was subsequently reinforced by a 
damaging newspaper interview in which Kissinger refused to rule out the possibility of 
force in resolving the dispute.
83
 Given such a context, the Shah evidently judged it 
imprudent to further antagonise his northern neighbour.  Central to this decision were 
Barzani’s increasingly ambition demands, which substantially outgrew what the Shah 
was willing to accept: not only did the increased Iranian military involvement required 
to sustain the resistance apparently entail acceptance of a separatist Kurdish-Arab 
government if successful, it also ran the considerable risk of open Soviet intervention on 
the Iraqi side.
84
 In April 1975, Iraq and Iran agreed to resolve their differences. 
President Boumediène of Algeria, a statesman with close ties to the Kremlin, was 
conspicuously instrumental.
85
 The agreement provided for a division of sovereignty 
over the Shatt Al Arab waterway along its median line, and called for both parties to 
‘exercise strict control of their borders, with a view to a final cessation of all subversive 
infiltration, on both sides.’86 In effect, the Shah had agreed to call off the insurgency. 
According to one U.S. intelligence report, the Iraqi government secretly undertook to 
pay Iran $300 million dollars to assist in managing the Kurdish refugee flow onto 
Iranian territory.
87
 
 
The abrupt deescalation provided further evidence of Soviet efforts to proactively 
address, and where feasible to mitigate, areas of potential conflict with Iran. Although 
the Algiers Accord, in significantly strengthening Iraq's Ba'athist regime, actually 
diminished Soviet leverage over Baghdad, Moscow had contrived to avoid a regional 
                                                 
82 'The Shah plays safe with visit to Moscow', Daily Express,19 November 1974, cutting in FCO 8/2265. 
83 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 27: Telegram from the Embassy in Iran, 26 September 1974; the offending 
interview appeared as „Kissinger on Oil, Food and Trade‟ in Business Week, 13 January 1974.  
84 FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 27: Backchannel Message from Helms to Scowcroft, 8 March 1975; see also 
Barzani‟s earlier requests in ibid., Memorandum from Colby to Kissinger, 21 March 1974. 
85 Asnad-e Laneh-ye Jasusi, Volume 31, Telegram 2750, 25 March 1975, §5, p45. 
86 See U.N. Treaty Series, Volume 1017, Communiqué Commun Irano-Irakien, 6 March 1975, p118-9. 
87 Asnad-e Laneh-ye Jasusi, Volume 31, Financial Payment by Iran to Iraq, 26 April 1975, p54. 
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conflagration that risked the loss of influence in both Iraq and Iran; hence the adulation 
with which the Soviet media greeted the agreement.
88
 The subsequent assertion by 
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Sytenko to his counterpart in London (which 
the latter described as „breathtaking‟) that Moscow had actively supported the 
rapprochement was, the evidence suggests, true.
89
 Indeed, the positive attitude shown by 
the Kremlin toward resolution of the Kurdish conflict, in favour of Baghdad, was 
entirely consistent with earlier Soviet reaction to the March Manifesto of 1970.
90
 From 
the Iranian perspective, willingness to reach a compromise with Iraq undoubtedly 
reflected the fact that, as the Shah had himself privately conceded as early as 1973, the 
Kurds „would not last for ever‟ under Iraqi and Russian pressures. 91  The episode 
nevertheless presented a clear illustration of the Shah's readiness to accommodate with 
the U.S.S.R., where expedient to do so, even at the risk of severely embarrassing his 
Washington allies. Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi, who was present at the meeting in 
Zurich – held on the 19th of February 1975 – where the Shah presented Kissinger with 
the possibility of dropping the Kurdish insurgency, recalls that the Secretary of State 
had nothing to say in response: “His face went completely white.”92 
 
Concern and Concession: The Curious Case of Lieutenant Zosimov 
Taking the broader view of Soviet-Iranian ties in the post-1973 period, and 
notwithstanding the accommodation achieved with respect to Iraq, it is clear that wider 
potential for tensions existed in relations. Most visibly, Iran's estimated $20 billion 
annual oil income had not only made the country a centre of attraction for the West, 
with whom the Shah „recycled‟ much of Iran's increased revenue, but also came to 
                                                 
88 In the view of one Soviet commentator, the Accord had 'frustrated the plans of those who would like 
to see these two neighbouring countries pitted against each other in the role of regional gladiators.' V. 
Shamarov, New Times, No. 15 (April 1975), quoted in Smolansky, op. cit., p169. 
89 FCO 8/2547: Anglo-Soviet Consultations – Middle East, 25 January 1975, §5. 
90 See n35 above; during an official visit to Iraq in June 1972, the Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, 
Vladimir Novikov, stated that the Manifesto had 'expanded the capabilities of [the Ba'ath] in its 
national struggle against colonialism.' A. L. Khudayda: Soviet-Iraqi Relations and the USSR's Position 
on the Kurdish Question from 1958-1991 (Doctoral dissertation, 2010), p107-8. 
91 FCO 8/2094: Telno 334 of 19 April 1973. A month after the Algiers Agreement the Shah told a U.S. 
journalist that Iranian aid to the Kurdish movement had been cut off due its 'futile struggle', see: 
Asnad-e Laneh-ye Jasusi, Volume 31, Tehran Telegram 3281, 10 April 1975, §3, p47. 
92 Interview with author, Montreux, 16 June 2012. Zahedi's recollection of Kissinger's panic is borne out 
by the documentary record, which reveals the Secretary of State's frantic attempts to limit the 
domestic political fallout from the Shah's decision. Asnad-e Laneh-ye Jasusi, Volume 31, State 
Department Telegram, 23 March 1975, p43. 
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dwarf Soviet economic aid, which had previously been of substantial benefit for internal 
development.
93
 A salient illustration of the reversal in Iran's financial fortunes was 
provided by the Shah's decision to embark on a foreign investment programme of his 
own, including the conclusion of loans to Afghanistan, India, Egypt, Syria and Eastern 
Europe.
94
 The choice of countries, furthermore, seemed purposefully calculated to 
balance or even counteract Soviet influence, albeit Iranian investment in Eastern Europe 
was not entirely unwelcome to Moscow.
95
 A prominent source of friction remained, 
unsurprisingly, Iran's ongoing militarisation, fundamentally designed to check Russian 
scope for expanding influence in the Gulf and Indian Ocean. The Shah's apparently 
connected role as America's „obedient gendarme‟ in the region drew sustained and 
pointed Soviet criticism, publicly and privately, with the regression towards overtly 
threatening language – in some cases – seeming to reflect a frustration on the part of the 
Kremlin at its diminishing influence.
96
 In both the economic and military fields Iran had 
emerged as a middleweight power whose policies appeared, much to the satisfaction of 
Western governments, deeply inconvenient to the USSR.
97
 
 
Yet such an analysis fails to recognise that, and as evidenced in each of the case studies 
analysed above, frankness in relations between Iran and the Soviet Union by no means 
precluded concerted and qualitative efforts by both parties to consolidate economic ties 
and maintain a functional level of political exchange.
98
 In fact, the Shah's 1974 trip to 
Moscow and the subsequent Algiers Agreement, in resolving a significant point of 
                                                 
93 FCO 8/2497, Annual Review of Iran for 1974, 9 January 1974, §2 & 3. 
94 FCO 8/2265, Folio 11: 'Shah set for hard talks in Moscow', Daily Telegraph, 19 November 1974. 
95 Shahram Chubin, op. cit., p9. 
96 For published Soviet criticism see A. Borisov, Shadow over the Persian Gulf in Izvestiya, 10 March 
1975. A useful survey of Radio Moscow broadcasts on the subject is provided in Tehran Echo No. 43 
(Summer 1975) – Political Survey: Current Iran-USSR Relations, FCO 8/2504, Enclosure (Final 
Paper), p4; for details of private Soviet representations to the Iranian government, see FCO 8/2265: 
Iran / Soviet Relations, 6 June 1974, §5. 
97 See exchange of letters between Iain Sutherland (British Ambassador in Moscow) and Michael Weir 
(Head of Middle East Section at the Foreign Office), FCO 8/2504, Folios 2  (25 June 1975) and Folio 
7 (31 July 1975.) 
98 The three year period from the Soviet-Iraq Friendship Treaty to the signing of the Algiers Agreement 
saw visits to the USSR by the Shah (10-21 October 1972), Prime Minister Hoveyda (7-12 August 
1973) and an Iranian Parliamentary Delegation (9-19 February 1974), and return trips by the Soviet 
Premier (14-16 March 1973), an economic delegation (October 1973) and the Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Trade (3 – 18 August 1974) see: FCO 8/2049, FCO 8/2261 and FCO 8/2497: Annual Reviews 
for 1972, 1973 and 1974 respectively. 
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disagreement, had set the stage for renewed cooperation in a number of areas.
99
 Two 
specific cases bear highlighting. First, on the 27
th
 of March 1975, Iran signed what was 
billed by the Finance Minister as „the largest ever economic agreement‟ concluded 
between the two countries. The provisions of the deal, valued at some $2.5 billion 
dollars, included substantial expansion of the Isfahan steel mill. In a second significant 
reversal, Iran also undertook to finance a paper mill in the Russian SSR, with the latter 
to repay the loan retrospectively in products from the mill.
100
 It was envisaged that trade 
between 1971 and 1975, estimated at $1.2 billion, would double within the subsequent 
four year period; a projection borne out by the Soviet documentary record.
101
 Second, 
and of comparable importance, April 1975 saw the conclusion of a trilateral „gas swap‟ 
partnership whereby Iran, through a new pipeline to be constructed parallel to existing 
infrastructure, was to double its supply to Soviet industrial centres in the Caucasus and 
Eastern Europe.
102
 In response, the Soviet side undertook to increase its exports to 
Federal Germany and Western Europe. Unlike the previous agreement financing the 
Esfahan steel mill however, Iran was to be paid hard currency.
103
 Notably in this 
connection, even prior to the proposed pipeline expansion, Soviet trade figures reveal 
that by 1975 the pipeline out of Iran effectively underpinned a substantial fifty percent 
of Soviet gas exports to Eastern and Western Europe.
104
 Politically and economically, 
therefore, the effect of the deal was to further strengthen the signatories‟ investment in 
each other‟s stability.105 
 
Yet in spite of such successes, one constant in relations remained. As internal and 
external dissidence to the Iranian political system expanded in terms of its scope and 
virulence, the Shah, encouraged by his security force SAVAK, sought out a familiar 
thesis within which to situate and rationalise the apparently cohesive nature of 
opposition to his rule. Thus, the previous sense of „claustrophobia‟, derived from a 
                                                 
99 An undersecretary at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that 'preliminary discussions' 
had taken place during the Shah's trip. FCO 8/2502: Embassy in Tehran to London, 20 March 1975. 
100  FCO 8/2502, ibid. 
101  The period saw an annual bilateral trade volume of 370 million roubles (262 USD). See: Foreign 
Trade of the Soviet Union, 1922-1988, Jubilee Statistical Compilation (in Russian), p17. 
102  FCO 8/2502: Soviet / Iranian Relations, 28 June 1975, §2 
103  Under the existing arrangement, initialled in October 1965, Iranian gas had retrospectively financed 
both the construction of the pipeline itself, and also the Esfahan steel mill. See Chapter Three. 
104  Foreign Trade of the USSR for 1975, p122 and p238; see also Robert G. Jensen, Theodore Shabad 
& Arthur W. Wright (1983), Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy, p373. 
105  Shahram Chubin, op. cit., p9. 
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perception of Soviet activities in countries surrounding Iran, became steadily transposed 
onto activities within Iran.
106
 Evidence of this transition was provided in events 
surrounding the Rockwell murders of August 1976. Earlier that year, Rockwell 
International (a prominent American defence contractor) had been engaged by the 
Iranian government to spearhead the design of the Ibex project, a clandestine series of 
intelligence facilities intended to monitor communications in the Gulf region.
107
 The 
project's subsequent disclosure by the New York Times, in June 1976, immediately 
soured relations with Moscow, underlined by a front page invective published in 
Pravda, a marked increase in hostility on the part of the clandestine radio stations and a 
„difficult‟ audience undertaken by the Soviet ambassador with the Shah during which 
the former elected to tackle the subject of Iran's military build-up head on.
108
 Most 
damagingly however, the exposé highlighted the presence of contracted Rockwell 
employees in Iran, three of whom were subsequently killed in a brutal armed attack on 
the 28
th
 of August 1976.
109
 Despite an apparent lack of evidence connecting Soviet 
displeasure with the attack the Shah left his Court Minister, Asadollah Alam, in no 
doubt as to where the blame should be apportioned: 
 
„Above all, let the ambassador know that in our opinion the blame for this 
atrocity rests with the communists. They're taking advantage of the US Senate 
and the idiotic questions raised by its committees. Various senators have 
suggested that US advisers might one day be taken hostage. The terrorists are 
now trying to impress this fear on the minds of the American public. […] I'm 
also convinced, tell him, that various US journalists and newspapers are 
controlled by communists.‟110 
 
Although such a view was undoubtedly aimed at currying sympathy with the West in 
light of events –  as the first assassination of „non-official‟ U.S. citizens in Iran, the 
incident had greatly shocked the expatriate community – suspicion of Russian 
involvement was supported, in the minds of Iranian officials, by „hard proof‟ that the 
                                                 
106  FCO 8/2502: Soviet / Iranian Relations, 28 June 1975, §7. 
107  This point is well made by Andrew Scott-Cooper, op. cit., p214. 
108  Radio Iran Courier: Iran to Cooperate in Espionage, FBIS-MEA-75-108, R1, 2 June 1975. 
109  Three Americans Killed By Terrorists in Teheran [sic], FBIS-MEA-76-169, R1, 28 August 1976;  
110  Asadollah Alam, The Shah & I, p503. 
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terrorist organisation allegedly responsible was supported by Libya.
111
 By extension, it 
was concluded, such activities were tacitly encouraged by the Soviet Union from behind 
the scenes.
112
 It was similarly clear that the official concerns ranged far more widely 
than the Rockwell murders per se. As the Shah explained, in a highly significant 
audience with the British Ambassador two weeks later, Soviet agitators had now elected 
to „concentrate on‟ Iranian students abroad and terrorist organisations within Iran.113 
Two months later, the Shah issued a further warning via the Foreign Ministry, 
appraising the British ambassador of contact between Iraj Eskandiari and Enrico 
Berlinguer, respectively leaders of the Iranian (Tudeh) and Italian Communist parties. 
The Shah was, as the ambassador commented, „clearly firmly convinced‟ that the 
meeting could not have taken place without specific approval from Moscow.
114
 
 
The above state of affairs provided the backdrop for a particularly noteworthy episode, 
illustrating both the impact of Iranian anxieties on practical policy, and the integral 
nature of US-Iranian ties within the overall equation. On the 26
th
 of September 1976, a 
mid-ranking Soviet Air Force Lieutenant, Valentin Zosimov, defected from Soviet 
Azerbaijan to Iran in an Antanov-2 biplane and sought political asylum.
115
 One month 
later, in spite of significant international protest – including a direct, official protest 
from the UN's High Commissioner for Human Rights – the Iranian government decided 
to turn Zosimov over to the Soviet authorities, under the highly questionable legal cover 
of a 1973 Bilateral Agreement to combat airborne piracy.
116
 By all accounts, substantial 
                                                 
111  See Hoveyda's interview with Le Monde, FBIS-MEA-76-106, R6, 28 May 1976; two days after the 
Rockwell murders, Radio Mihan Parastan (Radio of the Patriots), broadcasting in Persian from 
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115  Chronicle of Human Rights Protection in the USSR (in Russian), Issue 23-24 (1976), p52. 
116  Chronicle of Human Rights Protection in the USSR (in Russian), Issue 30 (April-June, 1978), p62. 
For the text of 1973 Agreement on Airborne Piracy see Collection of Active Treaties, Agreements and 
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pressure had been exerted by Moscow.
117
 The unfortunate Lieutenant was subsequently 
convicted of treason and sentenced to twelve years in a hard labour camp.
118
 This 
concession by Iran to the Soviet Union on a sensitive issue was reciprocated in the 
replacement of Ambassador Erofeev, who had been in post for nine years, in favour of a 
diplomat with more senior standing, Vladimir Vinogradov.
119
 Summoned to see the 
Foreign Minister, Vinogradov was informed that he „hardly needed to be told what great 
importance‟ relations with Iran had for the USSR, however, Gromyko added, 
„something is rather amiss.‟ 120  It would in fact appear that Erofeev had become 
personally unacceptable to the Shah following their „famous‟ exchange of views earlier 
in the year; “those of us who have necks sometimes get them cut off”, the outgoing 
ambassador was heard to remark.
121
 Instructively, the rapprochement also came at a 
time of heightened tension between Iran and the West. In a private letter to President 
Ford, dated the 1
st
 of November – three days after Zosimov's return to the Soviet Union 
– but withheld by Iran's Ambassador in Washington, Ardeshir Zahedi, until after the 
presidential election on the 2
nd
 of November, the Shah's tone expressed anger at 
stiffening Western attitudes toward Iran on the subject of oil prices and, in an unusually 
direct threat, betrayed a nervousness regarding the future direction of American policy: 
 
„You are no doubt aware of my deep concern for the need to maintain close 
cooperation between our countries. However, if there is any opposition in 
Congress or other circles to see Iran prosperous and militarily strong, there are 
other sources of supply to which we can turn: our life is not in their hands.‟122 
 
To underline the point, at the end of November the Iranian government concluded a 
$528 million arms deal with the USSR, by some considerable margin the largest 
                                                                                                                                               
Conventions concluded between the USSR and Foreign States (Moscow 1976), pp293-295. 
117  Chronicle of Human Rights Protection in the USSR (in Russian), ibid. Issue, p62. See also FCO 
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121  FCO 8/2984, Folio 1: Iran / USSR Relations, 19 January 1977, §9; Radio Iran Courier (Peyk-e Iran), 
evidently in recognition of Iran's forthcoming approach with Zosimov, ceased broadcasting. Ibid., §6 
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hitherto signed between the two countries.
123
 In a significant reversal of Kosygin‟s 
rejected 1973 offer, it was now the Iranian side (by their own admission) that had 
approached the Soviets for advanced weaponry.
124
 Thus, as relations cooled with the 
United States, Iranian leaders again looked to the USSR as a counterbalance; a function 
the latter was only too pleased to fulfil. Thus, by the start of 1978 two important trends 
can be discerned. First, for the reasons outlined above, a genuine and mutually-
beneficial stability had been achieved in Soviet-Iranian relations; evidenced both by the 
enhanced level of economic exchange and a series of notable diplomatic concessions 
from both sides. Secondly, and notwithstanding the former point, the Shah's entrenched 
and intractable convictions regarding the external, communist-inspired nature of 
opposition to the regime demonstrably restricted his ability to recognise or engage with 
the true internal, societal determinants of Iran's incipient revolutionary storm.
125
 
 
Reticence and Realisation: Soviet Policy towards Iran in 1978 
One of the first visits the new Soviet ambassador made following his appointment was 
to Amir Abbas Hoveyda, by then the Shah‟s longest-serving Prime Minister. The two 
had developed a friendly relationship dating back to 1967 when the Hoveyda had made 
an official visit to the Soviet Union.
126
 They met, as Vinogradov recalled, „as old 
friends‟ – a circumstance which „naturally helped‟ his work in Tehran. In a lengthy tour 
d‟horizon, Hoveyda dwelt at length on Iran's differences with West European countries 
and, in particular, with America: 
 
„Relations with the USA are complex [...] one cannot rely on them. We do not 
know what Carter represents. His recent letter to the Shah [...] concluded with 
the impudent expression 'Write me' - the same way he ended his [February 1977] 
letter to [prominent Soviet dissident, Andrei] Sakharov. This absolutely 
infuriated the Shah.‟127 
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127  Vinogradov, op. cit., p396. 
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The Iranian government's distaste for the newly-elected Carter administration and its 
preoccupation with human rights was indeed shared by the Soviet leadership, which had 
naturally found itself a principal target.
128
 Apparently seeking to build on this common 
ground, Hoveyda intimated: 
 
„“The Americans behave in an overly familiar way toward Iran; they try to 
interfere [...] As a consequence, we have more problems in our relations with 
America than we do with the Soviet Union. Although there are deep difference 
in ideology between our two countries, our respective governments nevertheless 
understand each others' interests.”‟129 
 
Vinogradov's account of Hoveyda's apparent willingness to pursue greater 
accommodation with the Soviet Union in light of the perceived unreliability of Iran's 
Western allies finds support in the memoirs of Amir Ashraf, an Iranian diplomat and 
close confidante of the Shah. Recalling the events of May 1978 in his role as then Chief 
of Protocol at the Imperial Court, Ashraf wrote: 
 
„I suggested to His Majesty that now that the Americans and the Europeans are 
agitating against Iran it would be better that we get closer to the Russians so they 
understood that Iran would review its foreign policy, or that [...] we invite 
Brezhnev to Iran. His Majesty accepted my proposal and summoned the Russian 
ambassador. The next day the Russian ambassador was given an audience during 
which His Majesty reminded him of the friendly relations between Iran and 
Russia and there was talk of inviting Brezhnev to Iran [...]; the ambassador 
happily agreed to inform Moscow of the royal decision.‟130 
 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which such approaches, if accurately reported, were 
genuinely intended to enlist Russian support in the face of mounting protests, or in fact 
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to dissuade the Soviets from encouraging the opposition while simultaneously 
leveraging any improvement in relations to pressurise the Americans. Vinogradov 
himself was inclined to be cynical.
131
 What remains beyond doubt however, is that the 
developing internal situation in Iran presented the Kremlin with some uncomfortable 
policy choices, underlined by the length of Vinogradov's summer „break‟ in 1978, which 
by the ambassador's own account lasted from June to September.
132
 On the one hand, a 
long sought-after opportunity had arisen to enhance Soviet influence over an 
increasingly isolated Iranian regime, the reliability of whose staunchest ally was in 
doubt. On the other hand, that same regime stubbornly refused to loosen its ties with 
West – a key Soviet objective – and had become, in Vinogradov's assessment, „clearly 
objectionable to its people.‟133 Official responses, reflecting this dilemma, were initially 
characterised by caution. Publicly, Soviet media, while implying sympathy for the 
political demands of the opposition, tended to focus on American activities in Iran and 
carried no direct criticism of the regime itself.
134
 „The Soviet calculation‟, a British 
assessment from late November 1978 was led to conclude, „appears to be that the Shah 
may pull through.‟135 It was an impression that Soviet officials were themselves eager to 
cultivate, seeking to avoid charges of interference. Most remarkably, at an informal 
meeting in Tehran between the U.S. Embassy's Political Officer, John Stempel, and the 
Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, Guennady Kazankin, the latter volunteered his 
government's hope that conditions in Iran would „settle down‟; the U.S., he bluntly 
charged, was „not doing enough to help the Shah.‟136 
 
Moscow's apparent preference for maintaining the status quo notwithstanding, it became 
progressively clear that the mounting unrest posed significant risks for the Soviet 
Union's interests in Iran. By October 1978, strikes at the Esfahan steel mill came close 
to necessitating a full-scale shutdown, and a walk-out by workers on the IGAT pipeline 
had halted deliveries of natural gas to the Caucasian SSRs.
137
 In a note to the Iranian 
Foreign Ministry on the 28
th
 of October, the Soviet Embassy complained that a series of 
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fires had been deliberately started at the Soviet-built Ramin power station in Khuzestan 
and, in a separate incident, the homes of Russian specialists in Boroujerdi attacked and 
vandalised.
138
 The gravity of the situation was soon mirrored in Tehran itself by 
widespread protests on the 5
th
 of November, notable both for the lack of security 
provided to the Soviet Embassy, and, as Vinogradov himself recalled, the shouts of the 
crowd outside: marg bar shuravi ('Death to the USSR.')
139
 In response to these 
developments, the embattled Soviet ambassador took the unprecedented decision to 
request permission from the Iranian authorities to issue a plea on national television and 
radio.
140
 Underlining the Soviet Union's „principle of non-interference‟ in Iranian 
affairs, Vinogradov took the opportunity to forcefully (albeit implicitly) differentiate 
between Soviet and Western economic assistance: 
 
„The industrial enterprises and various other economic projects [...] being built 
in Iran with the assistance of the Soviet Union belong entirely to Iran. The 
Soviet Union is not motivated by the goal of extracting profits. Soviet 
specialists, working side by side with Iranian employees at the Esfahan Steel 
Mill, at construction plants, on fishing vessels and in powerplants […] they are 
fellow workers, comrades. Indeed, they have not come to Iran for higher pay but 
rather to fulfil the mandate given them by the Soviet nation; to provide friendly 
help to our neighbour Iran in attaining economic independence.‟141 
 
The intervention did not have the desired effect; the Ramin power station continued to 
be targeted by arsonists, despite being guarded by the Armed Forces.
142
 As dependents 
of the Soviet Embassy staff and other non-essential personnel began to be evacuated, 
Moscow became increasingly concerned by the insistence of the Shah's regime, as of 
local and Western media, on identifying „communist intrigue‟ as the primary source of 
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„incitement‟ behind the street protests. It was thought this campaign might be a 
deliberate strategy designed to provide a platform for American intervention, as had 
been the case with the Mosaddeq regime in 1953.
143
 In an effort to counter this 
impression, President Carter, in an statement on the 13
th
 of November affirmed that his 
government had „no evidence that the Soviets […] are trying to disrupt the existing 
government structure in Iran.‟ Drawing on lessons learnt „the hard way in Vietnam‟, 
Carter insisted the U.S had no wish to get involved „unless our own security should be 
threatened.‟144 For the Soviet leadership, however, the latter reservation only served to  
heighten their concern. Brezhnev, in a direct riposte issued six days later, decisively 
advertised his own rejection of outside interference in Iran, warning that the Soviet 
Union „could not watch indifferently‟ in the event of foreign „and especially military‟ 
intervention in Iran.
145
 In Tehran, Vinogradov made hurried preparations to ensure 
Brezhnev's statement was given as wide a distribution as possible. His endeavours, 
however, met with little success. 
 
„It slowly became clear that the Shah […] after reflecting for a while, had 
decided not to publicise Brezhnev's statement. His reasoning, it transpired, was 
as follows: if the text were published without critical comment, it would be 
interpreted as an attack on the USA. And yet it was not possible to criticise the 
statement; indeed, the Soviet Union had underlined in it the necessary of 
guaranteeing Iran's independence.‟146 
 
Vinogradov's account conveys the sense of frustration his superiors felt about the 
difficulty in making the USSR's views known. In point of fact, the Soviet leader's 
unusual public intervention did little to deter the Carter regime from exploring military 
options, even if major divisions did exist within U.S. administration; two articles in the 
New York Times at the end of December 1978, which appeared to report authoritatively 
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on the options being considered, caused the Kremlin particular alarm.
147
 For Moscow, 
the revelation that „Pentagon analysts [had] advocated a larger military role for 
American armed forces in the region‟ was a step too far, as was the suggestion that some 
quarters in the U.S. were „prepared, if necessary, to go up in flames with the Shah.‟148 In 
a robust and important counter-offensive, Pravda's leading article on the 11
th
 of January 
1979 evidenced a significant hardening in attitudes: 
 
„To the extent that American attempts to direct events along their desired course 
have been unsuccessful, an old acquaintance has begun to loom on the horizon: 
the spectre of 'the Soviet threat.' [...] A pretext must be found [...] And thus they 
are now speaking of expedited measures for a 'last resort' coup and institution of 
military dictatorship in Iran if the Bakhtiar government is unable to maintain 
'order' or if it seeks normalisation of the situation at the price of too many major 
concessions to the opposition democratic forces.‟149 
 
In explicitly contrasting Soviet non-interference with the alleged imperialist 
machinations of the West, „who Lord it over Iran like it is their personal fiefdom‟, the 
piece signalled an abrupt departure from the hitherto restrained Soviet press coverage of 
the uprisings.
150
 More notably, given both the article's timing and its explicit attempt to 
undermine the credibility of the Bakhtiar government, its message appeared tailor-made 
to strengthen the Soviet Union's credibility with a post-revolutionary regime and, in 
particular, to appeal to the clergy. 
 
Soviet strategy thus began to shift, albeit belatedly, from one of containment to one of 
actively preparing for transition in Iran. Such an analysis is supported, in practical 
policy terms, by a remarkable collection of evidence from the KGB archives in Baku 
obtained by Azerbaijani scholar, Jamil Hasanli.
151
 The documents reveal that, one week 
prior to the Pravda article's publication, a decision was taken at the highest level to 
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encourage the Iranian People's Party (Tudeh) – whose Central Committee was based in 
Leipzig – to unite the Iranian left with Khomeini against the Shah in what was styled 
the „first stage‟ of Iran's revolution.152 Noureddin Kianouri (see Chapter One, attempted 
assassination of the Shah in 1949) was ordered to Baku in an effort to secure the support 
of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party in his mission to assume control of Tudeh and to 
impress the Kremlin's refreshed strategy upon his Azeri comrades. It had become clear 
that the position taken by Tudeh's incumbent first secretary, Iraj Eskandiari (namely that 
the Iranian opposition movement's religious colouring should „not be exaggerated‟) was 
wildly at odds with reality.
153
 Eskandiari had not sought cooperation with the clergy, 
believing that they and Tudeh were „simply participating in one and the same 
movement.‟154 In conversation with the leader of ADP on the 3rd of January, Geydar 
Aliev - then First Secretary of the Azerbaijan SSR emphasised the new official line: 
 
„At the present time in Iran there is no more popular person than Khomeini. 
They believe in him. People go to their deaths with portraits of him. It is 
necessary to understand that he is engaged in struggle not only against the 
throne, but also the American presence in Iran.‟155 
 
The shift in Soviet strategy was further evidenced by an „exchange of views‟ on the 
post-revolutionary environment between the Soviet Third Secretary in Tehran, 
Mohamed Osmanov, and an American counterpart: one of several such meetings that 
took place prior to the U.S. Embassy siege. Osmanov openly confirmed Moscow's 
assessment, namely, that Khomeini's broad popular support was indicative of his 
„progressive‟ tendencies; and that, while the Soviet side still had doubts and 
reservations, they were „hopeful‟ that once the Ayatollah was exposed to the broader 
thinking of his fellow revolutionaries, „he would moderate some of his views.‟ 156 
Accordingly, at the Tudeh Party‟s 16th Plenum – held in Leipzig in February 1979 „with 
                                                 
152  Ibid., p488 
153  See Eskandiari's interview with Prague-based journal Problems of Peace and Socialism in FCO 
8/3196, Folio 8, Interview with Iraj Eskandiari, 24 November 1978, §1(A). Notably the journal 
carried no editorial comment on the interview, nor were Eskandiari's views discussed in the Soviet 
press, underlining the Soviet leadership's ambivalence toward the Tudeh leader. FCO 8/3196, Folio 6: 
Interview with Iraj Eskandiari, 23 November 1978, §2. 
154  FCO 8/3196, Folio 8, Interview with Iraj Eskandiari, 24 November 1978, §1(E). 
155  Jamil Hasanli, op. cit., p488. 
156  Asnad-e Laneh-ye Jasusi, Vol. 49: Exchange of Views with Soviets on Iran, p5, §2. 
 183 
the active participation‟ of the Soviet Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic 
– the decision was taken to formally approach Khomeini and Bazargan with a request 
broaden the participation of the Tudeh within post-revolutionary politics. Kianouri, in 
line with Moscow's wishes, was confirmed as leader.
157
 Eskandiari was demoted.
158
 
  
The foregoing account supports an argument that the Soviet position, one of both public 
and private restraint prior to and indeed during the „first stage‟ of the revolution itself, 
was one of active – if somewhat belated – preparation in the background to take 
advantage of its aftermath; a conclusion further evidenced by the fact that the Soviet 
Union became the first country to offer the new regime economic aid.
159
 It was 
however, seen in retrospect, a policy of considerable naivety. If Soviet leaders hoped 
that by ingratiating itself with the incoming regime it might strengthen the hand of 
leftist forces, as early as July it was forced to admit that Tudeh's optimistic predictions 
had been woefully misplaced. A postmortem in Moscow conducted jointly between the 
head of the Politburo's international department with delegates from the Iranian People's 
Party and the Azerbaijan Democrat Party concluded as follows: 
 
„The Peoples' Party of Iran (Tudeh), as a result of its policy of unconditional 
support for Khomeini, has isolated itself. Practically all leftist and democratic 
organisations have turned away from it, and are now subjecting Tudeh to sharp 
criticism. Religious leaders, for their part, totally ignore Tudeh and, 
notwithstanding Kianouri's repeated attempts to reach out to them, refuse all 
contact with him.‟160 
 
As a consequence, and even as the ruling clergy‟s subsequent determination to eliminate 
leftist opposition became clear, and Soviet involvement in Afghanistan deepened, 
Kianouri's urgent request to Moscow for armed reinforcements met with an ambivalent 
response.
161
 The affiliations of the senior Tudeh leadership, allegedly exposed to British 
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Intelligence by KGB defector Vladimir Kuzichkin in 1982, and subsequently shared 
with Iran's revolutionary authorities by the CIA as part of the Iran-Contra affair, 
subsequently sealed the tragic fate of the Iranian left.
162
 
 
Conclusion 
The momentous consequences of the Shah's determination to pursue military 
„credibility‟ at the expense of closer attention to domestic policy features prominently in 
the literature on Pahlavi foreign relations.
163
 A related tendency, both among scholars of 
the period and indeed those themselves involved in its events, is to focus on the effects 
of Western policy in Iran. The assessment offered by Sir Eldon Griffiths – a member of 
the UK House of Commons foreign policy both before and during the Revolution – 
provides a typical example of such an approach. „It was our pressure‟, he wrote, „that 
led the Shah to overestimate the Soviet threat and spend far too large a share of Iran's 
income on the sophisticated weaponry of which we were the principal suppliers.‟164 By 
contrast this chapter has sought to argue that the chief underlying determinant of Iranian 
foreign policy during the 1970s remained, as previously, an instinctive suspicion and 
distrust of the Soviet Union nutured by the Shah quite independently. It is undeniably 
the case that Western officials encouraged that suspicion to varying degrees, much to the 
chagrin of their Russian counterparts.
165
 Yet they were not its source. Principally, it was 
the impact of an historical experience, a consistent theme in the preceding chapters of 
this thesis, that had predisposed Iranian leaders to perceptions of „the socialist tide‟; a 
trend discerned as far afield as Italy and New Zealand.
166
 Such sensitivities were, again 
as previously, reinforced by the excesses of clandestine Communist radio stations, the 
tenor of whose programming – as one U.S. analysis conceded – the Iranian government 
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could be „forgiven for assuming‟ was aimed at its violent overthrow.167 Soviet regional 
activities came to acquire a central significance in directing the course of Iran's foreign 
policy, irrespective of however limited, cautious, or unsuccessful Moscow's various 
activities or Middle Eastern forays may have been in reality. 
 
Analogously, a clear motivational factor in Soviet regional diplomacy remained its 
concern with resisting, or at least containing, any American military presence in the 
Persian Gulf. Consistent with events of the 1950s and 1960s, this sensitivity was clearly 
evidenced in the Soviet response to Iran's military build-up, and in particular, to projects 
such as that appeared to provide America with a physical foothold in Iran or entail the 
long-term presence of U.S. personnel or threaten the security of Soviet borders. The 
Ibex radar installations and, latterly, the proposed sale of AWACS aircraft were a 
particular source of tension. The memoirs of Vladimir Vinogradov, the Soviet Union's 
last ambassador to pre-revolutionary Iran, provide a fascinating insight: 
 
„The Shah and, under his direction, Prime Minister Hoveyda constantly tried to 
inspire us with the notion that Iran's warm relations with the USA were a, quote, 
“temporary matter” – until Iran could stand on her own two feet. When for 
instance I raised the question of Iran's possible purchase of AWACS jets from the 
USA, the Shah tried to convince me that these planes were necessary because of 
Iran's 'challenging mountainous terrain.' I was obliged to direct his Majesty's 
attention to the operational surveillance radius of these aircraft; they could cover 
a substantial part of Soviet territory. Moreover it was known that American 
personnel would maintain them. Did this not contradict repeated assurances that 
Iran's territory would not be used to the detriment of her northern neighbour's 
security? The Shah tried to manoeuvre around the issue, stating that he would 
not allow American pilots to serve on the jets. This was of course utter nonsense. 
And what if such aircraft should 'accidentally' overfly Soviet territory? “Then 
shoot them down”, suggested the Shah cooly.‟168 
 
From such exchanges it emerges strongly that Tehran and Moscow's respective 
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suspicions, and by extension the effects of that mistrust on practical policy, were of a 
mutually reinforcing character. From the Soviet perspective, they enhanced and 
supported a wider narrative of struggle against colonialist revanchement, identified in 
the alleged desire by the West to control Middle Eastern oil and singling out Iran as a 
tool of American neoimperialism. From the Iranian side, the suspicions both produced 
and perpetuated the perception of Communist grand design: a thesis expressed in terms 
of strategic „triangles‟ and „blocs‟; of Soviet attempts to „encircle‟ the Near and Middle 
East through its activities in Iraq, India, South Yemen and Ethiopia; and above all, of 
Russia's unwavering „historical‟ objectives.169 Emotive rhetoric aside however, a sober 
analysis of Soviet foreign policy during the period, as the evidence presented in this 
chapter illustrates, was primarily defensive in instinct and cautious in execution. To the 
extent that an overtly aggressive impression was undoubtedly at times created, 
particularly through the strident pronouncements of Soviet radio stations, this appeared 
to reflect not so much a desire to spread communism as to match or mitigate the 
extension of U.S. influence in the Middle East. For Moscow, the key objective was to 
protect the USSR's southern borders; a consistent feature of Soviet policy from early 
Tsarist times. Thus, the Soviet treaties with India, Afghanistan and Iraq in the 1970s, far 
from being primarily directed against Iran, rather reflected a long-established Soviet 
priority of cultivating friendly, economically engaged neighbours on the Soviet 
periphery; a priority demonstrated, on closer inspection, by Soviet diplomacy toward 
Iran. Contrary to the Shah‟s vision of Russian „axes‟ cutting across the region, Soviet 
policy was in fact one, as a major U.S. government study commissioned by Henry 
Kissinger in 1970 explicitly concluded, of „opportunism rather than grand design.‟170 
 
It was however, precisely the opportunistic nature of Soviet policy that perpetuated and 
reinforced the Iranian leadership's impression of a wider strategy. Its response to this 
perceived threat was two-fold. The first element might be characterised as active 
containment. By taking the fight, as it were, to the Soviets in Iraq (and to similar extent 
Oman), Tehran aimed to frustrate the Kremlin's perceived attempts to infiltrate the 
region. The second element was economic, underlined by the healthy balance of trade 
maintained throughout the period, and in particular, by the agreements concluded 
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following the resolution of the Iraq conflict in 1975. Ardeshir Zahedi, Iran's foreign 
minister from 1968 to 1972, was a firm proponent of this approach. Describing his 
government's efforts to strengthen the Soviet Union's stake in Iran's stability, he 
summarised the policy as one of “You can't eat the cake alone.”171 In this manner, 
through limited but substantive economic engagement, the Shah's government aimed to 
reduce the Kremlin's appetite for coercive diplomacy.
172
 The policy was, in this respect, 
a successful one. An analysis by the Foreign Office from October 1976, prepared in 
response to the Shah's request for a British assessment of the Soviet threat to Iran, 
contains a hand-written note in the margin by one of its contributors: „cf. dependence on 
Iranian gas.‟173 Indeed, the unprecedented augmentation of Iran's revenues during the 
period – ironically a result of the very battle against Western „oil cartels‟ that the Soviet 
press had so fulsomely encouraged – had in its own right significantly reduced the range 
of methods available to Moscow for exerting pressure on its southern neighbour.
174
 
 
Yet the balance thus achieved was clearly an uneasy one. From the Soviet side, on the 
one hand, official attitudes remained consistent with long-standing attempts to foster 
stability in relations with Tehran, deploying a „carrot and stick‟-style approach designed 
to maintain influence and secure essential interests. From the Iranian side, on the other, 
conciliatory appearances continued to mask a deepening conviction, at times verging on 
paranoia, that the Soviet Union was secretly pursuing a long-range objective of 
undermining the régime. Indeed, following the Rockwell murders, the British 
Ambassador Anthony Parsons confessed himself „a bit shocked‟ by the apparent 
hardening of Iranian attitudes, asserting that the Shah's view, in his identification of a 
more immediate, domestic Soviet threat, had „changed completely.‟175 This assessment 
was surprising. Rather, the development represented a natural and, arguably, inevitable 
broadening of a concept that had been steadily gestating since World War II and the 
Shah's fateful meeting with Khrushchev in 1956; that of the „real‟ Soviet face concealed 
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beneath „good-neighbourly‟ veneer. Indeed, the Shah's conception of a maudite alliance 
between the radical clergy and the Iranian left had been in development for some 
time.
176
 And critically, this chapter has argued, it was this precise conception that both 
underlay and exacerbated the fateful combination of paralysis and overreaction with 
which Iran's government met the increased internal dissidence of 1978. Such an analysis 
is supported by the both Soviet and Western diplomatic sources, which unanimously 
report that in their final audiences with the Shah, the latter blamed „the incitement of 
foreign agents‟ for the unrest.177 
 
In examining the Soviet response to events of 1978, a striking factor was the initial 
incomprehension regarding the revolution‟s genesis; a deficiency, as also seen, that 
arose in respect of Mosaddeq‟s rise to power in 1951. In a conversation with his U.S. 
counterpart, Guennady Kazankin of the Soviet embassy was eager to learn „what sort of 
people‟ the U.S. Embassy thought might be involved in the „Qom situation.‟178 This 
apparent lack of information was no doubt partly caused by the severe restrictions 
placed on Soviet personnel in Iran, a fact regarding which officials regularly 
complained. For example, Soviet diplomats were required to obtain the written 
permission of the Iranian Foreign Ministry for any travel within Iran. Phone lines were 
tapped by SAVAK and most of the time failed to work at all.
179
 In light of such 
challenges, the evidence suggests that the Soviet response to events was initially to steer 
a strictly neutral course. At the same time, this chapter has argued that Iran's developing 
unrest was far from welcome to Moscow. In particular, the cessation of gas supplies in 
November 1978 caused, by Soviet officials' own admission, significant supply problems 
in southern Soviet republics during winter months.
180
 As such difficulties compounded 
however, the Soviet leadership finally, in the words of one British report, „came down 
off the fence.‟181 They did so relatively late: close analysis suggests the Soviet position 
only began to shift appreciably in early December 1978. Attitudes finally hardened 
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against the Shah in January 1979 when it became clear both, that the crisis might 
precipitate U.S. intervention, and internally, that the Bakhtiar government was 
attempting to rally the „national bourgeoisie‟ to his cause at the expense of the left.182  
 
With respect to the revolution's aftermath, the source materials presently available 
suggest that the Soviet leadership, both in its concern with potential U.S. intrigues, and 
in focussing too narrowly on a Tudeh and ADP leadership, whose isolation from events 
severely limited their ability to influence them, was ultimately too late in formulating, 
still less implementing a policy that might have furthered its ends.
183
 In particular, it was 
slow to fully appreciate the religious nature of opposition; a fact that sat uncomfortably 
with the standard class analysis and objective rules of societal development to which 
officials and press commentators were accustomed.
184
 The direct consequence was a 
failure to anticipate either the extent to which the Iranian clergy would itself appropriate 
the levers of power, or the implications of their ascendancy for the Soviet Union's 
position in Iran. Kianouri and his followers, for example, were evidently convinced that 
Ayatollah Khomeini would „not place the USSR on a par with the USA.‟185 That they 
should have believed so was, in a sense, understandable; several prominent mullahs, 
such as Ayatollah Taleghani (who Kianouri names specifically) were known to be of a 
left-leaning persuasion. Yet the exiled Tudeh leadership, as events were to prove, lacked 
the ability to correctly predict and react to the events, still less to effectively exercise 
control over its adherents inside the country. Kianouri's naivety in this respect had been 
shared by his predecessor, Iraj Eskandiari, whose astonishing assessment, as late as 
November 1978, was that „as far as we know, Iranian religious leaders have never called 
for the establishment of a theocratic state.‟186 Thus, in the final account, the Soviet 
Union's belated endeavours to turn Iran's revolution to its advantage were severely 
hampered by two factors. First, the inadequacy of the vehicle chosen. And second, the 
rapid progression of events to a point where the impracticality and risks of Soviet 
interference came to outweigh potential dividends. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
„The departing West did not leave behind a socialist East. We never even 
entertained the thought that other nations might have their own values and ideals 
beyond thе elusive Marxist doctrine proclaimed by Soviet leaders. We liked 
Khomeini for his firm rejection of U.S. dictates – economic, political, cultural. 
Here, it seemed, was an Iranian leader who ought to turn his gaze northward, to 
his great neighbour; to lean on her military and political might. Alas! With his 
characteristic dry wit the Imam once remarked: “America is worse than Britain, 
Britain is worse than America, but Russia is worse than them both.”‟1 
 
- LEONID SHEBARSHIN, KGB STATION CHIEF IN TEHRAN (1979-1983) 
 
 
This thesis has sought to offer an in-depth analysis of Soviet-Iranian relations in their 
historical context. Its stated objectives were present a chronologically-organised 
analysis of that relationship, in its own right, based on a detailed examination of the 
documentary record; to describe that relationship's impact on the broader conduct and 
trajectory of Iranian foreign policy under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi; to assess the 
consequences of Iran's Cold War alignment with the West on ties with Moscow and the 
extent to which Western priorities affected them; and finally, to establish to what degree 
the Iranian regime's perceptions of the Soviet Union, and the policy choices that 
resulted from those perceptions, may have contributed to its ultimate downfall. The 
relevancy of these issues, and their contribution to the conclusions outlined below, are 
central not only to the period under review in this dissertation, but also to subsequent 
Iranian history. In the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis that followed the revolution, for 
example, when a large quantity of State Department documents were confiscated and 
thematically published in line with the views of their hard line editors, volumes 
pertaining to the Soviet Union were entitled „The Aggressive East‟ (sharq-e 
tajavozgar).
2
 The introduction to the first volume in the series, asserting that 
„imperialism and communism are actually two manifestations of one motive […] to 
deprive mankind of humanity‟, provides an assessment of Soviet intentions that bears 
striking similarities to that expressed privately by the Shah throughout this thesis: 
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„Following the precious opportunity presented [by the Islamic Revolution] the 
Russians exploited their hypocritical policies and under the guise of supporting 
the Islamic Republic began to foster groups that were dependent on Moscow in 
order to achieve two goals; first to bring them to power in Iran through the 
special Soviet tactics [sic], and second to materialize [their] centuries old dream 
of gaining access to the rich resources of Iran and finally to the Persian Gulf.‟3 
 
And as recently as 2009, in a scene that would have been familiar to the Soviet Union's 
last ambassador to Pahlavi-era Iran, crowds protesting the outcome of the rigged 
presidential vote converged on the Russian Embassy in Tehran with cries of marg bar 
russiyeh (“Death to Russia”) reflecting public anger at the Russian government‟s 
support of that election‟s outcome.4 
 
In seeking to offer a framework for understanding these themes in the Soviet-Iranian 
relationship, this dissertation began with a survey of prevailing theories in the 
international relations field and existing literature on relations between the two 
countries. Partially concurring with Dostoevsky, it concluded that individual theories 
may be insufficient, taken in isolation, to describe the complex motivations and 
psychological determinants that underlay and produced Iranian and Soviet foreign 
policy during the period. The explanatory potential of theory is further undermined with 
respect to Soviet-Iranian relations by the observation that, for both regimes, the exercise 
of policy by a single individual – or a restricted elite – introduces a further set of mental 
vicissitudes that frustrate any reliable analysis. As Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih 
have diplomatically noted, „When controlled by one person, foreign policy will tend to 
project that person's temperament. It will tend to view other systems of government as 
personal, and to equate personal slights with insults to the state and personal antipathy 
to national rivalry.‟5  
 
There can be no doubt that Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and particularly toward the latter 
end of his reign saw the world in anarchic terms; Iran had no choice but to augment its 
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military strength in order hold its own in an increasingly uncertain world. To this extent, 
he might be said to have been a realist. Yet, as the evidence presented in this thesis has 
also highlighted, the actions and policies of the Shah and his government were also in 
significant degree both historically and socially contingent. Collective memory of 
perceived or actual injustice at the hands of Russia was both historically rooted and a 
key article of faith among the elite. Prime Minister Hoveyda, for example, debriefing 
the British Ambassador on his return from Moscow in 1975, emphasised that, 
notwithstanding the relative success of the trip, „his generation could never forget the 
Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan‟ and that Russia's action had „left an indelible mark on 
him.‟6 Thus, to the extent that the relationship was significantly determined, in the 
words of Alexander Wendt „by shared ideas rather than material forces‟, it may also be 
explained in constructivist terms. Both of the above elements may be discerned in a 
remarkable interview given by the Shah in 1976: 
 
„[Interviewer] What are your Majesty's worries about the future? [Shah] As far 
as the domestic situation is concerned, fortunately I have nothing to worry about. 
However, when it comes to the world situation, I have a great deal to worry 
about. It seems that within the next 7 or 8 years, the fate of today's world be 
settled. Will civilisation as we know it […] survive? However, those planning to 
put an end to the present civilisation should not have the misconception that, 
once it is changed, the world will become Marxist. On the contrary, Marxism, 
too, will perish. [Interviewer] Do you share the general pessimism concerning 
the forces of what is known as the totalitarian bloc? [Shah] Yes. And our 
pessimism stems from the complacency and carelessness of the other party [i.e. 
the West] I see nothing to make me optimistic. Our only alternative is to become 
and remain more powerful.‟7 
 
The exchange provides an further illustration, as has been witnessed throughout this 
thesis, of the direct connection between the Shah's „realist‟ apprehensions vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union and Iran‟s pursuit of military supremacy to the subordination and 
ultimately detriment of economic and societal considerations. Within the same interview 
                                                 
6 FCO 17/382: Visit of Iranian Prime Minister to Moscow, 10 August 1967, §10(c). 
7 FBIS-MEA-76-209, Shah Interviewed on Domestic and World Situation, 28 October 1976, R8. 
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however, the connection between those ambitions and the impact of constructed „ideas‟ 
also finds clear expression, in this case the devoutly held and urgently perceived need, 
as argued in Chapter Four, to counter the weight of past humiliation: 
 
„[Interviewer] It is fifty years since the establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty. 
When your majesty views the past half century, what do you see? [Shah] Above 
all, I think about the previous condition of the country. How did this country, 
divided between Russia and Britain, remain a de facto state? This is really 
amazing. During the entire course of Iranian history, our country's decline 
coincided with an upsurge of European civilisation. At precisely that point, they 
lured our people to sleep. We were being ridiculed by everyone. It should suffice 
to recall a simple incident. During the period of decline, they [the Iranian 
government] had issued orders for a road to be built between Pol-e Rumi and 
Tajrish [two adjacent areas of northern Tehran] in order to establish a route 
between Tehran and Gilan. Now pay attention: they [the Russian authorities] 
reported to the then-governor that this was not possible. This is a fact.‟8 
   
Observing therefore the difficulty of applying any discrete theory of international 
relations to the Soviet-Iranian relationship, the introductory chapter proposed the need 
for a more nuanced view of Pahlavi foreign relations, attaching particular importance to 
the process of historical myth-making in underpinning and informing policy. To deploy 
the term „myth‟ does not, it bears reemphasising, seek to deny the immediacy and 
relevancy of Soviet interference for Iranian politicians, which was both real and 
legitimate, nor to ignore Moscow‟s analogous concern at American involvement in Iran. 
Rather, its aim has been to highlight the centrality of political narratives, and to 
evidence their power as a justificatory framework in the conduct of relations. 
Accordingly this dissertation, in contrast to the approach adopted by Chubin and Zabih, 
has focussed primarily on the perceptions, motivations and decision-making processes 
giving rise to the conduct of specific episodes in Soviet-Iranian relations, as opposed to 
a narrower concern with the physical content and outcome of foreign policy; and argued 
that Iranian elite conviction in the Soviet government's „historical‟ objectives – and by 
                                                 
8 FBIS-MEA-76-209, Shah Interviewed on Domestic and World Situation, 28 October 1976, R14-15. 
The implication was that the Russians kept Iran divided by denying the authorities access to the north. 
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turn, Soviet preoccupation with perceived Western imperialism – were both profound 
and wide-ranging in impact. From the perspective of Iranian history, while such an 
analytic framework cannot in itself provide the full picture (indeed, as seen, the Shah's 
broadly pro-Western inclinations were not entirely unwavering and his personal 
admiration for the USSR's agricultural, technical and scientific advancements appear to 
have been genuine), the basic underlying conception of communist grand design – 
physically demonstrated by Stalin‟s territorial adventurism and psychologically 
reinforced by Khrushchevian bombast – ultimately frustrated any attempt by the two 
sides to reach a lasting accommodation and precluded the neutral foreign policy 
position that Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq had coveted.  
 
As Chapter One endeavoured to show, Iran's „bitter experiences‟ of World War II, most 
prominently the Soviet Union's demand for an oil concession and concurrent activities 
in Iranian Azerbaijan, were a significant factor in prompting Mosaddeq's call for 
„negative equilibrium.‟ Yet as the Prime Minister was to subsequently discover, practical 
enactment of this ostensibly simple principle – that no one country should be in a 
position to dictate Iranian interests – succeeded only in attracting the incremental 
suspicion of Washington and a lack of sympathy from Moscow. In particular, the 
documentary evidence presented from the Soviet archives has shown that Mosaddeq's 
explicit wish to utilise Soviet aid in order to extract concessions from the West was as 
unrealistic as it was unappetising to the Soviet negotiators. This was, after all, an era of 
bullish competition between the Cold War opponents: each outside party desired and 
indeed expected that a gain for their own political position in Iran should come at the 
other side‟s expense. This explains Soviet leaders‟ reluctance to support an otherwise 
textbook „national liberation movement‟, since to have done so would have met neither 
of their primary objectives: reducing Western influence in Iran and, connectedly, 
ensuring the security of the USSR's southern flank. Mosaddeq‟s asking price however 
(namely, the tabling of „other‟ issues in Soviet-Iranian relations, and more specifically, 
the USSR's right of armed entry to Iran on the basis of the 1921 Treaty) was 
unacceptable to Moscow insofar as such a move would risk reducing their leverage over 
Iran with little tangible gain in return for its support. The Soviet leadership‟s resolute 
refusal to accept such an exchange, as the fascinating negotiation minutes between the 
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Soviet ambassador and Hossein Fatemi bear witness, effectively led (and not for the last 
time) to an insuperable impasse.
9
 To a significant degree, both sides overplayed their 
hand and neither won. 
 
Meanwhile, for the Shah himself, the events of 1946, 1949 and 1953 had shown that a 
febrile political environment and an uncontrolled opposition appeared to be an open 
invitation to Soviet-sponsored subversion. It is important to recognise that this 
(ultimately dominant) narrative was not without its justification. Soviet sponsorship of 
the Pishevari regime in Azerbaijan is an historical fact; KGB support for certain 
elements within the Tudeh party cannot reasonably be doubted although the 
commitment certainly varied in line with wider political goals; and the potential 
willingness to support the Mosaddeq regime in order to loosen Iran's relations with the 
West is a matter of archival record. As Chapter One has suggested however, such a 
reading requires some significant qualifications. First, Moscow's adventurism in 
Azerbaijan (in common with its precursor in Tsarist times) can be substantially 
explained by a desire to secure a greater political and economic stake in Iran, rather than 
subversion or territorial expansion for its own sake. Second, available evidence suggests 
that the assassination attempt on the Shah of 1949 proceeded from factionalism within 
the Tudeh party and from a radicalism which the KGB probably supported to some 
degree but did not explicitly direct. Third, Soviet interaction with Mosaddeq's 
government, although giving the external impression of a coincidence of interests 
between the two sides, the reality was considerably cooler. Such nuances 
notwithstanding, the critical impression made on the Shah and other senior figures by 
these undoubted failures of Soviet policy, caused at heart by the blunt and binary 
approach to international affairs of which Stalin and Molotov were chief architects, (and 
which Khrushchev gave the impression of continuing), first precipitated – and 
subsequently appeared to justify –  the Shah‟s decision to adhere to the Baghdad Pact. 
  
Yet the Shah's rationale for siding with the West also gave rise to an fundamental 
tension, alluded to above, resulting from the conviction that Iran could and should 
                                                 
9 АВПРФ, ф.094, о.65, п.403, д. № 033, л. 178: Record of Negotiations between Ambassador of the 
USSR to Iran, Comrade Anatoly I. Lavrent'yev, and Iran‟s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hossein 
Fatemi, 15th of August 1953. 
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thereby achieve a credible capability to counter Soviet aggression. The Eisenhower 
Doctrine, predicated on the observation that – in the words of John Foster Dulles – the 
so-called Northern Tier of nations were „feeling the hot breath of communism on their 
necks‟, had enabled the provision of military assistance to countries seen as under threat 
and positioned the independence and geopolitical integrity of the Middle East as central 
to U.S. national security interests.
10
 In this respect, the Doctrine may reasonably be said 
to have created an expectation; an expectation that its physical incarnation – the 
Baghdad Pact – was singularly slow to fulfil. Indeed, as the incoming British 
ambassador in 1958, Sir Geoffrey Harrison, almost immediately conceded, the Iranian 
government felt „sharply the very exposed nature of their position […] their main goal 
is likely to be the securing of some more concrete, formal and explicit guarantee from 
their allies than is at present offered them by the very non-committal wording of the 
Baghdad Pact.‟11 Nevertheless, there is evidence that the Shah's military ambitions met 
with a marked degree of cynicism on the part of Iran's American sponsors. Indeed, as 
Dulles reported to Eisenhower following a trip to Tehran in 1958: „The Shah, who 
considers himself a military genius, is determined to build up the military forces in Iran 
and perhaps in this way to gain a dominant position in the Baghdad Pact.‟12 
 
Further undermining the Shah's confidence in the West was a mounting perception that 
he was personally expendable. Already unnerved by the brutal demise of the monarchy 
in neighbouring Iraq, the Shah's suspicions were buttressed by his principal ally‟s 
insouciant reaction to (and apparent implication in) the Qarani plot. Commenting on the 
Shah's reaction to the episode, the British Ambassador substantially missed the point 
when he noted, with a startling air of condescension that „if the action taken as a result 
of the plot had the effect firstly of discouraging Iranians from coming to foreign 
embassies with cock-eyed and half-baked ideas about reform and change and secondly 
of making them generally more self-reliant and less prone to turn to foreigners for 
“support”, we should certainly be delighted.‟ 13  By contrast, the Shah's Soviet 
                                                 
10 FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. IX: Memorandum of Discussion at the 153rd Meeting of the NSC, 9 July 
1953. Text of the Eisenhower Doctrine in American Foreign Policy, 1957 – The Near and Middle East 
and Africa, pp829-830. 
11 Iran Political Diaries, 1954-1965, Annual Review for 1958, 21 January 1959. 
12 FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 12, Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles, 25 January 1958. 
13 FO 371/133009: Secret Minute, 3 March 1958.  
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counterparts were energetically engaged in what the British portrayed, with equal 
cynicism, as a „sweetness and light campaign.‟ 14  And demonstrably, in spite of 
Khrushchev's ill-disguised hostility towards the Baghdad Pact, the direction and style of 
the Kremlin's foreign policy toward the Middle East had changed substantially 
following Stalin's death.
15
 Given this background, Chapter Two of this thesis has argued 
against the prevailing Western opinion at the time; that the Shah was „bluffing‟ in his 
decision to engage in negotiations for a Non-Aggression Treaty with Moscow.
16
 It is 
further suggested that the negotiations' abrupt breakdown was due less to western 
governments‟ panicked reassurances and more to the stubborn insistence of Soviet 
negotiators on retaining their treaty rights in respect of Iran (the same 1921 Treaty that 
Mosaddeq had sought unsuccessfully to tackle), in turn caused by the Iranian side‟s own 
emphasis on the Treaty‟s inoperability; a suggestion which served only to sharpen 
Soviet suspicions. Indeed the subsequent attempt by Iranian politicians to denounce the 
articles in question was firmly rejected by Moscow, who continued to invoke the Treaty 
in protesting against U.S. military activities in Iran.
17
 
 
The acrimonious denouement of the 1959 negotiations precipitated a serious political 
crisis in relations and led to the highly unusual step of a Soviet newspaper printing the 
full text of a diplomatic note.
18
 Soviet leaders, it emerged clearly, were genuinely 
surprised and irritated at what they saw as an „ill-intentioned game‟ by the Iranian side. 
A KGB defector and former operative in Iran, Vladimir Kuzichkin has alleged that the 
Kremlin was so enraged by Iran's subsequent consolidation of ties with the US that an 
assassination attempt was ordered on the Shah (a move whose apparent failure owed 
only to incompetency of the agent who attempted to carry it out.)
19
 While the truth of 
this allegation cannot be independently substantiated, the Soviet diplomatic record does 
show unequivocally that diplomatic relations were profoundly strained. At one stage, 
Abolhassan Masoud-Ansari, the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, appears to have 
                                                 
14 FO 10116/58: Tehran Embassy Report for 2
nd
 Quarter of 1958, 30 July 1958. 
15 The significance of the post-Stalinist foreign policy shift has been outlined by Geoffrey Wheeler 
(British press councillor in Tehran from 1946 to 1951), Russia and the Middle East in Political 
Quarterly, Issue 28, No. 2, p134-5.  
16 See Chapter Two, notes 147-149. 
17 FO 371/164190: Aspects of Soviet / Iranian Relations, 5 December 1961; Pravda, 15 March 1959, p5. 
18 See Pravda on 13 February 1959. Full translation in appendix. 
19 Vladimir Kuzichkin (1992): Inside the KGB – My Life in Soviet Espionage, p211. 
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narrowly averted a full-scale break in diplomatic relations and a subsequent exchange of 
letters between Khrushchev and the Shah did little to ameliorate the deep distrust that 
had developed between the two sides.
20
 In one letter in particular, delivered personally 
by the Iranian Chargé D'Affairs in Moscow to Khrushchev himself at the latter's dacha 
in Yalta, the Shah gave full reign to his latent grievances against the Soviet Union with 
respect to the Azerbaijan crisis. Khrushchev predictably robust and unrepentant 
response, in turn, lambasted the Shah for „insulting‟ the Soviet Union and put forward 
his view, hitherto withheld by the Soviet Foreign Ministry as unduly inflammatory, that 
the Soviet invasion of Iran during World War II had saved the country from fascism.
21
 
Yet behind the recriminations, Khrushchev's chief objective, in common with Russian 
leaders both previous and subsequent, was straightforward: to prevent the use of Iranian 
territory for the purposes of threatening the USSR. 
 
„It was no use categorising military bases as good or bad. The danger was the 
existence of any such bases, which might be used for foreign aircraft or foreign 
nuclear weapons. When a country permitted a third power to use its territory, 
there might be sinister and irreparable consequences.‟22 
 
Khrushchev was not writing in the abstract. Less than two years later, the reality of U.S. 
IRBM deployments in Turkey was to become, by President Kennedy's own tacit 
admission, a central precipitating factor in the Cuban missile crisis.
23
 Although, as one 
scholar has pointed out, by 1962 advances in US missile technology had effectively 
rendered such „intermediate range weapons stationed in the Middle East obsolete, this 
was decidedly not how the Soviet government saw matters.
24
 Ultimately, in the face of 
the Soviet Union's relentless hostility to the „anti-popular‟ Amini administration, and 
                                                 
20 АВПРФ, ф.94, оп.48, п.136, д.011 л.17-18: Verbal Note of 28 May 1959, and л.53: Ansari to Pegov. 
21 FO 371/149768: British Embassy in Moscow to Foreign Office, 29 August 1960. 
22 FO 371/149769: Tehran to Foreign Office, 27 September 1960, §8. 
23 See Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow (Eds., 1997), The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House 
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, p100. Kennedy remarked to one of his advisers that, were America 
to deploy nuclear warheads in Turkey, this would be 'goddamn dangerous.' A National Security 
assistant, to his embarrassment, had to inform the president that this was in fact precisely the case! 
24 Nur Bilge Criss (1997): Strategic nuclear missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter affair, 1959–1963 in Journal 
of Strategic Studies, 20:3, p112. In his memoirs, then Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, 
explicitly justified the USSR's 'right to help Cuba [to] strengthen its defensive capability' on the basis 
of US commitments in Turkey and elsewhere on the Soviet periphery. See: Andrei Gromyko, 
Memories, (trans. Harold Shukman, 1989), p230. 
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indeed the US administration's increasingly evident disillusionment with their „abortive 
experiment‟ in Iranian reform, the Shah was persuaded, through Amini's replacement 
with Asadollah Alam, to normalise relations with Moscow by providing the 
commitment Khrushchev sought.
25
 With the Shah's subsequent 1965 trip to Moscow, 
made possible by a sharp reduction in media propaganda and the political groundwork 
laid by Brezhnev personally in his 1963 visit to Tehran, a series of important bilateral 
deals – most notably regarding the Esfahan steel mill – led to a marked improvement in 
ties.
26
 In a remarkable reversal, on returning from Moscow, the Shah not only 
announced his willingness to reconsider non-aggression pact with the USSR, but 
„uncorked‟ а swathe of grievances regarding Allied conduct in World War II, 
denouncing Bevan, Byrnes and Molotov (Foreign Ministers respectively of the UK, the 
US and the Soviet Union) for having conspired together in 1945 to „agree autonomy‟ for 
Iran's Kurdish, Azeri and Arab populations.
27
 It was indeed clear that the Shah, as one 
U.S. politician lamented at the time, saw „rust on his westward anchor.‟28 Meanwhile, a 
visiting Soviet economic delegation let it be known that the Kremlin wished Iran to 
„supersede Afghanistan‟ as an exemplar of economic cooperation with Moscow.29 
 
Notwithstanding the favourable climate described at the close of Chapter 3, the British 
departure from the Middle East from the late-1960s, and the opportunities this appeared 
to present for the Soviet Union and its regional satellites – the PDRY, Iraq and Egypt – 
reignited latent antipathies. For the Shah, the root of the problem lay not in the British 
withdrawal per se, but Iran's potential „encirclement‟ and a connected desire to avoid the 
humiliations of 1941 on which Mohammad Reza, even here at the height of his power, 
continued to dwell at length.
30
 It is important to recognise that successive US 
                                                 
25 FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 18: Paper by Robert Komer, 20 October 1962. 
26 FCO 371/175718: Irano-Soviet Relations: 1962-1964, 2 September 1964, §5. 
27 FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 31 August 1965, §7 & 9a. 
The allegation appears to have its origin in Bevin's draft terms for a tripartite commission on Iran, put 
forward at the Moscow Council of Ministers in December 1945. Faced with the 'unyielding attitude' of 
Stalin and Molotov, Bevin and Byrnes made significant concessions on regional autonomy in the 
draft, including provincial council elections and the recognition of Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish as 
minority languages. Molotov rejected the draft. See FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Vol. 8: 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, 28 December 1945 and text in ibid., Vol. 2: 
Memorandum by the United Kingdom Delegation, 24 December 1945, §6 & 7. 
28 FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 22: Memorandum for President Johnson, 16 September 1965. 
29 FCO 17/382: Irano/Soviet Union Economic Agreement, 16 April 1967, §3(i). 
30  FCO 17/1517: The Dynasty Blessed by the Gods, 11 October 1971, §3. 
 200 
administrations had hitherto been unwilling to provide Iran with any significant 
defensive capability. To do so, it had been argued, was not only likely to enhance 
Iranian pressure for military aid, but also to trigger similar demands from other 
Baghdad Pact members. The underlying vision for the Iranian military was thus, at root, 
one of „instilling doubt‟ in the Soviet military authorities as to their ability to invade 
Iran.
31
 Under the Nixon doctrine, by contrast, significant arms sales to Iran were 
designed both to assuage and encourage the Shah's desire for regional leadership; a role 
entailing precisely the capability that previous policy had precluded.
32
 Building on these 
observations, Chapter Four has implied as a whole that the Shah's personal 
preoccupation with countering a perceived Soviet rayonnement in the Middle East 
demonstrably diverted attention from domestic matters; and shown more specifically 
that, as protest to his rule mounted, the Shah's instinctive reaction was to identify the 
primary causes of the dissent in Soviet-sponsored agitation. In point of fact, as the last 
Soviet ambassador to Pahlavi Iran has alleged in his memoirs, the regime's lack of 
insight into the tempest brewing in the sprawling southern slums of Tehran was 
reflected in the Shah's answer to the question of whether he had visited them. „“Yes”, he 
said somewhat uncertainly, but then added, “true it was a while ago.”‟33 
 
It has been tempting for some scholars, as Abbas Milani has done in his recent 
biography of the Shah, to suggest that the monarch's asseverations in respect of the 
communist-clericy collusion were „at best inaccurate‟; that like the fallen ancien régime 
of the French revolution he had „learned nothing.‟34 Such an analysis fails to capture the 
full significance of Soviet-Iranian tensions. As the documentary record clearly shows, 
the Shah was convinced – through good times and bad – that his opponents were the 
„willing dupes‟ of Communism, all „inspired and controlled from outside.‟ 35  The 
objective „laws‟ of societal development, as seen from Moscow, including the 
suggestion that the Shah's own reforms may have borne the seed of his demise, were 
anathema in the context of „enemy intrigues, including the clergy, who wish to return 
                                                 
31  FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. 17: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 10 May 1961, §8 & §9. 
32  FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 24: Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting, 9 December 1970. 
33  V. Vinogradov, Diplomacy: People and Events, p377. 
34  A. Milani (2011), The Shah, p294-5. 
35  FRUS, 1961-1964, Vol. 17: Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, 6 June 1961, (A). 
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the country to the Middle Ages with the support of foreign agents.‟36 Published SAVAK 
documents, and indeed the title given by the post-revolutionary regime to the relevant 
volumes („The Red Spider‟), bear witness to an enduring wariness of Russia; 
sensitivities that the activities of clandestine radio stations and Russian personnel on the 
ground did little to alleviate during the period discussed.
37
 Nor was the Shah's 
conceptualisation of „red-black reaction‟ necessarily baseless. 38  The results of these 
historically-rooted convictions, however, irrespective of their relation to fact (which this 
thesis has suggested was more banal or benign than appearances may at times have 
suggested), and regardless of their roots in alleged „Pahlavi paranoia‟ identified by the 
Shah's opponents, were profound and far-reaching.
39
 Thus, as this dissertation has at 
core argued, neither Pahlavi foreign relations in particular, nor the trajectory of events 
from 1941-1979 more generally, can be viewed in isolation from the thesis of 
communist infiltration of which the Shah was an unyielding and singularly effective 
proponent. As to the reality of Soviet interference in Iran, there can be no more fitting or 
illuminating vignette than the following account from highest level of the Soviet 
government provided by Leonid Shebarshin, the KGB Tehran chief quoted above: 
 
„Before I flew out to Tehran [in February 1979], Yuri Andropov summoned me 
to see him. I was surprised by this, since the head of the KGB almost never 
personally briefed residency chiefs. He invited me to sit and asked: “What do 
you see as our next steps in Iran?” As a Soviet man and specialist in the region, I 
replied: “Yuri Vladimirovich! I consider Iran's Islamic Revolution to be an 
intermediary event. It will inevitably evolve into a communist revolution, and 
we will therefore actively support our friends in Iran's communist party. Yuri 
Vladimirovich looked at me carefully and said, “Maybe you are right, but I think 
otherwise. To be exact, I am convinced that things will be otherwise. I am 
certain that the mullahs are here to stay, and to stay for a very long time. This is 
not bad for us […] but your task must be to work in the knowledge that there 
                                                 
36  V. Vinogradov, op. cit., p377. 
37  For a representative illustration, see the dubious activities of Sergei Krakhmalov, described in his 
Notes of a Military Attaché. Iran – Egypt – Iran –Afghanistan (Passim) 
38  The Shah's claim in his Answer to History (p104), for instance, that communist radio stations 
accorded Khomeini the title of Ayatollah (and spoke approvingly of his anti-imperialism) is supported 
by evidence. See Chapter Four, n43. 
39  FRUS, 1968-1976, Vol. E-4: Letter from Nasser Afshar to President Nixon, 1 September 1972, p2. 
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will be no communist revolution. This should also govern our relations with 
Tudeh.” I was amazed by what Andropov said, contradicting what even our own 
specialists thought about the region. We were convinced of Tudeh's strength; we 
knew Iran well. It appears that Andropov however, in contrast to ourselves, 
grasped the situation. Yuri Vladimirovich understood that the main thing for 
Russia was not to gain a friend in Iran, but rather to ensure Iran did not become 
our enemy.‟40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Public lecture at Moscow State University (МГУ, March 2005.) Lenta (Russian source, newspaper), 
On the Death of a Resident. http://pda.lenta.ru/articles/2012/04/02/shebarshin/ (accessed 10.03.13.) 
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APPENDIX | TRASLATION OF PRAVDA ARTICLE 
 
Thesis reference: p187, n18 
Written: 11
th
 of February 1959 
Content: Text of note delivered by Soviet government delegation to the Iranian Foreign 
Minister following the breakdown of negotiations for a treaty of non-aggression and 
friendship. 
 
Since January the 29
th
 of this year, a Soviet government delegation has been present in 
Tehran at the invitation of the Iranian government. The delegation consisted of the 
Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, V. S. Semenov, the Soviet Ambassador to Iran, 
N. M. Pegov, and the Director of the Middle East Department at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ambassador A. P. Pavlov.  
 
The delegation conducted negotiations with the Shah of Iran and his government 
regarding the conclusion of a Friendship and Non-Aggression Treaty, a draft of which 
was proposed by the Iranian government. In the course of negotiations, however, when 
the Soviet delegation announced that their government accepted the Iranian 
government's proposed draft in its entirety, the Iranian government disavowed the 
original draft, putting new conditions on its signature, and attempting in every way to 
draw out the talks. 
 
On the 10
th
 of February the Soviet delegation held a meeting with Iran's minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Hekmat, during which it was became clear that the Iranian government 
had opted for the breakdown of talks and were refusing to conclude the text of the 
Treaty, as proposed by the Iranian government, with the Soviet Union. Wherefore, by 
order of the Soviet government, the head of the Soviet delegation, V. S. Semenov, made 
the following statement to the government of Iran: 
 
'Your Excellency, we have listened to your statement, containing the reply of the Iranian 
government to the Soviet proposals submitted by us to his Majesty the Shah-in-Shah on 
the 6
th
 of February. Its substance may be reduced to the fact that the Iranian side no 
longer agrees with the aforementioned proposals. The Iranian government does not at 
the present time wish to proceed with signing a Treaty for Friendship and Non-
Aggression, the draft of which they themselves proposed. They insist a clause is 
included to the effect that the Soviet government approves, along with activities already 
undertaken, future activities that may be undertaken in connection with Iran's 
participation in the Baghdad Pact, which it considers, contrary to fact, to be defensive in 
nature. Тhe Iranian side does not agree to take upon itself a commitment against signing 
bilateral agreements, directed against the Soviet Union, with third parties. Moreover, the 
Shah-in-Shah's government has today directly announced, via yourself, that it will 
conclude a bilateral military agreement with the USA. The Soviet government's position 
with regard to this is well known to you.  
 
You consider it essential that the question of foreign military bases in Iran be submitted 
to specialists for further study; this position concerning the entry of foreign forces into 
Iranian territory cannot but be considered evasive and ill-defined. The motives you cite 
for such a response are completely unconvincing, аnd bear no relation to the content of 
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the negotiations held here between the two sides. The refusal of the Shah-in-Shah's 
government to accept the Soviet government's proposals of February 6
th
, or to sign a 
Treaty of Friendship, Non-Aggression and Cooperation can only arouse regret in those 
who sincerely strive for good-neighbourliness between Iran and the Soviet Union, and 
for the strengthening of peace in the Middle and Near East. 
 
Your Excellency, it should be recalled that the negotiations we conducted in Tehran 
regarding the conclusion of a Treaty for Non-Aggression and Feiendship were initiated 
at the request of the Iranian side. The subject first arose during the exchange of views 
which took place in December 1958 between our respective governments concerning 
Soviet-Iranian relations, which had been especially aggrevated in connection with 
preparations for the conclusion of a military agreement between Iran and the USA, 
directed against the USSR and against other peace-loving countries of the region. А 
noteworthy message, transmitted by the USSR's ambassador in Iran, N. M. Pegov, to the 
Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hekmat, on the 28
th
 of December, underlined 
that the intended Irano-American military agreement is incompatible with the 
promotion of peace in the Near and Middle East and would inflict irreparable damage 
on Soviet-Iranian relations. At the same time, the Soviet government expressed its 
aspiration that the Near and Middle East become a zone of peace; a zone of good-
neighbourliness and friendly cooperation between governments. Wherefore the 
government of the USSR, taking into account the Iranian government's assurances of its 
wish to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union, expressed its willingness to 
make efforts, together with the Iranian government, to find a way to improve Soviet-
Iranian relations and promote the normalisation of the present situation in the region. 
 
Following an exchange of views regarding the shared issues of Soviet-Iranian relations 
on the 19
th
 of January, a proposal for the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship and Non-
aggression was submitted to the Shah-in-Shah's government through the Soviet 
ambassador, and likewise the Iranian draft of the treaty. The Soviet government 
regarded the idea of a such a treaty with approval and expressed itself in favour of 
conducting negotiations on the subject, also making known its readiness either to 
welcome an Iranian delegation to Moscow for the purpose, or, should the Iranian 
government find it more appropriate, send a Soviet government delegation to Tehran. In 
response to this, on the 27
th
 of January, the government of Iran expressed its wish that 
the Soviet government urgently send a delegation to Tehran, and that the negotiations be 
held in the strictest confidentiality. This was accepted by the Soviet side. 
 
Accordingly, the Soviet delegation arrived in Tehran on the 29
th
 of January at the urgent 
invitation of the Iranian government. The delegation proceeded on the basis that the 
Iranian government was genuinely interested in the conclusion of a treaty between Iran 
and the Soviet Union, and had full powers to conduct negotiations and to sign an 
appropriate treaty. The delegation met on several occasions with the head of the Iranian 
government, his majesty the Shah-in-Shah of Iran, and also with the Prime Minister, Mr. 
Manouchehr Eqbal; with yourself and responsible officials from the Iranian Foreign 
Ministry; and again with the Iran's appointed ambassador to the USSR, Mr. Aligholi 
[sic] Masoud-Ansari. 
 
Acting on behalf of the Soviet government and on the personal orders of the Chairman 
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of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N. S. Khrushchev, the delegation informed the 
Shah that the Soviet government was in favour of signing a new Soviet-Iranian Treaty, 
which would strengthen friendship and cooperation between our neighbouring 
governments аnd facilitate the removal of distrust and misunderstanding from Soviet-
Iranian relations. The Soviet delegation handed the Shah the Soviet draft of the Treaty, 
in which many of the clauses from Iran's draft were taken into account. At the same 
time, included in the Soviet draft were a series of clauses directed toward the wider 
development of friendly cooperation between our two countries. In the Soviet draft, 
inter alia,  it was stated that Russia and Iran would build their relations on the basis of 
mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; of non-aggression and non-
interference in each other's internal affairs; and on the basis of equality and mutual 
benefit. These clauses are in accordance with the decisions taken at the Bandung 
Conference, to which Iran was party, and also with the principles and goals of the 
United Nations. 
 
The draft also included an obligation for both sides not to afford third parties the right to 
construct, or make use of existing, military bases and aerodromes within their territory 
nor permit the presence therein of any third party's armed forces. The Soviet draft of the 
treaty envisaged further expansion of economic, trade and cultural ties between the two 
sides. In this connection, the Soviet government expressed its willingness to extend 
assistance to Iran, in a spirit of friendly cooperation,  for the development of its 
economy, particularly in development of industry and agriculture, as well as 
hydroelectric and transport facilities. Additionally, measures were envisaged for the 
widening of cooperation in the fields of culture, healthcare, and the fight against animal 
diseases and agricultural pests. 
 
They may ask, why is the Soviet Union displaying such interest in the development of 
friendly relations with its Iranian neighbour? Is there not some concealed agеnda here? 
As has already been stated on more than one occasion, this interest proceeds before all 
else from the Soviet government's aspiration for the strenthening of peace on Soviet 
borders and similarly from an ambition to promote the independent development of the 
sovereign nations of the East as they struggle to dispose of the heavy legacy of 
colonialism. The Soviet people consider it far better to labour and invest in the peaceful 
development of nations on a mutually beneficial basis rather than expending energy and 
material resources on arms races and the maintenance of inflated armies. It appears to 
us, of course, that Iran is no less interested in this than the Soviet Union. Regrettably, 
the Soviet delegation is forced to admit that the Shah-in-Shah's government passed over 
the above-mentioned Soviet proposals in complete silence and did not accept the hand 
of friendship, which the Soviet Union sincerely extended to Iran. 
 
During the course of negotiations, the Iranian side attached particular significance to the 
cancellation of the 5
th
 and 6
th
 articles of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921. These articles, 
as is known, encompass an obligation on the part of both sides not to permit the 
presence in their respective territories of any foreign state's armed forces that may 
constitute a threat to the borders, interests or security of the other contracting party; and 
additionally, an obligation on the part on the part of Iran not to allow the conversion of 
its territory into a base for military action against the Soviet Union.  
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The suggestion of revoking these articles of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty, which remain in 
force, was not entirely comprehensible to the Soviet side in as much as, according to 
available information, the conclusion of a military agreement between Iran and the USA 
envisages the potential stationing of U.S. troops on Iranian territory, and also the further 
widening of military cooperation between Iran and the USA within the framework of 
the Baghdad bloc. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the Shah's clarification, the 
Soviet government consented to discussions with the Iranian side on the issue of 
cancelling the 5
th
 and 6
th
 articles of the 1921 Treaty. 
 
In taking this major step, the government of the USSR had hoped to clear all obstacles 
from the road, and remove any doubts, that might complicate Soviet-Iranian relations or 
lead to а recurrence of dissatisfaction either now or in the future. It also took into 
account the statement from the Iranian side to the effect that, in case of a treaty of 
friendship being concluded between the USSR and Iran, the Iranian government would 
not in future conclude military agreements directed against the Soviet Union, either with 
the USA or other with third parties; it also considered the Shah-in-Shah of Iran's 
statement that, in respect of the aforementioned articles, which were included in the 
Treaty of 1921 under particular historical conditions, аnd especially the provisions of 
Article 6, which envisages the possibility of Soviet forces entering Iranian territory in a 
specific context, their cancellation would facilitate the creation of a strong basis for 
mutual trust and development of friendly relations between Iran and the USSR, for 
which the Soviet government has continually striven. 
 
Needless to say, the Soviet side could not but consider the fact that aggressive 
imperialist forces continue with their plans to utilise Iranian territory for the preparation 
of military escapades directed against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving nations. 
Wherefore, in the course of the negotiations, the Soviet government expressed its 
concern that Iran's participation in the Baghdad military pact will be used against the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet side expressed its opinion, that it would be beneficial if both 
sides – both the USSR and Iran – could conclude a treaty of friendship, non-aggression 
and mutual cooperation with the goal of formulating some essential security guarantees 
for both sides, in which connection Iran would secure its withdrawal from the Baghdad 
Pact.  
 
The Soviet side stated with complete openness that the Baghdad Pact, as experience has 
demonstrated, has not brought, and cannot bring, security to Iran. Placing, as it does, on 
the shoulders of Muslim nations – its participants – the burden of heavy military 
expenditure, pushing them toward the exhaustion of their economic resources, the 
Baghdad Pact leads in reality to the transformation of their territories into a theatre of 
military activities in case of the emergence of armed conflict; something in which only 
foreign imperialist powers are interested – the long-standing oppressors of the Near and 
Middle East. Being a tool in the hands of aggressive powers, the Baghdad Pact has 
caused hostile and strained relations between the USSR and Iran, and also between Iran 
and her other peace-loving neighbours. Thus, the result of Iran's presence in the Pact is 
only a negative one. 
 
Taking into account, however, the statements made by the Shah-in-Shah that Iran's 
participation in the Baghdad Pact will not be used against the interests of the security of 
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the Soviet Union, the Soviet government did not insist on Iran's withdrawal from the 
Baghdad Pact. That the Soviet government arrived at this stage followed from its 
sincere desire to underline its trust in what the Shah said, albeit the Soviet Union knows 
only too well that the initiators of the Pact see it as an aggressive military organisation, 
directed first and foremost against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries. A 
view was taken that, as peace is strengthened and tension reduced in the Near and 
Middle East, the Baghdad Pact will wither, like a tree with rotten roots withers; a tree 
from which Iran has neither received nor will receive any fruit. 
 
That the Soviet government regards the aggressive Baghdad Pact in a strongly negative 
manner has been known to the Shah-in-Shah's government from the very day of the 
Pact's emergence. It nevertheless proposes that we now abandon our convictions on the 
subject, which have been confirmed by experience; it further proposes that we sign a 
treaty, in which we undertake to legitimise, in the eyes of the nations of the Near and 
Middle East, the aggressive Baghdad Pact and Iran's participation in it. Does this really 
speak of an intention on the part of the Shah-in-Shah's government to reach an 
agreement with the Soviet Union?  
 
Having considered the report on the Soviet delegation's recent meeting with the Shah of 
Iran, held on the 3
rd
 of February, the Soviet government instructed the delegation to 
inform the Shah that, in view of its aspiration to do everything possible for establishing 
genuinely friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the USSR and Iran, it had 
decided to make another step to meet the wishes of the Iranian government. The Soviet 
government announced that it accepted, in its entirety, the text of the draft Treaty on 
Friendship and Non-Aggression, which was proposed by the Iranian side on the 19
th
 of 
January, and which, in terms of its content, was beneficial primarily to Iran. On the 6
th
 
of February, the Soviet delegation underlined that it had authority to sign this treaty 
without delay. In taking such a step, it goes without saying that the Soviet government 
counted on the Iranian government, and the Shah personally, to take corresponding 
measures that might furnish evidence of the Iranian side's desire to strengthen trust 
between our countries and likewise provide security, in equal measure, for Iran and the 
Soviet Union.  
 
The government of the USSR proceeded on the basis that, with the signing of a treaty of 
friendship and non-aggression as set out by the Iranian side, the Iranian government 
would, as had been stated by the responsible government officials in the course of the 
negotiations, take upon itself the obligation not to conclude bilateral treaties directed 
against the Soviet Union with any third government. The Soviet government likewise 
had in mind that, in accordance with assurances given by the Shah, the government of 
Iran would undertake not to make its territory available for the establishment of foreign 
military bases and the placement therein, under some pretext or other, of foreign forces. 
It is obvious that such a statement on the part of the Iranian government would not only 
bring no harm to Iranian's independence, but also promote the strengthening of its 
sovereignty. 
 
The reply of the Shah-in-Shah's government, transmitted today by you, can only be 
understood as a refusal to conclude such a treaty with the Soviet Union and to affirm 
those commitments, given on more than one occasion by the Iranian side both leading 
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up to and during the negotiations. They now wish to bury the whole affair, and even to 
drown the clear question regarding foreign military bases and the exclusion of foreign 
forces from Iranian territory in the murky water of 'studies' and the logomachy of 
specialist commissions. 
 
The refusal of the Iranian government to adopt its own proposal for the conclusion of a 
treaty of friendship and non-aggression, which was made only a couple of weeks ago, 
and its abandonment of the treaty's draft, which was put forward by its own side, cannot 
but cause astonishment. Did not the Shah of Iran state, in his very first meeting with the 
Soviet delegation on the 30
th
 of January, that the signing of such a treaty would be a 
substantive turning point in the betterment of relations between Iran and the USSR, and 
lead to a reduction of tensions in the Near and Middle East region? Indeed, there can be 
little doubt that conclusion of a suitable treaty and the establishment of friendship and 
mutual trust between our countries would serve the interests of both the Iranian and 
Soviet nations, and all those who are interested in the consolidation of peace. 
 
The Soviet government, as you can see, placed its confidence in the Shah's 
aforementioned statement, and in the steps taken by the government of Iran. It did 
everything possible to meet the wishes of the Iranian side. And then now, it would seem, 
when there are no obstacles to the conclusion of the treaty proposed by the government 
of Iran, the Shah-in-Shah's government retreats from its own proposals. We now see 
that, on the part of the Shah-in-Shah's government, all this was nothing more than an ill-
intended game calculated, above all, to mislead public opinion in Iran. It is now clear 
why the Iranian side drew out the negotiations in Tehran and retreated both from their 
position on the proposals made by the Soviet side and from their own draft of the treaty. 
True, in the course of official and unofficial meetings, and even today, we listened to no 
few verbal assurances of friendship and good intentions fed to us by individuals 
responsible for Iran's foreign policy in relation to the Soviet Union. As a wise Persian 
adage says, however, conversations about halva don't make the halva sweeter. [Ba halva 
halva goftan, dahån shirin nemishavad.] 
 
The motivation behind Iran's behaviour is simple. The Soviet government is in 
possession of information, confirmed by the facts, that from the very first day of the 
Soviet delegations's arrival in Tehran, the Shah committed himself to a foreign 
government with an undertaking not to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union 
and stated instead that he intended to sign an agreement with the United States of 
America. Furthermore, during the course of negotiations, the foreign press, for example, 
in Pakistan, published reports on a public statement by prime minister Eqbal to the same 
effect. Today you yourself confirmed this in your statement, made in the name of the 
Shah-in-Shah's government. Thus, on the one hand, you made statements to the Soviet 
government regarding your desire to improve Soviet-Iranian relations by the conclusion 
of an agreement with us, and on the other hand, the Iranian government both prepared to 
and pre-determined that it would sign a military agreement directed against the Soviet 
Union with the United States of America. 
 
A similar hostility toward the USSR follows from the intention of the Iranian 
government to boost its role within the aggressive Baghdad pact. The hostile orientation 
of the Baghdad Pact, not only in relation to the Soviet Union but even in relation to the 
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peoples of those countries participating in the Pact, has been demonstrated, аnd in 
particular more recently, by events in certain member countries. It's role in increasing 
region tensions has been proven. Nations have taken a more decisive stand against the 
aggressive plans of Western colonialist powers of the Baghdad Pact and against the 
burdens which membership of this pact has placed on them. The forces of peace have 
found means to curb the aggressive and feeble machinations
41
 of the Baghdad Pact's 
sponsors. What we have said here suggests that the Iranian government and the Shah 
have pursued a two-faced policy in respect of the Soviet Union, which cannot but lead 
to grave consequences, above all for Iran. The Iranian government and the Shah of Iran 
clearly do not value friendly relations with the Soviet Union and do not appreciate the 
sincere steps taken by the Soviet Government toward settlement of unresolved issues 
with Iran. 
 
As is well known, in recent years, and through the initiative the Soviet government, 
concrete and positive results have been attained in improving Soviet-Iranian relations: 
an agreement was inked on the resolution of border issues, providing for both 
demarcation and re-demarcation of the whole Iranian-Soviet border, putting an end to 
border disputes that have lasted more than a century; mutual financial claims were 
definitively settled to Iran's advantage and a significant increase in trade achieved 
between the two countries; the Soviet Union freely renounced, for Iran's benefit, its 
rights to and holdings in the joint Soviet-Iranian oil cooperative 'Kevir – Hurian', 
wishing to enable the Iranian people themselves to make use of their countries natural 
resources as they see fit; agreements were signed regarding the joint and equal-rights 
usage of the Arak and Hari-Rud (Tedzhen) river's water and energy resources; in line 
with the Iranian government's wishes, the question of transit fees was resolved, with 
preferential rates for Iranian goods passing through USSR territory; finally, а noteble 
widening of both business contacts and cultural ties was achieved on both sides.  
 
Through their activities in preparing to conclude a military agreement with the USA, 
and also in breaking of the negotiations regarding a treaty of non-aggression and 
friendship with the Soviet Union under American pressure, the Iranian government is 
cancelling out the recent trend toward the development of neighbourly relations 
between Iran and the Soviet Union. It has clearly demonstrated that is does not desire 
the betterment of relations, renouncing such an improvement. The unfriendly conduct of 
the Shah-in-Shah's government bears an indisputable relation to their collusion with 
those circles among certain foreign powers, who envisage making use of Iranian 
territory аs a springboard for aggression against the Soviet Union and other peace-
loving countries of the Near and Middle East. Such a conspiracy however, indicates 
nothing other than an about-face  in the Iranian government's policy, which is leading 
Iran into the ranks of those who oppose the Soviet Union and opening up the possibility 
of Iran being utilised by aggressive foreign forces. 
 
It goes without saying, all of this means that the activities being undertaken by the 
Shah-in-Shah's government will constitute a turning point both for mutual relations with 
                                                 
41 It is difficult to convey the full meaning of the admirable Russian noun 'поползновение' in English. 
The term derives from the verb 'to crawl' (поползти), and gives a sense of an action that is underhand, 
clandestine and deliberate in nature, but at the same time feeble, somewhat directionless and 
ultimately doomed to failure. 
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the USSR and for Iran, since, as everyone knows, the Soviet Union cannot overlook 
such activities on the part of the Iranian government, which have been dictated neither 
by the interests of improving our relations nor those of the maintenance of peace. We do 
not doubt that the hostile course recently adopted by the Shah's government in respect 
of the Soviet Union accords neither with national interests of the Iranian government 
nor with the aspirations and sentiments of the peace-loving Iranian people, who harbour 
deep sympathies for the peoples of the Soviet Union. Of course, the Iranian nation, just 
as other nations of the world are interested neither in increasing the burden of military 
expenditures, nor in cooperation with the aggressive powers of colonialism and 
imperialism that strive to push them into the abyss of war, nor in the deterioration of 
Iran's relations with her neighbours. On the contrary, the Iranian nation is interested in 
economic development and improving its quality of life; in strengthening Iran's 
independencе; in sincere, neighbourly and amicable relations with certain freedom-
loving states. 
 
Insofar as the Shah's government has refused to conclude the treaty they themselves 
proposed regarding friendship and non-aggression with the Soviet Union, and insofar as 
it has already decided to sign a military agreement with the USA, continuing the present 
negotiations is meaningless. It is known to us that the Iranian government's decision 
was prompted by the Americans, who have endeavoured to break off the signing of the 
treaty with the USSR and ensure the signing of the bilateral agreement with the USA. It 
is also known to us that the Shah-in-Shah's government is in a great predicament, since 
it is unable to explain to its people the reasons for its two-faced policy toward the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet government will be obliged to make plain the true state of affairs 
with the negotiations. 
 
Of course, the hostile steps taken by the Iranian government in respect of the Soviet 
Union cannot be regarded as anything other than evidence that the Shah's government is 
now openly siding with the aggressive American policies being enacted in the Near and 
Middle East; openly treading the path of cooperation with aggressive foreign powers, 
who are interested only in exacerbating the situation between our own two countries, 
and indeed in the whole Near and Middle East. It is natural that, in connection with the 
aforementioned unfriendly steps taken by the Shah-in-Shah's government in relation to 
the Soviet government, which is interested in ensuring the security of its borders and 
peace in the Near and Middle East, no agreeable conclusion can follow from this.' 
 
On the 11
th
 of February [1959] the Soviet delegation departed from Tehran. 
 
